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1Translating the Self
Between Discord and Individualism
in American Literary History
Selfhood and freedom—in American literature and culture, these two terms
have long been linked. The link has seemed so natural that even American
sociologist Charles Horton Cooley, whose career was devoted to theorizing
the interconnections between the self and society, was moved to declare in
1902, "No matter what a man does, he is not fully sane or human unless
there is a spirit of freedom in him."1 Despite Cooley's theoretical bent and
his disciplinary allegiances to the field of sociology, he thus would define the
core of human selfhood as that which not only evades predication by social
forces but which finds its truest expression in the pursuit of freedom from
social strictures. Cooley, not surprisingly, found inspiration for his defi-
nition in Thoreau. And why not Thoreau? Although the bond between
selfhood and freedom appears strong throughout nineteenth-century lit-
erature, a body of writing customarily identified with the emergence of dis-
tinctively energetic American selves, it is during the American Renaissance
that we encounter Thoreau's solitary, heroic experimenter at Walden, Emer-
son's Orphic poet, Whitman's omnivorous "I," and Hawthorne's steadfast
and passionate Hester Prynne—all characters understood to be committed
to strenuous affirmations of the self and the individual consciousness when
confronted by the restraints of tradition. With their acts of defiance against
social mores, these literary creations have furnished much inspiration to
American intellectuals like Cooley.
But the association between selfhood and freedom seems less natu-
ral, more strained and tenuous, when questions are posed about their
relationship: What kind of freedom is it that can translate us to an ideal
state of selfhood? And is the self properly to be understood as the refuge
of freedom? Frustration over the self's inability to deliver on an implied
promise of liberation would seem to have fueled the poststructuralist drive
against the humanist preoccupation with subjectivity. What is especially
interesting about the conflict between poststructuralists and humanists is
the way each has made its claims about the self in the name of freedom.
The humanist view foretold liberation through allegiance to an inviolable
subject, and, in an ironically corresponding manner, poststructuralists like
Foucault have countered with their own claims of a new liberation, though
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its fulfillment would come only when the tyranny of the philosophical sub-
ject is effectively subverted.
The structure of this theoretical debate over selfhood and subjec-
tivity has been disturbingly reminiscent of Melville's Typee, which drama-
tizes the problems created by an obsession with freedom. Typee's narrator,
who calls himself Tommo, jumps ship to escape a tyrannical captain. But,
as we know, despite his new, paradisiacal home in the Marquesan Islands,
he finds himself continually beset by the urge to escape his extraordinarily
gracious Typee hosts, whom he suspects of cannibalistic designs. A century
and a half after Typee, the rhetoric of freedom has shaped the debate over
the philosophical subject, and scholars of literary and cultural studies have
been reenacting Tommo's desire for escape. Humanist literary theories
have offered ennobling visions of the individual consciousness, visions that
have appealed to scholars appalled by the realities of twentieth-century life.
But the long-standing dominance of these theories has, perhaps inevitably,
seemingly naturalized their association with the academic institutions in
which literary scholars have made their careers. Thus, as in Typee, in which
the captain's history of abusive behaviors vitiated his warning to Tommo
and the ship's crew that cannibals would consume deserting sailors, a his-
tory within academic institutions of insensitivity to questions of social
justice has eroded the moral authority of humanism and its advocates. But
when scholars seeking an alternative to a tainted humanism have turned to
poststructuralist theory, they, like Tommo, have witnessed how the self
stands in danger of being consumed; only this time the threat comes not
from suspected cannibals but from linguistic and textual universals. As in
Typee, theoretical questions about the significance of both selfhood and
freedom have been problematically transformed into unworkable di-
chotomies, choices cast in overly simple contrasts between tyranny and
liberation.2
This study returns to the topic of American literary selfhood, particu-
larly its nineteenth-century manifestations, and its goal is to challenge
understandings of selfhood that are rooted in the logic of dichotomies.
I believe that alternative, more complex contemporary descriptions of
nineteenth-century selfhood have long been ignored. These descriptions,
unlike oppositional and subjectivist visions of selfhood, accommodated the
more socially attentive aspects of nineteenth-century selfhood. An aware-
ness of the social orientation of the self, as it was understood by con-
temporary writers, can effectively reveal a range of nineteenth-century
preoccupations. These preoccupations emerge in my examinations of two
particular periods—the 1830s through the early 1850s, and the 1890s—
and three important figures from those times whose writings display their
longstanding interest in and telling anxieties about selfhood: Nathaniel
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Hawthorne, William Dean Howells, and William James. In addition,
briefer discussions of works by Ralph Waldo Emerson, James Fenimore
Cooper, and Harriet Beecher Stowe, among others, will be used to high-
light particular issues and raise questions about subjectivity.
The writings of Hawthorne, Howells, and William James reflect a
curiosity about questions of subjectivity and the individual consciousness.
Yet their fundamental concern was not simply to validate the priority of
the individual consciousness. Instead, they, like so many other nineteenth-
century writers, were also preoccupied with perceived threats to social
cohesion. The dilemma that these writers faced may be formulated in the
following question: How can the affirmation of individual consciousness
and conscience authorize a commitment to social cohesion, a commitment
that simultaneously would assure the possibility of individual experience?
Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, this commitment to social cohesion
was central to that contemporary discourse devoted to questions about the
self: psychology. Nineteenth-century psychological discourse dealt with
more than just structures of consciousness; it was equally attentive to the
interplay between the individual and society. This conceptualization of
selfhood from a social perspective characterizes both the Common Sense
psychology that predominated during the antebellum years as well as the
evolutionist psychology that followed. The fact that such fiction writers
as Hawthorne and Howells, each of whom exhibited great awareness of
contemporary psychological discourse, shared a social conception of indi-
vidual psychology is thus no accident. As this study will argue, Hawthorne
and Howells used their knowledge to create narratives that would make
salient problems in contemporary psychology. William James enters this
discussion because in The Principles of Psychology he offers more than the
innovative ideas and literary charm for which the book is famous. More
significantly, he turns to narrative form as a means to resolve the disci-
plinary problems in psychology that he, along with nonspecialists like
Hawthorne and Howells, had posed.
James's turn to narrative in The Principles of Psychology also influ-
ences the methodology of my study. In the chapter that would have a
profound effect on students of literary form, "The Stream of Thought,"
James describes how the sense of self makes itself known: "The mind is at
every stage a theatre of simultaneous possibilities. Consciousness consists
in the comparison of these with each other, the selection of some, and the
suppression of the rest."3 James's metaphor of mind as theater is particu-
larly telling—it suggests a series of scenes, a flow of action that presents
itself as continuous, a seemingly unbroken "stream of thought, of con-
sciousness, or of subjective life."4 The self, James's basic unit for study,
thereby constitutes itself in narrative form, that is as an ongoing story of
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itself to itself. The manner by which James perceives narrative to inform
selfhood suggests the value of attention to narrative forms in polemics as
well as in fictions of selfhood. My approach to particular texts thus is less
oriented toward questions of the representation of consciousness or its
symbolizations than it is toward the way selfhood arises in narrative and
the functions that selfhood assumes, even within texts that do not fore-
ground narrative structures. Obviously, I have The Principles of Psy-
chology in mind here as a text that is most revealing when its disciplinary
polemics are understood to be working in the service of a guiding dramatic
structure. My attention to dramatic structures within nonfictional works
leads to the reinterpretation of certain explicit authorial assertions or
images.
As an example of this, I would offer Emerson's image of the "trans-
parent eyeball," that most famous—or most notoriously open to ridi-
cule—symbol of the self from Nature. As Emerson describes it, in this
state, "I am nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate
through me; I am part or particle of God."5 As striking as this statement
may be and as forcefully as Emerson poses the visual imagery that informs
the piece, its importance within the scheme of Nature is limited. Successive
chapters develop a repudiation—or, perhaps more properly, a trans-
cendence and recontextualization—of earlier ideas about the lessons of
Nature. By the chapter on "Discipline," Emerson has discarded the relative
passivity of the transparent eyeball in favor of the "exercise of the Will"
and "the lesson of power" (28). And the Orphic poet's conclusion tran-
scends the early lesson of the transparent eyeball and calls instead for the
"kingdom of man over nature, which cometh not with observation" (49).
The passive observation of the transparent eyeball is here superseded by
the dominion of the will. Emerson's recontextualization of the transparent
eyeball can be appreciated only when the narrative structure of Nature—a
structure of continuous revision within this most emphatic, even pressured,
discussion of an ideal selfhood—is foregrounded.
Why, however, return yet again to questions about the self within
canonical nineteenth-century American writing? Now that critics of
American literature and culture have been furnishing newer disciplinary
questions, discussing alternative literary genres, and restoring neglected
literary figures for scholarly consideration, such a return might seem to
signal a renewed willingness to undergo enchantment by images of self-
hood. Yet the idea that the self within canonical writing must necessarily
be understood in terms established by an academic tradition of American
literary history that antedates Matthiessen's American Renaissance—that
is to say, a tradition in which the self is apprehended as the primary indica-
tor of a transcendental impulse that effectively diverts attention away from
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questions about social arrangements—overly simplifies and as a result ob-
scures the complex ways in which canonical writers have treated selfhood.
The relationship between canonical and noncanonical visions of selfhood
and subjectivity is one that, I would suggest, we may not yet be adequately
prepared to judge. For example, feminist scholars have articulated Harriet
Beecher Stowe's radical vision in Uncle Tom's Cabin, a vision which pre-
sents an ideal social realm that is not based on the self's opposition to
society. But questions remain as to precisely which aspects of her vision, a
conception of family and community guided by female insight and moral
suasion, should be considered radical. After all, Stowe was not the only
writer to suggest that the self achieves its ideal state within a family struc-
ture.6 The notoriously conventional Hawthorne also attempted to resolve
narrative crises through recourse to images of family and, most famously
in The Scarlet Letter, by asserting the moral centrality of an antipatriarchal
woman. Both Hawthorne and Stowe were deeply committed to what
politicians now call family values; and they were both concerned with
issues of morality and politics.
In order to disentangle the roots and comparative significance of
their differing commitments, we must develop a greater historical sensi-
bility as we speak to the question of how canonical writers represented
selfhood. Accordingly, in place of narratives of either transcendent self-
hood or determinant language structures, this study stresses a return to
particular intellectual and cultural situations. Works by Hawthorne, How-
ells, and James will be discussed with respect to specific contemporary
psychological discourses. In addition, I think it is important to acknowl-
edge the fact that selfhood, even if no longer understood to be a vehicle of
transcendence and freedom, has endured as a forceful symbol in American
culture. The endurance of this symbol may be best understood, I suspect,
as a reaction against a recurrent sense of social crisis and as an expression
of anxiety over the possibility of social disintegration.
What is man when no longer connected with society, or when he finds himself sur-
rounded by a convulsed and a half-dissolved one? He cannot live in solitude; he
must belong to some community bound by some ties, however imperfect.
—J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur7
The fear that American society may be decomposing is repeatedly voiced
by journalists and politicians who decry the disappearance of a purport-
edly unified, peaceable, and homelike past. But fears of social dis-
integration are hardly new. When we listen, for example, to Crevecoeur's
complaints from two centuries ago, we may detect a surprising resem-
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blance to modern (or postmodern) despair over the destruction of social
cohesion. Crevecoeur's narrator, in the final chapter of Letters from an
American Farmer, claims to have had his sensibilities utterly shaken by
recent events. Prior to what he calls "these calamitous times," he had "la-
bored and prospered, without having ever studied on what the security of
my life and the foundation of my prosperity were established: I perceived
them just as they left me."8 And what was the lamentable event that frac-
tured the narrator's security, his sense of a coherent community, leaving
him so devastated? It was precisely the founding episode of the United
States, the American Revolution. The very creation of a national identity
thus is linked by Crevecoeur with the dissolution of community.
Crevecoeur's crisis of social dissolution has profound psychological
ramifications, as he indicates when asking his almost despairing question,
"What is man when no longer connected with society?" He has discovered
that his formerly stable sense of selfhood was tightly bound to social order,
and, now that this order appears to be unraveling, Crevecoeur panics. Such
concern during the late eighteenth-century over the possibility of social
disintegration is not unique to Crevecoeur. What makes his complaint dis-
tinctive is the way he associates potential social dissolution with what we
now would more likely describe as a crisis of personal identity. He
responds to this crisis by seeking the consolation of a community, "how-
ever imperfect," because he cannot "live in solitude." The community he
finds, as he soon tells us, is that of Native Americans, and he retreats to the
very wilderness he had earlier in his Letters disparaged as a place of "law-
less profligacy."9 In short, his struggle to create and maintain a stable self
in the midst of accelerating social disintegration takes precedence over all
else, and he is willing to dissociate himself from that idealized American
society whose emergence he earlier had celebrated.
Crevecoeur's images of selfhood and society in crisis are the polar
opposite of those offered in what customarily stands as the representative
text of the early republic, Franklin's Autobiography. Franklin, too, exhibits
anxieties about social cohesion when in The Autobiography he repeatedly
regrets the way theology leads to disputation; along similar lines, James
Madison speculates in The Federalist Papers that perhaps the most impor-
tant thing a government can do is "to break and control the violence of
faction."10 But Madison articulates a faith that government is up to the
task, and Franklin's account of self-improvement ultimately provides a re-
assuring link between the personal and the national. Franklin's personal
transformation from a hungry neophyte, who awkwardly carries his three
huge loaves of bread up Market Street, into the stately, most prominent
citizen of Philadelphia reinforces—and is reinforced by—his descriptions
of national formation. But while Franklin's intertwined stories of personal
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and national progress historically have exercised a hold over the national
imagination, it is Crevecoeur's anxiety that may indeed reflect a more en-
during, typically American literary preoccupation.
What I am suggesting here is that American literary concepts of self-
hood have deeply social roots. By this I mean that selfhood is typically
presented as arising within particular social networks and in response to
conventions, and that, like Crevecoeur's narrator, literary selves routinely
find themselves in crisis states when social cohesion is threatened. In this
important respect, nineteenth-century literary selfhood has much in
common with its eighteenth-century precursors.
The idea that the nineteenth century witnessed the development of
the "Imperial Self," to use Quentin Anderson's well-known term, has long
been a critical commonplace. And in recent years, this commonplace has
served as a foil against which revisionist critics have juxtaposed the litera-
tures of women and ethnic minorities. Thus, for example, in her intro-
duction to a recent paperback edition of The House of Mirth, Martha
Banta begins by mentioning "the two most famous narrative traditions that
secure other American classics": Franklin's rise and Emerson's faith in his
ability "to attain self-sufficiency."11 Banta's introduction addresses a popu-
lar, presumably collegiate, audience rather than scholars. What makes it
noteworthy is the fact that one as immersed in American cultural history as
is Banta is comfortable casually presenting the Emersonian, transcendent
self to her audience. She does not need to speak of Emerson in any detail;
he simply serves as a stable launching point for a discussion of Wharton's
more complex and highly socialized narrative of self-possession.
But perhaps Emerson is not quite so consistently Emersonian. A clas-
sic work of Emersonian idealism, "The Transcendentalist," features Emer-
son in a mood more equivocal than that of Nature, a mood that may be
understood to express a typically nineteenth-century anxiety about self-
hood. "The Transcendentalist" opens by gesturing toward a dichotomy
between "Materialists and Idealists; the first class founding on experience,
the second on consciousness" (193). Emerson, of course, will find idealism
logically prior and morally preferable to materialism, but such findings
may finally be less significant than the manner by which he presents mental
processes as an ongoing struggle. Accordingly, he finds that "two states of
thought diverge every moment, and stand in wild contrast" (205). And
this struggle is itself constitutive of the mind and of the self: "The worst
feature of this double consciousness is, that the two lives, of the under-
standing and of the soul, which we lead, really show very little relation to
each other, never meet and measure each other: one prevails now, all buzz
and din; and the other prevails then, all infinitude and paradise; and, with
the progress of life, the two discover no greater disposition to reconcile
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themselves" (205-6). Since Emerson offers here no possibility for rec-
onciliation between "the two lives," it is the transcendentalist's hope to
make the condition in which the ideal prevails permanent. But, as he pes-
simistically observes, "moments of illumination" are, at best, passing, and
the mind remains fractured (205).
It is this divided state, rather than faith in mental unity and self-
sufficiency, that truly characterizes nineteenth-century American depic-
tions of the self. Can it be an accident that two turn-of-the-century writers
with backgrounds as dissimilar as those of W.E.B. Du Bois and Henry
Adams would both home in on the same Emersonian image of internal di-
vision? Du Bois opens The Souls of Black Folk with his famous description
of "double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through
the eyes of others."12 This state of double consciousness reflects an Emer-
sonian attitude toward internal division, and it also conveys the sense that
the racial essence on which Du Bois would comment, the "black folk," is
itself multiple, comprised of "souls."13 Du Bois was writing in response to
the crises faced by African Americans in the decades after Reconstruction,
crises that presumably were distant from the more generalized anxiety of
Henry Adams, who remarks, "The child born in 1900 would, then, be
born into a new world which would not be a unity but a multiple."14 To
Adams the great shift in Western civilization, a "movement from unity to
multiplicity," manifests itself not only on the largest social scale but within
the individual as well.15 Hence, the historian Adams would feel it appro-
priate to look within. It follows that The Education of Henry Adams
begins with an image surprisingly similar to that of Du Bois: "The boy in-
herited his double nature," and, as a result, "for him, life was double."16
This "double nature" of the self and the corresponding "multiplicity" of
society stand against Adams's more famous symbol of cultural unity in
The Education, that of the medieval Virgin. Juxtaposed against the histori-
cal backdrop of unity, the same image of unity that he pursues through
Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres, double nature is to Adams the represen-
tative state of nineteenth-century American selfhood just as to Du Bois it is
the state of African American consciousness.
These accounts of selfhood internally divided and in crisis are not
being offered here as simple displacements of the more well-known images
of transcendent nineteenth-century selfhood. Rather, I am arguing for a
recognition that when read with a sensitivity to the ways it situates itself
socially even the transcendentalist rhetoric of an arch-individualist such as
Emerson can be understood as continuous with his more clearly socially
oriented writings. Emersonian transcendence may well constitute a
compensatory rhetorical strategy, one that corresponds to Du Bois's and
Adams's more straightforward acknowledgments of internal division. All
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three look inward, and where they had anticipated some sort of integral
unity of selfhood they find double nature instead.
The internal tension that Emerson describes in "The Transcendental-
ist" is further complicated in such later works as Representative Men and
Society and Solitude by more explicit discussions of social allegiances and
obligations. A succinct example of the way the later Emerson uses the indi-
vidual consciousness as the site for a debate between competing allegiances
may be found in "Solitude and Society." The rhetorically balanced title of
the essay contains a tension amplified by a statement which presents Emer-
son's response to his dilemma: "Solitude is impracticable, and society fatal.
We must keep our head in the one, and our hands in the other. The con-
ditions are met, if we keep our independence, yet do not lose our sympa-
thy."17 Emerson here uncritically relies on three crucial, commonplace
assumptions of antebellum psychology: the idea that the self possesses cer-
tain essential qualities (or faculties) that furnish the basis for conceiving
"our independence"; the certainty that society possesses coherent, author-
itative, adjudicative functions in response to claims made on behalf of
individual knowledge; and a belief in the importance of social cohesion.
Emerson's contemporaries agreed on these three points; his argument with
them had to do with precisely where and how one is to demarcate the
boundaries between self and society. Accordingly, the Emerson who re-
minds us that we must "keep our independence" also warns that we must
"not lose our sympathy." Sympathy is the key word here because to an
antebellum audience it connoted an affective (and even physical) force of
social cohesion.
The importance of sympathy correlates with the interpersonal focus
of antebellum psychology, a focus that has been largely lost in discussions
of American literary history. When discussed by twentieth-century literary
scholars, this psychology, rooted in Scottish Common Sense philosophy,
generally has been taken to represent the conservative force of social
repression, an obstacle to the artistic imagination. For Common Sense
thinkers the essence of the individual was a relatively conventional Chris-
tian idea of the soul; nevertheless, in practice, their psychology was
concerned not only with the state of the individual soul but with that of so-
ciety, as illustrated by their interest in terms such as sympathy. Social
cohesion and sympathy were important to Common Sense thinkers who
also suggested that psychological truths were subject to communal affir-
mation (i.e., any thought process observed by the individual should be
present in other people). The contradictory nature of this disciplinary
structure is suggested by the yoking of two ostensibly contrasting terms in
the phrase common sense. Sense implies individual perception and con-
sciousness, while common refers to the idea that the perceptions and
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components of the individual consciousness are shared. That these things
are presumed to be shared indicates the normative function of this psychol-
ogy. But while others must be relied upon to affirm the validity of one's
perceptions, the individual is directed to introspect in order to discover
psychological truths. The tension between the introspective methodology
and the need for social validation of individual experience would create un-
certainty over their relative importance within the system of Common
Sense psychology. It was that space between common and sense which
Hawthorne would explore in his narratives of interiority and sociality.18
By the late 1800s, evolutionist thought and the advent of physiologi-
cal psychology had substantially transformed the field of inquiry into the
discipline that more closely resembles modern psychology. The individual
will, a basic Common Sense category, seemed almost vestigial in the face of
evolutionary determinism. Popularizers of evolution theory proposed that
sciences which concentrated on thought processes or social structures
were secondary to those scientific studies of the physical environment that
purportedly determined individual and social development. From the envi-
ronmentalist perspective, thought appeared epiphenomenal and intro-
spective discourse embarrassingly primitive. Moreover, the new emphasis
on physiology rendered introspection an outmoded philosophical, hence
unscientific, methodology. This rapid disciplinary transition from the ear-
lier philosophical orientation had profound effects on both the theory of
psychology and the interpretation of earlier disciplinary history. The idea
that Common Sense psychology was unredeemably moralistic results from
polemics by physiological psychologists against the old school of academic
holdouts. Despite the accusation of moralism, Common Sense thought
provided a framework for American writers, not usually considered moral-
istic pedants, who wished to explore selfhood. A fairly explicit example of
the Common Sense tension between allegiances to introspective knowl-
edge and social validation of this knowledge may be found in Emerson's
Representative Men.
The inherent tension within Representative Men immediately
emerges in the competition over the word representative. Does representa-
tion denote a metonymic reduction of some higher transcendent principle
into the material realm? Or does representation operate as the synecdochic
distillation of the ordinary, a raising up of banality into a principle? The
essay on Swedenborg serves to model the former, the understanding of rep-
resentative as metonymic reduction. In this essay, Emerson repeatedly lauds
Swedenborg's platonic vision. Before long, however, he complains of how
Swedenborg's abstractions oppress: "Swedenborg's system of the world
wants central spontaneity; it is dynamic, not vital, and lacks power to gen-
erate life. There is no individual in it" (682). Emerson finds solipsism in
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Swedenborg's attempt to inhabit exclusively the transcendental realm, but
also, paradoxically, the weight of transcendental universals extinguishes
the personal. The corrective to this transcendental oppression is a return to
worldly and material circumstances. When Emerson descends from the
spiritual Swedenborgian plane to the mundane realm, he switches to a com-
peting rhetorical figure to define representative, that of synecdoche. The
representative man now acts in a political capacity: "the constituency de-
termines the vote of the representative" (619). This political, synecdochic
logic predominates in "Napoleon; or, the Man of the World." Napoleon's
significant characteristics, his strengths and weaknesses, all derive from
his status as representative of the mass of people: "He had the virtues of
the masses of his constituents: he had also their vices" (742). In the
too-worldly Napoleon, Emerson finds the most radical embodiment of
synecdochic representation. But without the presence of transcendent prin-
ciples, materialized in the figure of Swedenborg, synecdochic repre-
sentation fails to transform society properly. Neither form of representation
by itself effectively changes the world, and Emerson vacillates between the
two rhetorical figures of synecdoche and metonymy, and the respective
social significance of each, in Representative Men.
Emerson reveals this ambivalence early in his introduction, "Uses of
Great Men." The divided relationship between the great man and society
leads him to declare: "Men are also representative; first, of things, and,
secondly, of ideas" (618). This counterpoint between material and ideal
corresponds to that between Napoleon and Swedenborg, political repre-
sentation and idealist leadership, synecdoche and metonymy. The oscilla-
tion between opposite poles creates a situation in which Emerson will
value the great man for his social effects. For example, early in the "Uses
of Great Men," Emerson declares: "We have social strengths. Our affec-
tion towards others creates a sort of vantage or purchase which nothing
will supply. I can do that by another which I cannot do alone" (616). The
great man assumes a social role, and he draws out the individuality of
those who surround him. Despite such an inquiry into sociality, Emerson
may never be regarded as primarily a socially oriented thinker. But in
Representative Men, he substantially criticizes the goal of individualistic
transcendence, and he presents a vision of individualism that is consistent
with sociality.19 What may be most significant about the interplay between
claims on behalf of the individual consciousness as opposed to the social
validation of truth claims is that the entire debate takes place within the
framework of an overarching desire for social cohesion and a correspond-
ing fear of social disintegration.
The fear that society was disintegrating informed nineteenth-century
thought about the relationship of the individual to the community.20 The
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radical changes of post-Civil War society included such well-known de-
velopments as Reconstruction and its aftermath, the growth of cities, the
increase of immigration, shifting patterns of immigration from northern
Europe to eastern and southern Europe, and the rise of labor unionism.
Literary realists and naturalists more clearly responded to these changes
than did their precursors—no antebellum novel could claim, for example,
to dramatize the development of Lowell, Massachusetts, as a factory town
in a manner parallel to that of Frank Norris's chronicle of California rail-
roads and agribusiness in The Octopus—yet the relative omission of such
direct commentaries on the mechanics of social change should not obscure
its importance. Antebellum fears were inspired by such forces as the ex-
pansion of the market economy, the social disruptions that accompanied
industrialization, and the regional and ideological conflicts that led to the
Civil War. The fear of potential social chaos found expression, for ex-
ample, in Lincoln's 1838 Lyceum address, in which he decried "the wild
and furious" individual "passions" that collectively grew into "the worse
than savage mobs."21 The idea that social order was under siege recurred
throughout the nineteenth century, and it corresponds, I believe, with the
figuration of selfhood by Emerson, Du Bois, and Adams as fractured and
multiple. This fear of chaos generated nineteenth-century attempts to re-
define both the bases for community and understandings of the self.
For a fictional definition of selfhood in social terms, we may look to
what stands as the novelistic analogue of Emersonian individualism in
antebellum literature, James Fenimore Cooper's Leatherstocking tales. The
somewhat obsessive treatment of the Leatherstocking character during the
1950s and 1960s is well exemplified by R.W.B. Lewis's declaration, "If
there was a fictional Adamic hero unambiguously treated—celebrated in
his very Adamism—it was the hero of Cooper's The Deerslayer: a self-
reliant young man who does seem to have sprung from nowhere."22
Recent criticism has turned away from the purportedly representative per-
sonality of Leatherstocking and toward important questions of history, in
particular those involving race and gender.23 The value of these correctives
notwithstanding, I would suggest that the dynamics of Cooper's most
famous character in his most well-known novel, The Last of the Mohicans,
bear review; but rather than approach selfhood directly, a turn toward his-
tory is first appropriate.
The Last of the Mohicans presents itself in its subtitle as A Narrative
of 1757, that is, as a historical fiction. Cooper reinforces this claim in the
1826 preface when he instructs his reader that "an imaginary and roman-
tic picture of things which never had an existence" does not lie ahead.24
But Cooper's novel, if read not as a history but historically, as a com-
mentary on his contemporaries, reveals a profound anxiety about the pos-
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sibility of social dissolution. This in itself is not news; Cooper's conserva-
tive, antidemocratic politics are well-known.25 Although he may have
looked abroad to Luddite agitation between 1817 and 1819, the particular
goad to his conservatism was no doubt the political and social turmoil of
the 1820s, a period in which political and labor violence grew increasingly
common. As social historian Paul Boyer notes, the changes in the popula-
tion of the cities, the increasing number of laborers, immigrants, and the
poor, led to changes in the electoral process. Boyer describes it as a "period
when an older political order based on deference to elite figures gave way
to a system based on the manipulation of a mass electorate."26 Accord-
ingly, it was a time when political bosses, regarded by their opponents as
unprincipled, grew in strength: in Philadelphia, Joel Barlow Sutherland
rose in power; in New York, Tammany Hall would increasingly dominate
the local scene; and in Boston, the change in status from town to city in
1822 brought about a mayoral election that led to the installation of, in
Emerson's words, "a parcel of demagogues."27
In The Last of the Mohicans, we can see how Cooper's fear of
demagogues and distrust of democracy shape the narrative. The great vil-
lain of the novel is Magua, the deceitful Huron who successively betrays
friendly whites, captures Cora and Alice Munro, commands the Fort Wil-
liam Henry massacre, captures Cora and Alice yet again, and kills Uncas.
Cooper is less interested in the origins of Magua's animosity toward the
whites and their Native American friends than he is in the source of
Magua's power: the ability to sway Native American listeners through per-
suasive speech. Magua's masterful oratory is repeatedly presented through-
out the novel—first during the Munro sisters' initial captivity, then several
times during the arguments in the Native American settlements. Cooper
asks us to marvel at Magua's skill:
He commenced by flattering the self-love of his auditors; a never-
failing method of commanding attention. When he had enumerated
the many different occasions on which the Hurons had exhibited their
courage and prowess, in the punishment of insults, he digressed in a
high encomium on the virtue of wisdom. He painted the quality, as
forming the great point of difference between the beaver and other
brutes; between brutes and men; and, finally, between the Hurons, in
particular, and the rest of the human race. . . . He spoke openly of
the fruits of their wisdom, which he boldly pronounced would be
a complete and final triumph over their enemies. . . . In short, he
so blended the warlike with the artful, the obvious with the obscure,
as to flatter the propensities of both parties, and to leave to each sub-
ject of hope, while neither could say, it clearly comprehended his
intentions.
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The orator, or the politician, who can produce such a state of
things, is commonly popular with his contemporaries, however he
may be treated by posterity. All perceived that more was meant than
was uttered, and each one believed that the hidden meaning was pre-
cisely such as his own faculties enabled him to understand, or his own
wishes led him to anticipate. [797-98]
Magua's appeal to his audience is presented in a way that encourages an
ironic perspective on speakers who praise their audiences for their abilities
to reason. The demagogic Magua uses flattery to motivate his audience, as
he had in an earlier episode, but here Cooper adds to Magua's arsenal skill
at conveying vague promises. With this weapon, Magua thus becomes the
equivalent of the politician "in a more advanced state of society," in which
Magua would have "the reputation of a skilful diplomatist" (807). Lest the
reader possibly interpret the political analogy as flattering, Cooper presents
an unambiguously damning image: "It would not have been difficult to
have fancied the dusky savage the Prince of Darkness" (799).28
The great irony of the action here is that "the Prince of Darkness"
and those who follow his lead behave in what can only be described as a
democratic manner, one that may logically be associated with the inclusion
in the electorate of lower-class white males during the 1820s. By contrast,
Hawkeye, Chingachgook, and their compatriots work within either the re-
strictions of military life (as in the case of Major Heyward and Colonel
Munro) or those of aristocratic Mohican descent (as evidenced when the
prisoner Uncas stuns his captors by revealing the tattoo of a blue tortoise,
the primal clan). Cooper sets into play against each other two styles of gov-
ernment, the one extremely orderly and associated with inherited virtue,
the other an almost anarchic democracy devoid of virtue. The conflict be-
tween order and disorder is not fully resolved by the end of the novel;
rather, it is only momentarily paused, though the end of the conflict is by
implication the destruction of the dominant Native American culture
in The Last of the Mohicans, that culture associated with Magua. This
projected end serves to contain and counteract anxiety over the possible
breakdown of social order in Jacksonian America, an anxiety that is trans-
posed backwards onto the image of bloodthirsty Native Americans. What
links together 1820s America and the events of 1757 are the destructive
capacities of demagogues. Their destructiveness can be held in check by
one thing only: the regulation of desire. The ability of characters to regu-
late desire in The Last of the Mohicans is crucial to the action, and it
conveys the idea that selfhood may not be so much the site of freedom as
the occasion for internalized social control.
TRANSLATING THE SELF 15
The story may largely be understood as the integration of Cooper's
national concerns about the nature of democracy with the principles of in-
dividual action. When people are unable to regulate their feelings, they are
susceptible to the machinations of demagogues—in other words, you can't
cheat an honest man. One whose desires are regulated according to the
dictates of virtue cannot be seduced by desire, whatever form it takes. Self-
control is the distinguishing mark of Cooper's hero, and an early episode
in the novel offers an illustration of Hawkeye's attribute. In the action that
leads up to and includes the first fight with Magua's band, we can see how
Cooper associates self-control with maturity. For example, restraint is em-
blematized by the proper use of gunpowder, as when Hawkeye repeatedly
chastises Uncas: "You are wasteful of your powder, and the kick of the
rifle disconcerts your aim!" (547); and, again, "Uncas, boy, you waste the
kernels by overcharging; and a kicking rifle never carries a true bullet"
(552-53). Control over the flow of powder serves as a metaphor for con-
trol over the flow of feelings: effective action follows only if one governs
one's emotions. Hawkeye must also restrain the youthful and excessively
compassionate Heyward: "The first generous impulse of Duncan, was to
rush to the rescue of the hapless wretch, but he felt himself bound to the
spot, by the iron grasp of the immoveable scout" (548). And shortly after-
wards, Cooper presents a different though equally effective intervention:
"Heyward felt a burning desire to rush forward to meet them, so intense
was the delirious anxiety of the moment, but he was restrained by the de-
liberate examples of the scout and Uncas" (549). Uncas here shows his
comparatively greater combat experience, though both he and Heyward
require the counsel of an elder to develop self-mastery.
There are other moments when self-restraint (or its absence) is dra-
matized, such as the scene in which Magua's unruly band partakes of a
"revolting meal," consuming a freshly killed fawn "without any aid from
the science of cookery" (584), but none are so vital to the plot as the attack
that culminates in the deaths of Cora Munro, Uncas, and Magua.29 While
chasing after Magua and the captive Cora, the impetuous Uncas unneces-
sarily exposes himself to danger: "In his eagerness to expedite the pursuit,
Uncas had left himself nearly alone. . . . and reckless of the disparity in
their numbers, he rushed upon his enemy" (859). Hawkeye warns him
"in vain" to look after himself, but Uncas advances, joined by Heyward:
"Uncas abandoned his rifle, and leaped forward with headlong precipita-
tion. Heyward rashly imitated his example, though both were, a moment
afterwards, admonished of its madness, by hearing the bellowing of a
piece, that the Hurons found time to discharge" (861). By approaching the
fleeing Magua, Uncas brings about the confrontation between captors and
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captive which leads to Cora's death. And the weaponless Uncas, maddened
by her death, leaps "frantically," but he arrives on the scene too late to do
any good and unable to effectively defend himself. By contrast, retribution
against Magua results from Hawkeye's self-mastery: "the agitated weapon
of the scout was drawn to his shoulder. The surrounding rocks, them-
selves, were not steadier than the piece became for the single instant that it
poured out its contents" (864). Despite witnessing the death of his close
companion Uncas, Hawkeye maintains a heroic composure, thus modeling
Cooper's ideal of selfhood.
Hawkeye would seem to be Cooper's model citizen except for his
famed social aversiveness. In what perhaps remains the most well-known
work of criticism on the novel, Leslie Fiedler labels Hawkeye "the hunter
and enemy of cities," and it is hard not to believe that this trait, this
counterbalancing remainder that cannot be subsumed by the forces of
regulation and social control, has contributed to Hawkeye's endurance in
American culture.30 An important aspect of Hawkeye's selfhood remains
radically unknowable and irreducible—one might even be tempted to label
this aspect, as did Henry Nash Smith, Hawkeye's "subversive impulses."31
Yet it is not order that seems to most disturb Cooper, but disorder. Cooper,
as well as Hawkeye, may be understood to be an "enemy of cities," if we
presume cities were the places where demagogues ruled and civic order
was most notable by its lapses. Cooper, like Emerson, expresses in The
Last of the Mohicans impulses traditionally understood as individualistic
alongside an overwhelming desire for social order. The presence of this
desire leads to a question about the writing of American literary history:
When even the nineteenth-century writers most closely identified with
individualistic characters and arguments display so powerful a concern
about the integrity and cohesion of society, why has the critical characteri-
zation of the period focused on individualism as its distinguishing feature?
I propose that there are two overlapping sets of reasons for this critical ten-
dency, one institutional, the other methodological.
From the perspective of institutional history, the position of Americanist
literary scholars, like that of all engaged in the liberal arts, has been dif-
ficult. In large part their problems have resulted from populist anti-
intellectualism and the hostility of a scientistically oriented society toward
aesthetic studies. Because of these common attitudes, the professor of lit-
erature is in an embattled position in which many college freshmen feel
perfectly comfortable expressing skepticism toward the seemingly random
methodologies of literary studies, the absence of clearly definable results
from these methods, and even the very worth of the discipline. Amidst
such feelings, literary theorists have spent much time and energy formulat-
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ing defenses for the discipline. One characteristic defense has been that
offered by LA. Richards, who in 1926 claimed that technology without
the humanities is a soulless, empty pursuit. The other traditional justifica-
tion, best embodied by E.D. Hirsch's Cultural Literacy, responds to the
threat of philistinism with the assertion that knowledge of the humanities
is useful to the individual who wants to get ahead in the world.32 Despite
these ethical and practical arguments for the importance of literary studies,
the small budgets of English departments reflect the prevalent societal
attitude.
In addition to this primary alienation of the literary scholar, Ameri-
canists have had to battle to establish a place for themselves within litera-
ture departments dominated by English literary studies. This domination
has been reflected and reinforced by the continued numerical superiority of
English literature specialists in English departments.33 Much like early
nineteenth-century cultural nationalists, the Americanist scholar has rou-
tinely had to assert the value of American literature. The first English
language literary studies in the years after the Civil War exclusively treated
English literature. This focus continued through the 1800s, and at the turn
of the century the two dominant methodologies were philological and im-
pressionistic criticism. Obviously, American literature could not compete
with Old and Middle English in the sphere of philological studies. But
impressionistic criticism, though a response to dry and nonemotional
philological criticism, was equally biased toward British literature; only a
few American authors, such as Longfellow, Lowell, and Holmes, were ac-
ceptable to genteel academic tastes. According to contemporary standards,
American literature was second-rate, and it was commonly understood
that no Americans could compete with Shakespeare and other British lu-
minaries on aesthetic grounds.34
By the end of World War I, Americanists had begun to advance
an alternative theoretical and methodological basis for their work: cultural
criticism and a historicist method. The programmatic title of Van Wyck
Brooks's "On Creating a Usable Past" suggested that literary studies be
justified in terms of its cultural relevance: "The real task for the Ameri-
can literary historian, then, is not to seek for masterpieces—the few mas-
terpieces are all too obvious—but for tendencies."35 Having abandoned
the attempt to justify American literature on the basis of aesthetic value,
Brooks demanded a historical analysis of culture. The work that answered
Brooks's call and established the academic respectability of American liter-
ary studies was Vernon Parrington's Main Currents in American Thought.
Parrington, using Santayana's phrase "the genteel tradition" to describe the
aesthetic orientation he was to eschew, surveyed the history of American
literature and found American culture to be an ongoing struggle between
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conservative and liberal political tendencies.36 Defining political conser-
vatism as in principle contrary to the American democratic ideal—his
description of Alexander Hamilton as "one to whom our industrialization
owes a very great debt, but from whom our democratic liberalism has
received nothing" typifies his assessments—Parrington claimed that the
natural and social environment had created "an American liberalism,
frankly and vigorously individualistic."37 Parrington's endorsement of
individualism may now seem strange in view of his reputation. Marxist
literary historians during the 1930s, no advocates of individualism,
claimed Parrington's work as a predecessor to their own, and this critical
genealogy was affirmed, though with less approval and more ultimate
effect, by Lionel Trilling in 1940.
Trilling, struggling to assert a more complex treatment of aesthetic
issues within a cultural context, characterized Parrington's approach as
overly reliant on questionable dichotomies and as ultimately reductive:
"Parrington's was not a great mind. . . .  Separate Parrington from his
informing idea of the economic and social determination of thought and
what is left is a simple intelligence."38 Trilling's portrayal of Parring-
ton's work highlighted the economic determinism further developed by
Hicks and Calverton, among others, during the 1930s. Yet Parrington's
vision of progressive individualism, understandably rejected by those
Marxist historicist critics whom Parrington represented for Trilling, estab-
lished the tenor (if not the methodology) of American literary scholarship:
liberal political individualism was upheld as the best expression of Ameri-
can culture. This American expression of individualism, which contained
within it an implicit protest against the conservative anglophilism of the
academy, legitimized the posture of cultural critic assumed by Americanist
scholars.
For Americanist literary scholars, the appeal of the symbol of the in-
dividual has been especially profound. The image of the embattled
individual, struggling against an unappreciative, conformist society, rou-
tinely has been advanced by critics as a proper focus for disciplinary study.
With the exception of Emerson, the central figures of the American Re-
naissance have been characterized as alienated from an unmindful society.
We have therefore inherited the images of Thoreau in the wilderness,
Melville on the brink of madness, Whitman struggling to defend his art
against censors, Hawthorne isolated in his study, and the still more clois-
tered Dickinson. In these heroic figures, Americanist critics could find
ideals analogous to their own tenuous positions. Marginalized by a society
uninterested in literary pursuits, and further belittled within anglophilic
English departments, the Americanist could look to these earlier social
critics and, proclaiming the poetry of Whitman to a sleepy afternoon class
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of philistines, feel a symbolic elevation in the knowledge of a noble intel-
lectual lineage.
This stance of alienated aesthetic individualism has its basis in liter-
ary modernism. Modernist thought advanced two ideas that were to be of
particular significance to literary theorists: the notion of individual aliena-
tion from society, and the priority of individual experience. The idea of
individual alienation from society seems so natural now as to be taken for
granted. Marxist theories of alienation, the Freudian emphasis on individ-
ual analysis, the philosophical interest in ontological rather than strictly
epistemological issues—all these fed into modernist ideas about individual-
ism. An analysis by one critic who could hardly be said to champion
individualism may best express the modernist literary outlook. In his dis-
cussion of the development of the novel, Georg Lukacs asserted that the
modern world generated a literary form that concentrates on the indi-
vidual: "The epic individual, the hero of the novel, is the product of
estrangement from the outside world. When the world is internally ho-
mogenous, men do not differ qualitatively from one another."39 Lukacs
thereby accounted for novelistic expressions of individualism while he
nostalgically looked back to the "integrated civilizations" that did not pro-
mote alienated individualistic differentiation.40 Despairing of the possi-
bility of integrated civilizations and preferring attention to immediate
experience over the abstractions of historical theories, modernism sought
new beginnings in the individual. Given the modernist penchant for du-
alisms, the individual was quite naturally perceived to be in opposition to
society. The critical method that emerged from this desire for the integrity
of the individual aesthetic imagination was the New Criticism.41
New Critical aesthetic formalism may be understood as a moral
reaction to the emphasis on economic value characteristic of modern in-
dustrialist society. Kenneth Burke noted this in his contemporary response
to the Agrarian agenda when he commented that the doctrine of "art for
art's sake," an outgrowth of Kantian aesthetics, ultimately sought to sub-
sume ethics under aesthetics.42 Burke sharply criticized I'll Take My Stand,
taking issue with the reactionary Agrarian vision, but he also under-
stood that their vision of the aesthetic realm was an attempt to be "the
corrective of the practical."43 Advocates of this correction, though, uncriti-
cally adopted a central feature of the practical realm. The New Critics,
while objecting to the dominance of science, used the privileged methodol-
ogy of scientism: a repudiation of impressionism, exclusive attention to the
object at hand, and the hope for a method that would yield reproducible
results. Because New Critics were so successful, it is easy to overlook the
compensatory nature of their project. Their exaltation of art was in large
part a defensive response to an ungrateful world.
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Most significant to the development of American literary history and
criticism was the New Critical opposition of the individual to the commu-
nity. Against a society that prized rational, scientistic, conformist thought,
this critical method assumed an adversarial stance, one that promoted emo-
tion, introspection, and a nonconformist individualism. This perspective
eventually altered the meaning of earlier American literature: writers
who had criticized contemporary social conventions became proto-
modernists. Earlier American forms of individualism—individualisms
understood by Parrington to be expressions of political liberalism and
opposition—fused with the modernist outlook to produce a powerful
symbol of the individual in opposition to society. It is no surprise, given
this outlook, that critical tastes should change and that the novels of
Howells, for example, with their close attention to social interaction,
should fall into disrepute while Henry James's ironies and formal innova-
tions with respect to narrative consciousness should find favor. Similarly,
Parrington's rejection of Hawthorne's value, because of his purported inat-
tention to the social realm with a resultant "intellectual poverty,"44 seemed
hopelessly old-fashioned to those later critics for whom an aesthetic orien-
tation provided insights into the ways that historical knowledge of culture
is mediated by symbolic systems. Seeking a balance between historicist and
aestheticist approaches in his "History of a Literary Radical," Randolph
Bourne had prophesied a critical method that would account for literary
form and cultural history as well. A little more than twenty years later, F.O.
Matthiessen's American Renaissance appeared to answer this call.
The importance of Matthiessen's attempt to accommodate antago-
nistic historicist and New Critical methods in American Renaissance is
difficult to overestimate. His introductory chapter describes his approach
and defends his attention to those writers committed to providing "a
culture commensurate with America's political opportunity."45 The unin-
tended irony of this statement almost leaps off the page at the reader
because, despite his clear statement of political allegiances, his book is
strikingly inattentive to the issues of slavery and race relations. Similarly,
for Matthiessen to speak of "the possibilities of democracy" (ix) and then
two pages later cite Ezra Pound when justifying his choice of "past
masterpieces" (vii) now appears to be an astonishing juxtaposition. His
canon-making decision to deal only with writers who were northeastern
males of Anglo-Saxon origin seems equally at odds with his politics. Per-
haps most significant, as Myra Jehlen notes, was Matthiessen's recasting of
political problems as aesthetic ones.46
Yet it is exactly Matthiessen's conflation of aesthetics and politics
that made his work so influential to later Americanist critics. Whatever his
theoretical inconsistencies or failures, Matthiessen managed to establish
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American literary "masterpieces" as equivalent to their English counter-
parts. The subordination of history to aesthetics was an act that served to
free Americanists from the need to constantly defend their field on the
grounds of historical relevance. Not that Matthiessen neglected to cite the
importance of culture: "Any artist's use of language is the most sensitive
index to cultural history, since a man can articulate only what he is, and
what he has been made by the society of which he is a willing or an
unwilling part" (xv). The aesthetic approach thus justified on cultural
grounds, Matthiessen only occasionally needed to touch on political issues
to make his point. For instance, he understood Ahab to be Melville's de-
piction of those "strong-willed individuals who seized the land and gutted
the forests and built the railroads" (459). This interpretation conformed to
his socialist politics and must have appeared as a particularly timely refer-
ence to the personality cults of contemporary international politics.
By adapting a historicist interpretation of culture to the modernist
aestheticism of the New Criticism, American Renaissance set the scene for
Americanists to claim to be furnishing culturally relevant observations
while primarily performing close readings of relatively few literary texts.
Despite the success of American Renaissance, Matthiessen, as William
Cain observes, was in fact unable to reconcile his conflicting allegiances
to socialism, historicism, and the New Criticism. It is hard to disagree
with Cain, given the theoretical inconsistencies of American Renaissance;
there is no reasonable way to account for Matthiessen's neglect of mid-
nineteenth-century race relations unless one sees it as the victory of a to-
talizing aesthetic vision over historical specificity. Yet the fact that at the
time Matthiessen appeared to be successful in his book reveals much about
Americanist literary criticism. Earlier historicist scholars had drawn on the
image of American individualism either to criticize American culture, as
Marxists like Calverton and Hicks had done, or to point hopefully to the
possibilities for social change through individual action, as Parrington did
with his claim of an American tradition of a progressive, Jeffersonian indi-
vidualism. In their discussions of literary form, some later critics, such as
Leslie Fiedler, continued to criticize individualism as an essentially delu-
sory and ultimately unproductive protest against society. Most critics,
however, followed Parrington's lead while they simultaneously claimed to
escape his tendencies toward deterministic interpretations of literature. To
these critics, the purportedly free individual imagination was an invaluable
attribute of American literature.
American Renaissance exhibits both sets of attitudes toward individ-
ualism. Matthiessen was wary of the excesses of individualism, which, he
remarked, could be heard in "the voice of Hitler's megalomania" (546).
His comments about Ahab illustrate this wariness, as does his preliminary
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justification of his choice of writers according to their "one common de-
nominator . . . their devotion to the possibilities of democracy" (ix). This
interest in democracy even led Matthiessen to defend Emerson from the
potential charge of "the extremes of rugged Emersonianism" (8) with the
argument that Emerson was by nature democratic. But Matthiessen's ap-
propriation of the New Critical methodology, in which a few solitary
artists stand in for the culture as a whole, ultimately would overwhelm his
suggestion that individualism needs to be tempered. The New Critical
transformation of culture into a remote aesthetic realm further naturalized
the attention to individualism as a central feature of American literature.
And the modernist opposition of the individual to society established the
priority of the individual at both ends in the transmission of literature. The
mind of the author was acclaimed as supremely capable of appreciating
the aesthetic unity of the literary work, while the ideal reader's mind was
similarly understood as a corresponding site of authentic experience. The
aesthetic realm, situated in refined modes of consciousness, defensively of-
fered an ethical alternative to the horrors of the modern world. With the
arrival of the New Criticism, the celebration of American individualism
appeared to lead quite naturally into a celebration of aesthetics. The indi-
vidual, in the liberal spirit of Parrington's Main Currents, could be reliably
credited with the ability to work for social change in the world. The battle
over the symbol of the individual thus was largely resolved: champions of
aesthetics and advocates of social change could claim the individual for
their own. And, ironically, Leftist critics of American economic individual-
ism relied on an individualistic methodology to argue their claims.
Despite the fact that after Matthiessen nineteenth-century American lit-
erature had acquired canonical status, American literary studies continued
to be warranted on the grounds of cultural relevance. Major thematic
treatments of American literature during the 1950s and 1960s, such as
R.W.B. Lewis's The American Adam, Richard Chase's The American
Novel and Its Tradition, and even Richard Poirier's A World Elsewhere,
however much they depended on aesthetic standards for their choices of
works to discuss and their methodologies, offered as their justification the
elucidation of significant cultural tendencies or conflicts. Their interpreta-
tions of American culture concur on the following crucial points: the
individual and society have a necessarily antagonistic relationship, and the
individual merits the critic's allegiance. Even more historically oriented
critics, such as Henry Nash Smith, cited individualism as a distinctive
characteristic of American culture. The important feature of this claim
about individualism was its value as part of an oppositional stance against
a conformist society. With few exceptions, critics, such as the ones men-
TRANSLATING THE SELF 23
tioned above, situated themselves alongside their subjects, characterizing
opponents as essentially conformist, while they and their cohorts stood for
the spirit of the free individual or its artistic analogue, the imaginative
realm. This is not to suggest that these critics, viewed from a more skepti-
cal 1980s perspective as the developers of a "Cold War consensus," were
less than sincere when they attempted to use this individualistic rhetorical
tradition to advocate social change.47 Yet their protests against the domi-
nant order were apparently subverted by their reliance on the spatial
metaphor of insiders versus outsiders.
The casting of complex social, intellectual, and literary problems in
polarities remains a problem for any criticism that identifies itself as resist-
ing or oppositional. Sacvan Bercovitch, in The American Jeremiad, de-
scribes how oppositional rhetoric has shaped American literary history, but
he could equally have been describing the history of American literary
scholarship. In both sets of situations, the boundaries between the inside
and the outside become blurred as each category penetrates the other or,
one might say, as the theoretically opposed categories deconstruct them-
selves. The loss of categorical purity is not, though, what really matters in
terms of literary scholarship. Rather, the difficulty is one of dialectical
dynamics—the kind of dialectical process we see at work in Emerson's
Nature, which, unlike the later, more decidedly unresolved tensions of
Representative Men, Society and Solitude, and even "The Transcendental-
ist," repeatedly preserves a version of the self capable of transcending the
conflicts between the "NOT ME" (8) and an increasingly refined essence
of selfhood. Selfhood as a distinct subject matter may no longer generate
the same resonances among literary and cultural scholars as it once did; yet
the dialectical role of the self, often in the persons of critics who oppose
potentially overwhelming, frequently oppressive social forces as well as
corollary literary or historical figures, has been preserved in the disci-
plinary debate. In the wake of the New Historicism, cultural critics face a
situation in which the problematics of selfhood are further complicated by
the now prevalent awareness of how history has been either ignored or
textualized in literary studies. This set of difficulties is raised with reveal-
ing results in Eric Sundquist's To Wake the Nations: Race in the Making of
American Literature.
From the perspective of a disciplinary historian, To Wake the Nations
may be understood as the recovery of a cultural history overlooked—or
suppressed—by Matthiessen's American Renaissance and the works that
followed in that vein. Sundquist insists on the importance of race in the
United States, yet he avoids characterizing his work as a displacement of an
outmoded literary history. Sundquist accordingly maintains that he is not
offering a "new genealogy of American authorship."48 In refraining from
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this claim, he does not specify theoretical skepticism at the possibility of
such a narrative of descent, nor does he interrogate the function of textual
structures within historical accounts. Rather, he identifies his goal as the
act of "verification" of African American experience; in effect, he moves
from more strictly disciplinary concerns to a broader social sphere.49
This move, in which textual analysis is set off against a larger disciplinary
(and extradisciplinary) vision, raises questions about historicist textual
analysis.
In the climactic reading within To Wake the Nations, Sundquist
turns his attention to The Souls of Black Folk, an attention that serves as a
necessary corrective to a history of academic neglect: "Perhaps no other
book of such stature, such beautiful accomplishment and influence, is so
little appreciated even today by a general scholarly audience, let alone a lit-
erate public."50 Sundquist reads Du Bois as a kind of dialectician, one who
fully fathoms and explores the antitheses between white and black and be-
tween elite and folk cultures. Du Bois, despite his own elitist notion of a
talented tenth in which would inhere the best hope of African American
culture, recovers a scorned folk culture in The Souls of Black Folk. Or,
more precisely, Du Bois alludes to black spirituals, using brief musical ex-
cerpts to preface each chapter and leaving to the scholar the task of fully
fleshing out the unspoken—or unsung—language of the text. According to
Sundquist, Du Bois effectively transcends the opposition of folk and elite
cultures by the close of his book. As evidence, he offers the "concluding
song of The Souls of Black Folk, the only one . . . in which music and text
coexist."51 Du Bois's inclusion of words suggests the recovery of voice and
a renewed ability to articulate tensions in a self-conscious and self-
possessed manner. Hence, it "brings the metaphor of the journey to a
conclusion and functions as an envoy for the book as well as Du Bois's
message to the modern world."52 But this act of textual resolution is fol-
lowed by an additional, textually unsettling, rhetorical appeal.
The Souls of Black Folk ends with a section called "The After-
thought," in which Du Bois asks "O God, the Reader" to make certain
that his book "not fall still-born into the world wilderness."53 "With this
direct appeal to the reader, Du Bois points out the textuality of the text.
He is concerned that his book be an effective attempt at social action, that
it generate "vigor of thought and thougtful deed" in pursuit of "righteous-
ness." And he concludes by asking that "these crooked marks on a fragile
leaf be not indeed THE END."54 The text itself thereby indicates its own
incompleteness. This sense of its incompleteness, in effect, complements
the sense of textual—and musical—closure analyzed by Sundquist. My
point here is not that a sense of textual openness displaces closure; rather,
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it is to note the persistent tendency toward closure in historicist criticism,
a stabilizing tendency that can accompany the attempt to locate formal,
textual solutions to cultural problems.
The critical penchant for textual and interpretive solutions to cultural
problems may be conceived as an unwitting inclination to legitimize or
naturalize power relations. Wai-Chee Dimock addresses this when she
distinguishes between feminists and New Historicists, whose "universali-
zation of power and blurring of genders have struck many feminists as
nothing short of reactionary."55 Dimock, like Sundquist, defines her read-
ing self in terms of an interplay between cultural politics and poetics.
But she delineates her own subject position in a movement away from
a male-dominated New Historicism, which has been preoccupied with
"the sociocultural field at the text's moment of production," and toward a
feminist historicism that reinscribes the reader in the arena of cultural pro-
duction.56 As she programmatically asserts, "the interplay between pro-
duction and reception," an interplay that historicizes reading, is "crucial, I
think, to any historical criticism."57 Dimock's rejection of the totalizing—
and demoralizing—tendency of the New Historicism has been voiced by
various critics.58 But the obvious alternative, a return to a kind of advocacy
position that insists on critical activity as the site of cultural agency, involves
a risk that Gayatri Spivak identifies as "the fraud at the heart of identity pol-
itics."59 Spivak's cautionary remarks are worth noting: "The ethnic Ameri-
can—who is the nonethnic American?—has her face turned back and
front."60 In effect, Spivak suggests that all critics may make some claim to
marginality as a way of situating themselves as readers, not unlike the claim
of Bercovitch's Jeremiahs, and the risk is a return to a selfhood that is pur-
portedly cognizant of the poststructuralist critique of subjectivity but
which behaves as if this critique has itself been transcended.
The most sustained recent exploration of the problematic engage-
ments between selfhood, interpretation, and historicism in American lit-
erature may be found in Sacvan Bercovitch's The Office of the Scarlet
Letter. In this study, Bercovitch inquires into a selfhood that derives its sig-
nificance from the symbology of America, and he thus expands on his
earlier work in The Puritan Origins of  the American Self and The Ameri-
can Jeremiad. By attending to the problem of Hawthorne's silence about
Hester Prynne's return to New England in the final chapter of The Scarlet
Letter, Bercovitch opens up for discussion two distinct issues that bear
heavily on each other. These two issues are the relationship between ambi-
guity and what he identifies as "the principles of liberal exegesis," and the
ways by which the reader is implicated in the exegetical process.61 The un-
derlying questions here are quite similar to the ones that shape Sundquist's
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and Dimock's discussions of nineteenth-century American literature: How
are we to understand the workings of cultural power, and how are we to
situate ourselves as readers in relation to its operations? Bercovitch, more
than the others, stresses the subtly cooptational capacities of American
liberal ideology. He initially presents the problem as a textual one—"The
Scarlet Letter is a story of socialization in which the point of socialization
is not to conform, but to consent"62—but it is plain that there are disci-
plinary ramifications to his account of a culture in which speech consti-
tutes both the ends of social action and the simultaneous affirmation of the
status quo.
This situation resists easy answers. Simple assertions of opposi-
tional stances readily fall under the heading of "the fraud at the heart of
identity politics," and the discourse of resistance may engage the critic in
the logic of "liberal exegesis." By assuming oppositional postures, critics
risk unconsciously replicating the cultural work of earlier generations or,
more dubiously, engaging in what Cornel West calls the "self-serving
careerism" of those who espouse the "rhetoric of oppositional politics
of little seriousness and integrity."63 The alternative, though, as Emily
Miller Budick warns, is a deathly silence, and her suggestion that one may
articulate "an aversive relation with America" is made with cognizance
of potential theoretical pitfalls.64 With the awareness that no simple
remedy or cautionary strategy is available, and with the hope of balancing
the competing impulses to see texts as sites of repression as opposed to
their value as sources of criticism, I approach the problem by maintaining a
historicist skepticism toward the smooth translation into universalist terms
of nineteenth-century narratives and theories. As Steven Mailloux sug-
gests, interpretation "should move from theory to history as quickly as
possible."65
One potential problem of a historicist approach is that when fore-
grounded the cultural contexts of the works being studied may threaten to
either overwhelm or undermine relevant late-twentieth-century discipli-
nary and cultural concerns. When Sundquist encloses his reading of Du
Bois within a disciplinary framework, he effectively responds to this po-
tential difficulty. By contrast, the approaches suggested by Bercovitch and
Budick, for example, while attentive to issues of form and aesthetics, avoid
presupposing the centrality of literary studies and thus manage to suggest
engagement in a wide cultural arena. The price to be paid for this relative
openness is the loss of the certainty of ending that often accompanies the
reinstatement of disciplinary boundaries. When these critics, along with
Sundquist, return to questions of the interpretive functions of selfhood, it
is with a desire to shift the critical discourse of selfhood toward the ethical
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and the interpersonal realm. While my own work on the self is aimed in
this same direction, a direction that amounts to a corrective to either a hu-
manist self-aggrandizement or a poststructuralist self-denigration, I also
see this critical tendency as substantially continuous with the theoretical
and ethical dimensions of the nineteenth-century writings to be discussed
in the chapters that follow.
2Hawthorne's Drama of the Self
Antebellum Psychology and Sociality
The generation to which he belonged, that generation which grew up with the cen-
tury, witnessed during a period of fifty years the immense, uninterrupted material
development of the young Republic; and when one thinks of the scale on which it
took place, of the prosperity that walked in its train and waited on its course, of the
hopes it fostered and the blessings it conferred, of the broad morning sunshine, in
a word, in which it all went forward, there seems to be little room for surprise that
it should have implanted a kind of superstitious faith in the grandeur of the coun-
try, its duration, its immunity from the usual troubles of earthly empire. This faith
was a simple and uncritical one, enlivened with an element of genial optimism.
—Henry James, Hawthorne1
When, in his 1879 essay on Hawthorne, Henry James offered this assess-
ment of Hawthorne's generation, he looked back nostalgically to the
antebellum United States and the political and societal simplicity—"the
broad morning sunshine"—he associated with it. James believed, of
course, that this simplicity exacted a price; earlier in the essay he had made
his famous assertion that "the flower of art blooms only where the soil is
deep, that it takes a great deal of history to produce a little literature"
(320). A local, provincial, limited knowledge of the world and its intrica-
cies may have posed, according to James's criteria, aesthetic obstacles to
Hawthorne as a member of an "earlier and simpler generation," but Haw-
thorne appeared to have transcended his limitations through his astute
observations of "the deeper psychology" (427, 368). James thus intro-
duced a pair of characterizations that would prove enduring in the history
of Hawthorne criticism: the relative naivete of Hawthorne's generation (ac-
companied by his corresponding lack of interest in contemporary affairs),
and, turning his loss into gain, Hawthorne's acumen as a student of human
psychology.
Hawthorne's relationship to contemporary psychological thought
and its importance to interpretations of his work will be the primary focus
here. Contemporary psychology, utterly dominated by Common Sense phi-
losophy, offered behavioral prescriptions, for which it is best remembered,
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but it also was more than a compendium of moralisms. As I argued in
the preceding chapter, antebellum thought about the nature of the individ-
ual responded to increased societal complexities and perceived threats of
social upheaval. An awareness of these things is necessary for a balanced
assessment of antebellum psychology. Before discussing Common Sense
thought, therefore, I think it useful to more fully appreciate how James's
profoundly influential characterization of Hawthorne and his time may
have been colored by late-nineteenth-century concerns, while concerns that
preoccupied Hawthorne escaped James's notice.
James's estimation of the comparative simplicity of Hawthorne's time
is best discussed in late-nineteenth-century terms. The Civil War and its
aftermath appeared to furnish one demanding set of problems unknown to
Hawthorne's era; by comparison, the antebellum debate over abolition
seemed to James to have been rather limited. Of even greater immediate
importance to James as a sign of the difference between early- and late-
nineteenth-century American society was the issue of immigration. Haw-
thorne's era, according to James, was marked by an absence of immi-
grants, and this absence would create the insular outlook that informs
James's Hawthorne. James characteristically maintained, "Forty years ago
the tide of foreign immigration had scarcely begun to break upon the rural
strongholds of the New England race; it had at most begun to splash them
with the salt Hibernian spray. . . .  It is very possible, however, that at this
period there was not an Irishman in Concord; the place would have been a
village community operating in excellent conditions" (389). Henry James,
himself the grandson of an Irish immigrant, here overlooks the transatlan-
tic origins of his forebear, and he treats the threat posed by immigration to
his sense of social cohesion purely as a concern of his generation.
The mythically simple and stable New England village past that
James describes in Hawthorne achieves salience when it is juxtaposed
against the complexities and cultural instability characteristic of James's
time. James does not speak directly to the issue of late-nineteenth-century
immigration in Hawthorne or most of his other writings, but one may find
pertinent observations in The American Scene. The cosmopolitan narrator
of this account, devoting considerable attention to immigration, reflects
on the presence of "the representatives of the races we have nothing
'in common', with."2 The narrator looks with suspicion on immigrants
while, with the ironic tone James so often used to satirize the upper class,
he simultaneously distances himself from those who might constitute
themselves as the we who lack the common grounds necessary to establish
a coherent, unified social body with the conspicuously alien Jewish and
Italian immigrant populations. In contrast to this later scene of cosmopoli-
tan social disintegration, in Hawthorne James presents a New England
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that "must have been an even better specimen than to-day—more homo-
geneous, more indigenous, more absolutely democratic" (389). In this
instance, James condescendingly dismisses provincial antebellum culture
while concurrently evoking a time before the arrival of newer immigrants,
an era when democracy was unthreatened and a secure feeling of commu-
nity prevailed. James's precise allegiances in these two separate, ironically
ambiguous statements matter less than the typically nineteenth-century
anxiety to which he gives voice: Is American society losing its cohesion in
the face of pressures from inside and outside?3
Concerns about community were not, however, exclusive to Henry
James and the late nineteenth century. These concerns can readily be
traced at least as far as the world of eighteenth-century mercantile capital-
ism, a time when older, more stable social and political forms appeared
increasingly remote and philosophers like Shaftesbury and Adam Smith at-
tempted to develop new rationales for community cohesion. Psychology as
an inquiry into selfhood and social bonds began to assume prominence as
a discipline at this time, and we can find the roots of the dominant psy-
chology of Hawthorne's era in late- eighteenth-century Scottish Common
Sense moral philosophy.4 Members of Hawthorne's own generation, de-
spite Henry James's view that theirs was a simpler time, also experienced a
desire for social cohesion in the face of the threats to stability posed by
economic expansion, increased industrialization, the associated growth of
immigration and an urban working class, and the corresponding antebel-
lum problems posed by regional differences. An attempt at a coherent
theoretical response to these threats against community stability was pro-
vided by contemporary psychologists, as a close look at their writings will
reveal. It is therefore no accident that the interest in psychology displayed
by Hawthorne and his contemporaries thus arose simultaneously with
anxieties over the loss of social cohesion in antebellum New England.
Early-nineteenth-century social instability and change in New En-
gland largely resulted from the transformation of a primarily rural and
maritime economy to one dominated by water-powered manufacture and
associated industry. This rapid development radically altered the economic
bases of the region and induced corresponding changes in politics and mo-
rality, such as the introduction of the new industrial morality, generally
identified as the "Puritan" work ethic, which reverenced such behaviors as
punctuality and abstinence from alcohol and, in addition, the notion that
work is valuable for its own sake.5 Resistance to this industrial morality
often took the form of mass action, the kinds of behaviors abhorred by
Emerson and Cooper. As Charles Sellers notes, in Jacksonian America,
"The crowd in the streets was the ultimate working class weapon. Tradi-
tionally enforcing the preindustrial moral economy, it was invoked more
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frequently and coercively in strikes."6 For example, episodes of collective
objections to low wages in Massachusetts took place in the summer of
1831, when 227 shoebinders of Reading and surrounding towns formed a
"Society of Shoebinders" to obtain a uniform wage scale, and in 1833,
when more than 750 women organized in Lynn and Saugus to protest a
wage cut.7
Although Hawthorne did not dramatize so clearly as did Cooper
concern about mob action, the prominence of group violence in "My Kins-
man, Major Molineux" and "Earth's Holocaust" suggests that civility and
social stability were not taken for granted. Hawthorne's descriptions of the
countrymen of William James, grandfather of Henry, in "Sketches from
Memory" pointedly raise questions about the potential loss of civility:
"Nothing struck me more, in Burlington, than the great number of Irish
emigrants. They have filled the British provinces to the brim, and still con-
tinue to ascend the St. Lawrence, in infinite tribes, overflowing by every
outlet into the States. At Burlington, they swarm in huts and mean dwell-
ings near the lake, lounge about the wharves, and elbow the native citizens
entirely out of competition in their own line."8 Hawthorne's account
of these immigrants to American cities who lack a developed sense of civil-
ity is augmented by the conventional claim that "a glass of whiskey" is
"doubtless their first necessity of life"; he further amplifies this when he
compares a group of "wild Irish" to "devils" (Snow-Image, 299, 305).
These "wandering hordes" concisely symbolize the threat to social stability
that population migration was understood to pose.
Such direct portrayals of potential disruptions to the older bases of
social stability are relatively infrequent in Hawthorne's work. Neverthe-
less, as this chapter will maintain, fear of such threats to social stability
informs Hawthorne's work. And this returns us to Henry James's descrip-
tion of Hawthorne as someone who studied human nature while avoiding
the study of his own times. Michael Colacurcio has contended that James's
Hawthorne, the Hawthorne obsessed with questions of literary form and
psychology, is himself a work of fiction. Colacurcio's attention to the
historical bases of Hawthorne's fiction largely restored history and his-
toricism to Hawthorne studies during the early 1980s, thus serving to
counterbalance the contemporary critical preoccupation with formal or
phenomenological issues. Nevertheless, despite Colacurcio's strenuous
attempt to rescue Hawthorne studies from what he perceived as the de-
bilitating effects of Henry James's influence, he essentially accepted the
terms James established, that history and psychology form the opposing
poles in Hawthorne studies and that the critic must choose between them.9
It may well be more useful to conceive Hawthorne's psychology in a
manner contrary to that of both James and Colacurcio and more in accord
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with the way Hawthorne's contemporaries understood the discipline, that
is, as a way of responding to contemporary society. My argument is that
the conflict between psychologically and historically oriented critiques of
Hawthorne recedes when we understand the ways Hawthorne interpreted
contemporary psychology, transformed these interpretations into aesthetic
terms, and made salient latent tensions within this psychology. Thus, in
effect, Hawthorne's work suggests an alternative perspective on the moral,
psychological, and metaphysical conventions of his time, conventions that
informed Common Sense thought.10 This is particularly true of Haw-
thorne's novels, along with those shorter works that have engendered the
greatest critical commentary. But in such sketches and short stories
as "The Great Stone Face," "Egotism; or, The Bosom-Serpent," and "The
Haunted Mind," for example, Hawthorne's relatively uncritical reliance
on conventional psychological—and metaphysical—thought to generate
plots and characters is, I will be arguing, quite apparent. Before discussing
these and other fictions, I will turn to the writings of Thomas C. Upham, a
Common Sense psychologist whose prominence extended from the 1830s
through the 1860s and whose work was known by Hawthorne.11 The
Common Sense theoretical account of the individual's relationship to the
community provided the basis for Hawthorne's depictions of individual
psychology, but he did not consistently reflect contemporary thought as
he did in the works mentioned above. Rather, in stories such as "Young
Goodman Brown," which depicts a failed relationship between the indi-
vidual and the community, Hawthorne began to explore tensions latent in
Common Sense thought, thereby furnishing an equivocal response to
contemporary metaphysics and opening onto the problematics of the inter-
preting self raised by Sacvan Bercovitch and Emily Miller Budick in their
studies of Hawthorne.12
The association between Hawthorne and an intuitively Romantic, aestheti-
cized individualism has rested on seemingly certain textual grounds.
Perhaps most famously, the narrator's rejection of mundane affairs in "The
Custom-House" as antithetical to art supports this association, and, more
forthrightly, Hawthorne's description of himself and his surroundings in
an 1840 letter to his fiancee, Sophia Peabody, evokes a similar perception:
"This deserves to be called a haunted chamber, for thousands upon thou-
sands of visions have appeared to me in it; and some few of them have
become visible to the world. If ever I should have a biographer, he ought to
make great mention of this chamber in my memoirs, because so much of
my lonely youth was wasted here, and here my mind and character were
formed."13
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To those critics for whom Hawthorne emblematizes the socially iso-
lated, alienated artist, this letter to Sophia Peabody, with its references to
his "lonely youth" and "visions" in his "haunted chamber," has indicated
an artistic and imaginative estrangement from his contemporaries. This
individualistic characterization of Hawthorne has proved remarkably en-
during, and despite the efforts of biographers and critics such as James
Mellow, Arlin Turner, and Gloria Erlich to revise this attitude, the idea
that Hawthorne was a man immersed in his social surroundings often gen-
erates indifference, if not resistance. Thus a recent biography of Haw-
thorne, falling back on the older critical cliche, asserts, "No biographer
has failed to quote the [letter's] passage," drawing as its conclusion the idea
that the letter serves as evidence of Hawthorne's "lonely meditations and
self-imposed isolation."14
But Hawthorne's letter to Sophia continues, and as it does, the
earlier, more famous remarks are recontextualized in a way that signifi-
cantly alters their meaning. The letter likens Sophia to a dove who draws
Hawthorne out of his seclusion, a detail revealing the earlier assertion of
isolation to have been in the service of a love letter's rhetorical strategy.
As historicist critics such as Michael Colacurcio, Lauren Berlant, and
T. Walter Herbert have shown, the image of Hawthorne as a champion of
the isolated artistic consciousness does not satisfactorily correspond to his
work.15 Despite their corrective effects, however, critical arguments that
have demonstrated the historical and social bases for much of Hawthorne's
writings have not adequately accounted for his fascination—as evident in
his letter to Sophia—with psychological phenomena and the frequently
strange distortions of perception so often revealed in his work. To under-
stand Hawthorne's engagement with psychology, we must turn our at-
tention to the dominant system of antebellum psychology, that derived
from Scottish Common Sense philosophy.
The history of Common Sense psychology in the United States is not
unknown, yet its relation to Hawthorne's work has been obscured by the
tendency among Hawthorne's twentieth-century critics to describe his
concerns and attitudes as if they were directly opposed to those of the
prevalent antebellum school of psychology.16 This school of psychology
gained its strongest purchase on academic discourse precisely during a time
when community values were perceived to be eroding. The philosophy of
Common Sense thus developed in the United States, depending on one's
view, as either a compensatory belief system, one that advocated commu-
nitarian social ethics while legitimating the politics and economics of
individualism, or, alternatively, as a sort of rearguard protest based in
Christian morality. As noted earlier, the study of psychology achieved a
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new importance during the eighteenth century as one facet of the intellec-
tual response to a changing political and economic milieu. The Scottish
school of Common Sense philosophy, associated with Thomas Reid, Du-
gald Stewart, James Beattie, and Thomas Brown, emerged during the latter
half of the eighteenth century as a refutation of the philosophies of Hume
and Berkeley. Its importation into this country during colonial times was
effected by John Witherspoon and Benjamin Rush. (It was Rush who
claimed to have suggested the title Common Sense to Thomas Paine.)
Rush, the founder of American psychiatry, expressed concern over the
moral effects of physical and psychological phenomena; Witherspoon re-
vealed his moral concerns in a religious conservatism associated with the
Scottish philosophy. The overwhelming influence of Common Sense phi-
losophy on nineteenth-century American thought is undisputed: from the
start of the nineteenth century until the arrival of German physiology and
British empiricism during the 1860s, the Common Sense dominance over
American psychology was unchallenged, and its influence, albeit attenu-
ated, endured through the remainder of the century. Pedagogical practices
extended the influence of this thought throughout college curricula with
the choice of Common Sense textbooks, such as the extended supplements
to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, a project designed and overseen by Du-
gald Stewart. At Yale, the standard texts in Intellectual Philosophy were
those of Reid, Stewart, Beattie, and Brown.17
The dominance of Common Sense realism in the nineteenth century
accorded well with the moralizing aspects of popular sentimental fiction. It
is thus no surprise that twentieth-century critics who have found fault with
the one should have discredited the other.18 The impression that Hawthorne
chose the path of individualism in order to counter the prevalent mode of
conformity is, however, problematic for several reasons. On the level of
social analysis, it necessitates a disregard of the idea that individualism in
the United States itself has constituted a mode of conformity. Further, and
more significantly, the notion that the imagination was regarded as suspect
by those who subscribed to Common Sense psychology is based on an
ahistorical and uncritical reading of late-nineteenth-century opponents of
Common Sense thought; denunciations by these reform-minded psycholo-
gists are best understood as part of an ongoing disciplinary argument (and
thus as prone to the exaggerations and distortions typical of such argumen-
tation).19 It is necessary to note that not all Common Sense philosophers
agreed on all points. One important example of disagreement is provided
by Thomas Reid's attack on the theory of association of ideas; when under-
stood in terms of the contemporary philosophical debate, Reid's attack
appears situational, and Reid's successors, apparently taking this into ac-
count, generally departed from him on this point.20 If we actually return to
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the works of the period without use of the oversimplifying dichotomy pos-
ited by advocates of the idea that Hawthorne simply was a Romantic op-
ponent of Common Sense thought, a more complex understanding of the
relationship between the individual and society will emerge.
The intricacies of the relationship between the individual and society
preoccupied Common Sense theorists.21 In keeping with their preoccu-
pation, their theoretical discourse was not the exclusive province of an
academic elite. Rather, the ideas of Common Sense thought were broadly
disseminated through the use of textbooks, designed for high-school and
college students, that closely followed Scottish models. Such texts as
Thomas C. Upham's Elements of Intellectual Philosophy (1827), Francis
Wayland's Moral Philosophy (1835), and Laurens Perseus Hickok's Em-
pirical Psychology (1854) were popular in college curricula even after the
Civil War.22 Upham's Elements is particularly noteworthy because it rep-
resented the first American attempt to offer a system of psychology for
students. Upham's Elements of Intellectual Philosophy was combined with
the later Elements of Mental Philosophy (1831) and The Philosophical and
Practical Treatise on the Will (1834) in his Abridgement of Mental Phi-
losophy (1861). This compilation is important in part because it displays
a friendlier attitude toward literature and imagination than is usually at-
tributed to the American followers of the Scottish realists. In addition, it
reveals significant epistemological and methodological assumptions that
shaped Hawthorne's approach to individual psychology.
The works of Thomas C. Upham are useful now precisely because of
their status as textbooks. Their perspectives were relatively conventional;
moreover, their specific purpose as textbooks was to indoctrinate high-
school and college students into the prevalent belief system of the time.
Upham himself graduated from Dartmouth in 1818, prepared for the
ministry, and served as a pastor for one year before going to Bowdoin Col-
lege. Hawthorne studied mental and moral philosophy with Upham during
his senior year (1824-25); during this year Hawthorne read Dugald
Stewart's Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind.23 It is plausible
that Upham's direct influence on Hawthorne, then completing his studies
at Bowdoin, extended as well to Upham's advocacy of an American litera-
ture based in American experience.24 Upham's most complete work, the
Abridgement of Mental Philosophy, essentially recapitulates the range of
his earlier works. It will accordingly provide the focus for our inquiry here,
to which will be added an occasional reference to his Outlines of Imperfect
and Disordered Mental Action (1840), the first American text on abnor-
mal psychology.25
Two aspects of Upham's Abridgement are especially relevant to a
consideration of the way it organizes psychological discourse: the establish-
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ment of the field of knowledge and the method of inquiry. Upham's
Common Sense method of psychological inquiry will form an important
feature of this discussion because of the way it delineated the theoretical
boundaries that Hawthorne was to test. More striking, though, to those
for whom twentieth-century psychological discourses are the norm, is the
relationship between rational and emotional processes that constitute the
field of Common Sense psychological knowledge. In the Abridgement,
Upham divided mental operations into three parts: (1) the intellect, a cate-
gory that includes sensation, perception, and internal mental processes
such as dreaming, memory, and association; (2) the sensibilities, inclusive
of various emotions, desires, and the moral senses; and (3) the will, or
volitional states of mind.26 The prescriptively rationalist orientation of
Common Sense thought has made an easy target for those who might
scrap it along with the rest of pre-Freudian psychology. So conditioned are
we to a psychology of nonrational drives that earlier attention to the con-
scious mind appears embarrassingly positivistic and simplistic. But aside
from its importance as a precursor to pragmatist philosophy and its con-
ceptions of the human mind, Upham's Common Sense psychology cannot
be so easily dismissed. Its comparatively mechanistic application of facul-
ties and categories can lull the modern reader into ignoring the fact that it
treated with some subtlety the relationship of individuals to their natural
and social environments.
The intellectual functions cited by Upham were basically of two
types, external and internal. The external has to do with sensory input,
knowledge of things of external origin, the material world. Thus, unlike
the psychoanalytic emphasis on personal history, realist psychology main-
tained as essential the idea of ongoing contact between the perceiving
individual and the world. Upham justified this ordering scheme by citing
human development: "Far the greater of the mind's acts during [the early
period of life] can be traced to a material source."27 He clearly relied on
individual memory, an internalization of the external, for his rationale.
The description of internal mental states that follows posited a structure
of self-evident ideas, such as time, personal identity, space, power, and
concepts of right and wrong. There is a consequent interplay between
empirical facts acquired through sensory perception and the workings of
structures of consciousness.
Upham presented consciousness as the second source of knowledge
after sensory perception. Consciousness as the object of its own inquiry, a
basis of Common Sense psychology, rendered introspection the preferred
methodology for psychological exploration. Dugald Stewart, whose Ele-
ments was closely followed by Upham, explained the importance of intro-
spection by analogy: "As all our knowledge of the material world rests ulti-
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mately on facts ascertained by observation, so our knowledge of the human
mind rests ultimately on facts for which we have the evidence of our own
consciousness."28 The self-conscious methodology, fully practiced by
Upham, leads to a classification of various "intellectual states of internal
origin" (as opposed to those based in perception), such as memory, associ-
ation, and reasoning. Among those states Upham treats is the imagination.29
The imagination is a central issue in Hawthorne criticism, and the
prescriptive, rationalist orientation of Common Sense thought has sug-
gested the idea that Hawthorne's interest in the imagination is, if not
unique in its own time, at least a conscious challenge to Common Sense
hegemony. A close look at what a Common Sense psychologist like
Upham actually said, however, reveals the shortcoming in this thinking.
Upham discussed the imagination in the Abridgement, and his discussion
is hardly the material from which anti-imaginative biases may be con-
structed. Upham did review disorders of the imagination in Outlines of
Imperfect and Disordered Mental Action, but he specified at the start that
"great Imagination does not necessarily imply a disordered or insane
action of the Mind."30 One of the disorders of imagination cited by Upham
is a lack of imagination, of which he remarks, "Can there well be a greater
mental defect than this?"31 His statements on the imagination in the
Abridgement more closely resemble paeans than condemnations.
The crucial point for Upham is the ultimate source of the imaginative
faculty. As far as Upham was concerned, the imagination would not exist
unless "the Creator had some design or purpose in furnishing men with it,
since we find universally that he does nothing in vain" (228). He cited as
examples of imagination the books of the Prophets in the Bible:
If it be said that those venerable writers were inspired, it will still
remain true that this was the faculty of the mind which inspiration es-
pecially honoured by the use which was made of it. . . . Many an hour
it has beguiled by the new situations it has depicted, and the new views
of human nature it has disclosed; many a pang of the heart it has sub-
dued, either by introducing us to greater woes which others have
suffered, or by intoxicating the memory with its luxuriance and lulling
it into a forgetfulness of ourselves; many a good resolution it has cher-
ished and subtended, as it were, a new and wider horizon around the
intellectual being, has filled the soul with higher conceptions, and in-
spired it with higher hopes . . . the soul enters with joy into those new
and lofty creations which it is the prerogative of the imagination to
form; and they seem to it a congenial residence. (228-29)
Imagination is here associated with the Bible, the highest source of truth to
Upham, a writer imbued with a sense of moral certainty based on his
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belief in Christianity. And Upham's discussion of art was certainly a con-
genial one, albeit based on a definition of the artistic enterprise that
highlighted its social value—here largely in terms of its use as a means of
moralistic self-improvement or as relief for the grieving—rather than its
expressive qualities.
The question of the source and uses of the imagination is central to
an understanding of Hawthorne's psychology and his ideas about the
proper relationship between the individual and the community. The imagi-
nation, valorized in Romantic rhetoric and in the tradition of American
literary scholarship that has perceived artistic antagonism toward society
(and vice versa), need not be regarded as an avenue of individual protest
against community consensus. Hawthorne may not have explicitly en-
dorsed the theological origins of the imagination claimed by Upham, but
when he talks of the imagination, he does so in a way that recalls
the individual's social network. Hawthorne's most well known account of
the imagination, in "The Custom-House," conveys this notion when de-
scribing the "neutral territory . . .  where the Actual and the Imaginary
may meet."32 The successful writer of the romance, according to Haw-
thorne, must be able to add the interpersonal warmth of "a heart and
sensibilities of human tenderness to the forms which fancy summons up."
Only the presence of such emotional attachments "converts" the fanciful
forms "from snow-images into men and women."
Hawthorne appreciates the artistic imagination's social aspects—a
sociality that informs not only his description of the proper workings of
the imagination but also his interest in the artist's ability to communicate
with an audience—and this appreciation is most consistent with Upham's
Common Sense account of the imagination. The sources of imaginative
truth may possibly differ as far as the two are concerned, but their assump-
tions about its effects as well as their methods of testing their ideas are
identical. For Upham, the only way to verify claims to truth, understood to
be objective and absolute, was by way of social consensus, and this was in
accord with Hawthorne's interest in the sympathetic reader.33 Upham did
not arbitrarily begin his study of the intellect with a discussion of sensory
perception: by definition, objects of perception were real and their pres-
ence was revealed by the senses. The internal faculties (i.e., mental cate-
gories and processes such as imagination) were similarly real, and they
were revealed, in a manner analogous to the workings of the senses, by
the introspective method. Sensory perception and introspection thereby
formed the methodological bases of a psychology that revealed to us our
common sense. And this common sense, when functioning normally in the
individual, would be able to verify truths through their common or social
recognition.
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What is problematic in Upham's psychology, from the perspective of
American cultural studies, is less the metaphysical origins of his epistemol-
ogy than the relationship between his epistemology and the introspec-
tive methodology associated with Scottish realism. The basis of Upham's
psychological explorations was the analysis of mental phenomena by re-
flection. The introspective method works insofar as there are common
mental faculties that function reliably to confirm the truth about the world.
The problem with this methodology is not unlike the discrepancy revealed
by analyses of Puritan culture between, on the one hand, the idea of the
individual as the source of religious truth and, on the other, the Puritan
community as the agent that confirms this truth. Once the source of truth
is believed to reside in the individual, then the paradox arises that an
authentic reliance on individual insight or interpretation invalidates the
community's claim to confirmation of that insight, and antinomianism
logically follows.
This tension would subtend Scottish Common Sense philosophy and,
even more sharply, Upham's psychology, which was eclectic and open to
ideas identified with Romanticism. A case in point is Reid's rejection of
association of ideas because it denoted an arbitrariness within mental func-
tions that could result in solipsism. Upham, following the lead of Dugald
Stewart, found no such problem with the idea of association and did not
consider as potentially unsettling the implications of a division between the
perceiving mind and the world.
The fact that Upham could overlook the tension between an intro-
spective methodology and a way of affirming epistemological data through
the social affirmation of introspective insights may indeed be the result of
an American context that, from the Puritans onwards, had institutional-
ized the individual as the source of theological truth. So, when discussing
the sensibilities, Upham relied on individualist assumptions to prove the
moral emotions to be of a higher order than the "natural": "There is ob-
viously a sort of graduation in the feelings of regard and honour which we
attach to different parts of the mind. We at once, as it were instinctively,
regard some as higher than others. We may not be able always to tell
why it is so; but such is the fact" (264). This passage, chosen because it is
typical, shows the premises latent within Upham's rhetoric. The we,
himself and the audience of students empowered by their inclusion into
the author's community of reasonable adults, functioned to legitimate
the conclusion that there is a hierarchy of emotional states. This order was
affirmed through what is "obviously" apparent, what we "instinctively"
see. To perceive this truth, though, the we had to decompose into intro-
specting individuals who were then presumed to reconstitute themselves as
a community in order to affirm this truth. But, in the disintegration of
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community to individuals, the radical disjuncture between an objective
confirmation of truth and individual discovery of proof becomes manifest.
Once the introspecting individual is credited with the power to find truth,
there is no easy turning back to an objective truth claim. This conceptual
gap would provide the space for Hawthorne to begin his literary explora-
tions of selfhood.
The acuity of Hawthorne's psychological observations in his sketches and
tales often led critics during the 1950s through the 1970s to apply Freud-
ian and other psychoanalytic approaches. Hawthorne scholars during
those decades seem to have been trying to rescue Hawthorne from the
earlier critical characterization of him as a kind of latter-day Puritan, itself
an attempt to lend intellectual and moral weight to a writer who had been
dismissed by Parrington because of his "intellectual poverty."34 The more
recent revival of historicist methodologies among Hawthorne critics has
shifted the terms of debate by focusing on Hawthorne's historical milieu
and sources.35 As a way of mediating between historicist and psychological
approaches to Hawthorne's work, I will raise questions about the functions
of consciousness in terms of Common Sense tensions between its intro-
spective methodology and its socially oriented epistemology. Hawthorne's
use of an introspective method, his interest in the imagination, and his pre-
occupation with the power of benevolence—all explicitly discussed in
Upham's text as well as in the writings of the Scottish philosophers—
emerge in certain tales and sketches, and they may be comprehended as
explorations of contemporary psychological tenets.
Rather than approach consciousness within Hawthorne's writing in a
direct manner, I will look at the way it arises as a function or response to
problems in narrative. To this end, I propose that in his tales and sketches
Hawthorne repeatedly dramatizes travel, often using it as a way to enter
into discussions of the individual consciousness. Certain depictions of
travel and its consequences may at times evoke contemporary, antebellum
concerns about social stability and the effects of migration. These depic-
tions include the boat trip in "Sketches from Memory," with its derogation
of immigrants, or the account in "My Kinsman, Major Molineux," in
which young Robin's migration from countryside to the city coincides with
the apparently unrelated mob uprising. Against these associations of travel
with social disorder, Hawthorne repeatedly suggests the positive value of
home. One instance of this is the action in "The Great Stone Face" (1850),
a story that illustrates the way a departure from home may offer relatively
few benefits to the aspiring self.
"The Great Stone Face" dramatizes a presumably instructive compar-
ison between Ernest, who remains in the valley overlooked by a mountain-
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side called the Great Stone Face, and a series of more ambitious natives
who had left the rural settlement to gain prominence in the world. Each of
the first three returnees is greeted by the locals as the fulfiller of the proph-
ecy that one whose visage resembles the Great Stone Face will come and
will be "the greatest and noblest personage of his time" (Snow-Image, 28).
By contrast with the simple and virtuous homebody Ernest, each of these
three—a wealthy businessman, a celebrated general, and a former candi-
date for president—is in turn hailed by the deluded crowd as the pro-
phesied one. But all three worldly and shallow men are false fulfillments of
the prophecy. The withered, barely human old businessman merely scatters
with his "yellow claw" a few gold coins to beggars; the general's face dis-
plays an utter lack of "deep, broad, tender sympathies"; and the states-
man's life is revealed to be "vague and empty, because no high purpose had
endowed it with reality" (Snow-Image, 32, 37, 41). Only the last arrival,
an acclaimed poet, is sufficiently virtuous to acknowledge bluntly that he is
not the awaited one. In contrast to his predecessors, all of whom gained
worldly distinction without displaying or acquiring wisdom, the returning
poet announces that it is, in fact, Ernest who resembles the Great Stone
Face and thus is the most noble of all.
The revelation here that virtue attaches itself to one who has not left
his rural home amplifies the lesson that worldly success is no guarantee of
character. The conventional wisdom that there is no place like home would
not be worthy of comment were it not for the fact that it frequently arises
in Hawthorne's short works. Repeatedly, Hawthorne presents stories in
which a departure from home is associated with danger. Perhaps the sim-
plest of these is "Little Annie's Ramble," in which little Annie "feels that
impulse to go strolling away—that longing after the mystery of the great
world—which many children feel, and which I felt in my childhood."36 To
biographers of Hawthorne, this account of a child leaving "her father's
doorsteps" who then returns after being reported lost might seem an
inversion of the story of how Hawthorne's seafaring father died abroad
when young Nathaniel was not yet four years old.37 Without reducing little
Annie's successful return home, which accompanies the narrator's cele-
bration of the effects of children on adults ("the pure breath of children
revives the life of aged men" [Tales, 129]), into a wish-fulfillment fantasy
of family reunion, we may still note how cultural anxieties about wander-
ing populations intersect with Hawthorne's personal history and how this
plot of departure and return is one that sustained Hawthorne's interest.
A departure and return home, for the sake of dramatic action, often
is problematic, and problems in Hawthorne's fiction frequently lead to rep-
resentations of mental processes. Even in a pair of early sketches in which
the departure and return is relatively void of dramatic conflict, Hawthorne
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displays his interest in introspection as well as his commitment to sociality.
In "The Haunted Mind" almost nothing really seems to occur. Despite
the ominous word haunted, which recalls the "haunted chamber" of the
letter to Sophia that, too, would lead away from possible intimations of the
gothic and toward ordinary experience, the minimalist action of the story
is the chronicle of confused, random thoughts that arise in those minutes
during the middle of the night when one has awakened between stretches
of sleep. The other noteworthy feature of this sketch is the unusual second-
person mode of narrative address:
What a singular moment is the first one, when you have hardly begun to
recollect yourself, after starting from midnight slumber! By unclosing
your eyes so suddenly, you seem to have surprised the personages of
your dream in full convocation round your bed, and catch one broad
glance at them before they can flit into obscurity. Or, to vary the meta-
phor, you find yourself, for a single instant, wide awake in that realm of
illusions, whither sleep has been the passport, and behold its ghostly
inhabitants and wondrous scenery, with a perception of their strange-
ness, such as you never attain while the dream is undisturbed. (Tales,
304)
Both tone and imagery make clear that the narrator speaks from personal
experience; the sketch's very nature is so decidedly idiosyncratic and per-
sonal that no other possibility is tenable. But the ascription of the ex-
perience to another implies universality, that despite the highly personal
nature of the narrative the basic experience is commonly shared. This
foundation in common experience accompanies the idea of the mind as
subject (narrator) and object ("you") of psychological inquiry. The intro-
spective methodology of Upham's Common Sense psychology demands
this split in which the self becomes its own object of study. The embedded
narratee, the "you," resultantly assumes its two functions as an imagined
reader who has had analogous experiences and as the subject for inquiry.
This reenacts the methodological basis of Upham's psychology, in which
introspection reveals the operation of common faculties.
The thoughts and observations recounted in this sketch attain the
status of action only when a metaphor, the "train" of association, is im-
posed on mental activity. Hawthorne implies the possibility of a meaning-
ful link between what might otherwise appear to be random thoughts,
observations, or perceptions. The metaphor of travel is presented at the
start of the sketch with the use of the terms passport and scenery. Haw-
thorne plainly refers to the idea of the "train of association," a common-
place of association psychology, when he states, "Ah! that idea has brought
a hideous one in its train" (Tales, 306). The function of the associative
train is then described: "In an hour like this, when the mind has a passive
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sensibility, but no active strength; when the imagination is a mirror, im-
parting vividness to all ideas, without the power of selecting or controlling
them." The salient feature of the associative process is its passivity, its
openness to the unknown.
Some critics have cited Hawthorne's reliance on association psy-
chology as indicative of a Romantic vision of the mind and creativity.38
Certainly it is true that "The Haunted Mind" presents a vision of the
"intermediate space" (Tales, 305) that has been identified as a basic com-
ponent in Hawthorne's concept of creativity. Hawthorne's foregrounding
of the metaphor of travel ("Or, to vary the metaphor") bespeaks a very
conscious use of the theory of association and its impled metaphor. Despite
this appearance, an analysis of the action of the sketch shows that, instead
of a simple association psychology, Hawthorne presents an interplay of
willed thought and sensory perception with association. Along with mun-
dane perceptions of the bells of a church clock, the frosty air, or the light
of a star, a decision is made to defer thought on the analogy between the
frozen windowpanes and dreams: "There will be time enough to trace out
the analogy, while waiting the summons to breakfast" (Tales, 305). Else-
where, in an attempt to escape a series of gloomy thoughts, "You start
upright, breaking from a sort of conscious sleep" (Tales, 307), and then
"Your eye searches for whatever may remind you of the living world"
(Tales, 308).
This alternation of willed thought and unwilled association depicts
quite well the imaginative process as described by Upham: "Whatever a
person wills, or, rather, professes to will to imagine, he has, in fact, already
imagined; and consequently, there can be no such things as imaginations
which are exclusively the result of direct acts of will. So that the powers of
invention, although the influence and subordinate action of the will may be
considerable, must be aroused and quickened to their efforts in some other
way" (226). Upham took for granted the relationship between the imagi-
nation and the will, as indicated by his use of the word exclusively. Upham,
though, stressed the importance of unwilled association in order to distin-
guish himself from Thomas Reid, who excluded association from his psy-
chology. Reid's attack on association, or "the theory of ideas," was part of
his attempt to champion the cause of reason over what he saw as the threat
of radical subjectivity.39 Upham, following the lead of Dugald Stewart, saw
no problem with the concept of the imagination as a combination of asso-
ciated and willed thought together with sensory input. Moreover, Upham
presumed that the operation of the imagination followed the same basic
rules as those governing the powers of reason (221-22). Like Upham in the
Abridgement, Hawthorne asserts no priority between willed and unwilled
thought in "The Haunted Mind." The play between the two creates the
"intermediate space" associated by critics with creativity. This unusual
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mental state is sustained during this sketch only so long as the subject re-
mains awake. Once sleep arrives, association dominates, willed thought
and sensory perception recede, and the story is over: "Your spirit has
departed, and strays like a free citizen, among the people of a shadowy
world, beholding strange sights, yet without wonder or dismay. So calm,
perhaps, will be the final change; so undisturbed, as if among familiar
things, the entrance of the soul to its Eternal home!" {Tales, 309).
This conclusion, a return to a metaphysical "home," recalls the ending
to "Night Sketches." The narrator of "Night Sketches" presents a play be-
tween perception and fantasy during an evening walk. The sketch closes
with an image similar to that of "The Haunted Mind": "If we bear the lamp
of Faith, enkindled at a celestial fire, it will surely lead us home to that
Heaven whence its radiance was borrowed" (Tales, 432). Because of their
openness to fantasy and the unconscious, these two sketches might appear
to support readings that emphasize the gothic, the frightening impulses sup-
pressed in normal, rational, quotidian consciousness. But despite their
foreboding titles, both "The Haunted Mind" and "Night Sketches" present
images of balanced mental action in terms appropriate to the psychology of
Hawthorne's contemporaries. The key is that so long as mentation is guided
by the Common Sense principles of attention to external stimuli and
rational thought kept in balance with association then all is well. But Haw-
thorne's most popular descriptions of mental action tend to be those of
disordered thought. In these situations, the focus on the individual mind is
a focus on deviance, and the mental states explored are not offered as exem-
plary. A work in which such deviance is associated with narratives of
departure from home is "Egotism; or, The Bosom-Serpent," an account of a
successful return to normalcy following a period of alienation.
The bulk of comment on "Egotism" has been confined to explication
of the footnote Hawthorne appended to the title: "The physical fact, to
which it is here attempted to give a moral signification, has been known to
occur in more than one instance."40 Critics have found sources for the
image of the bosom serpent in classical literature, Puritan tracts, medical
texts, and journalistic reports, none of which really help to explain this ap-
parently simple story.41 The brief comments Hawthorne recorded in his
notebooks, which presumably were the origins of the tale, are limited in
their value to the reader, because they focus primarily on the significance of
symbol: "A type of envy or some other evil passion"; "a cherished sin."42
The symbol and its significance become apparent not through an analysis
of sources but through attention to the relationship between the plot dy-
namics of this highly moralized story and the protagonist's nature.
The story is about Roderick Elliston's domination by delusions and
hallucinations, in particular tactile hallucinations that lead to his belief in
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an indwelling snake. Elliston generalizes his case and exhibits the egotism
of the title, the "cherished sin," when he accuses others of the same condi-
tion and posits it as the normal human state. Despite the tale's ambiguity
(the etiological speculations on Elliston's malady as possibly sorrow, physi-
cal disease, guilt, or even dyspepsia), Elliston's misery is afforded a le-
gitimacy based on its real effects on his mental state, and the narrator sym-
pathetically offers information about Elliston in a manner consonant with
the eventual plot resolution. The uncertainty of the narrative account,
however, is significant. In the end, we are offered an interpretation of
Roderick Elliston's problem, but the narrator has access to information the
reader does not and displays this access prominently. References to things
beyond the reader's knowledge abound at the start, such as George Herki-
mer's comment on Rosina, identified several paragraphs later as the one
whose life is "indissolubly interwoven" with Elliston (Mosses, 270). A
proleptic reference is found in an early description of Elliston: "Herkimer
remarked that his complexion had a greenish tinge over its sickly white, re-
minding him of a species of marble out of which he had once wrought a
head of Envy, with her snaky locks" (Mosses, 269). More significantly,
vital information is given the reader, embedded in a subordinate clause:
"Shortly after Elliston's separation from his wife . . . " (Mosses, 270). The
earlier set of associations, likening Elliston's complexion to marble from
which Herkimer created an image of envy, becomes comprehensible to the
reader at the end of the tale when the sculptor announces the moral:
"A tremendous Egotism—manifesting itself, in your case, in the form of
jealousy—is as fearful a fiend as ever stole into the human heart" (Mosses,
283). Likewise, the offhand reference to Elliston's marital separation is
rendered significant only at the end when we see that marital reconciliation
drives out the serpent.
These instances of prolepsis, though they create a sense of ambiguity,
are relatively standard devices to promote suspense as well as to indicate
narrative control. But finally the process of reference transcends narrative
control when we are told, during a seemingly unimportant anecdote of
Elliston's crazy behavior, that one of Elliston's victims "was, in fact, the
very ship-master whom George Herkimer had encountered, under such
singular circumstances, in the Grecian Archipelago" (Mosses, 111). The
knowledge claimed by the narrator points to his identity as Herkimer,
the artist who rendered the image of envy. This identity is no surprise, for
the shape of the narrative is not that of Elliston's mental degeneration but
rather the course of Herkimer's progressive discovery of Elliston's illness.
The excess of detail offered here, the "singular circumstances" of which
we hear no more, manifests the artifice of the story, the fact that it is a
piece of narrative art, reaffirming the footnote at the start, which claims
46 THE SOCIAL SELF
that this is a moralized version of some event whose truth is common
knowledge. This break in the text, in which both too much and not
enough information is given, does not stand by itself. Instead, there are
other questions raised by the text, references insufficiently elucidated, that
point toward the conflict underlying "Egotism."
The action of the story, the reconstruction of the course of Elliston's
illness by Herkimer, runs a smooth course, but the cause of Elliston's prob-
lems, the impetus for the narrative itself, ultimately remains enigmatic.
By the close, we are left with the following information: that Rosina left El-
liston, presumably because of his jealousy; that over the course of their
four-year separation Elliston suffered from the belief he harbored a snake;
that he harassed the townspeople, proclaiming they suffered as he did; and,
finally, that Rosina decided to return to Elliston, and her return drove
out the snake. The moral announces a formal ending, yet the springs of
the tale's action remain as obscure as at the start. Even though it is sug-
gested that Rosina left because of Elliston's jealousy, we are never told any
more than that. Nor are we to know why Rosina chose to return when she
did or even why she chose to return at all. The narrative only points
toward causative events without adequately explicating them. In order to
show sufficient grounds for the narrative action, it is necessary to return to
the conflict between the individualistic method of introspection and the
idea of social validation of truth.
In the case of "Egotism," the composite image of home and wife
furnishes social validation. "When the woman leaves home, hallucinations,
delusions, and the loss of a feeling of relationship with the community
follow. Domestic relations thus serve to figure an entire social network, as
the woman is aligned with the idea of social stability. Hawthorne's letter to
Sophia Peabody, cited earlier, makes this association quite clear. Impris-
oned in his "lonely chamber," Hawthorne's "escape into the world" was
made possible by his relationship with Sophia.43 The identification of
the wife with the home and with society in general follows a cultural pat-
tern common to Hawthorne's day and our own. "When there is a threat to
the relationship with the primary female figure in Hawthorne's stories, the
sense of self begins to break down, and all social relations are problema-
tized. In terms of the conflict implicit to Common Sense psychology, when
social validation of individual insight is gone, mental disorders result.
Hawthorne's position on the conflict between individual insight and
social validation resists simple classification by allegiance because it is im-
possible to disentangle the one from the other. This entanglement is
reflected by the terms Hawthorne uses to describe the social relationships
lost by Elliston. To return to the introduction of Rosina's relationship with
Elliston, the narrator claims her life was "interwoven" with Elliston's
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(Mosses, 270). But very shortly thereafter, this same domestic image is
problematized when Elliston's pain is described: "The unfortunate man
clutched both hands upon his breast, as if an intolerable sting or torture
impelled him to rend it open, and let out the living mischief, even were it
intertwined [my emphasis] with his own life." This time the imagery of
weaving refers to a destructive influence, quite the opposite of the salvation
offered by Rosina. Still more equivocal is the narrator's assertion that
all who suffer chronic mental or physical diseases become obsessed with
themselves, whatever the cause, "whether it be sin, sorrow, or merely the
more tolerable calamity of some endless pain, or mischief among the cords
of mortal life" (Mosses, 273). These "cords," reminiscent of "the mag-
netic chain of humanity" abandoned by Ethan Brand (Snow-Image, 99),
may serve two purposes simultaneously, that of interconnection and that
of bondage. Hawthorne's equivocation dramatizes a basic conflict be-
tween individual introspection and a reliance on social validation of truth
claims.44
Roderick Elliston is rescued from isolation by Rosina's return to the
household, and by the time of "The Christmas Banquet," the story that
follows "Egotism" in Mosses from an Old Manse (both subtitled "From
the Unpublished 'Allegories of the Heart'"), Elliston has been sufficiently
rehabilitated to become the artist who himself narrates the tale. Rehabilita-
tion does not, however, necessarily follow domestic reunion. "Wakefield,"
a story perhaps most notable for its highly qualified narrative speculations,
presents a departure and reunion without such a promise. Wakefield
himself is the subject of some narrative questioning, but the absence of a
narrative resolution to the question of why Wakefield behaves as he does
suggests the counterbalancing importance of the basic plot form.45 Con-
forming to the moral associated with the plot of departure and return, the
conclusion presents a powerful vision of the necessity of—and tenuousness
of—sociality: "Amid the seeming confusion of our mysterious world, indi-
viduals are so nicely adjusted to a system, and systems to one another, and
to a whole, that, by stepping aside for a moment, a man exposes himself to
a fearful risk of losing his place forever. Like Wakefield, he may become, as
it were, the Outcast of the Universe" (Tales, 140).
The emphasis here on social bonds may be understood as ironic, but
Hawthorne's placement of the tale directly after "Little Annie's Ramble"
in Twice-Told Tales suggests a thematic continuity, albeit with deepening
complexity. This complexity fully emerges in Hawthorne's more acclaimed
short story "Young Goodman Brown." Having seen the way Common
Sense thought provided a theoretical structure of selfhood in relationship
to sociality, and with an awareness of how Hawthorne's narratives of de-
partures and return home explore different aspects of this relationship, we
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are in a position to observe how Hawthorne's problematic depiction of
selfhood in "Young Goodman Brown" probes the limits of Common Sense
thought by foregrounding the tension between the "opposing forces of
social and personal intentionality."46
The implications of introspection and individual psychology in Haw-
thorne's work are best understood when they are situated against the
socializing concept of benevolence, an eighteenth-century commonplace
that was still an active force in nineteenth-century psychology and moral
thought. Despite the predominance of individualistic economics, the idea
of benevolence maintained a hold on the American imagination, as typified
by the popularity of the sentimental novel and the social criticism of the
day. For example, one labor union president explicitly acknowledged the
doctrine of self-interest at the heart of American laissez-faire economics,
but he simultaneously based his argument in defense of unions on an
appeal to his audience's feelings of benevolence: "In order to mitigate the
evils that ever flow from inordinate desire and unrestricted selfishness, to
restrain and chastise unlawful ambition, to protect the weak against the
strong, and to establish an equilibrium of power among nations and indi-
viduals, conventional compacts [i.e., labor unions] were formed."47 The
notable attribute of this address is its presumed audience: not workers,
whose motivation would be self-interest, but those uninvolved in the labor
struggle, for whom the only operative force would be sympathy. The
speaker continued: "We have the consolation of knowing that all good
men, all who love their country, and rejoice in the improvement of the con-
dition of their fellow men, will acknowledge the policy of our views and
the purity of our motives."48 The appeal here is toward a collective view of
society in which mutual support would prevail.
Straightforward expressions of the importance of benevolence con-
stituted a large part of antebellum discourse. For example, they formed
much of the basis of popular sentimental novels. Whether or not one
agrees that these novels articulated a fully developed critique and alter-
native to the prevalent nineteenth-century laissez-faire ideology, the appeal
of novels grounded in sentimental principles was unquestionably powerful,
and their power no doubt drew in part from the fact that the doctrines they
espoused were a common part of the academic curriculum.
The records of Hawthorne's formal education and his readings
are consistent with common practice—they indicate his familiarity with
the moral writings of Adam Smith (The Theory of Moral Sentiments),
Thomas Brown (Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind), and
Francis Hutcheson (who acknowledged Shaftesbury's influence on the title
page of AM Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue).49
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These works on moral philosophy, in conjunction with Upham's psychol-
ogy, employed the same basic terms and approaches Hawthorne adopted
when discussing benevolence and its social significance. The operation of
benevolence apparently was understood to counterbalance economic in-
dividualism; the power of "irresistible compassion" was posited as "an
automatic mechanism for social good, not simply an intellectual option."50
Adam Smith accordingly described benevolence as a "social passion," a
way we are moved almost mechanically to feeling through an act of imagi-
nary identification with the suffering (or pleasure) of another.51 Hutcheson
similarly described an "Instinct toward Benevolence" and further declared
that "the ordinary Springs of Vice among Men, must then be suppos'd
to be a mistaken Self-Love, made too violent, so as to overcome Bene-
volence."52 And, as Thomas Brown insisted, "[Nature] has given us a be-
nevolence that desires the good of all."53 These affirmations of benevolence
became prescriptive moral statements in Thomas Upham's psychology.
Upham understood mutual love to be the general rule, as opposed to
the alternatives of indifference or, worse, mutual hostility. Nevertheless, he
did not think all instances of benevolence expressed moral significance.
The introspective Common Sense method led him to believe that parental,
filial, or fraternal concerns tended to be instinctual rather than volitional;
hence, the exercise of these faculties did not convey the same moral value
as did expressions of disinterested concern.
Despite questions as to precisely which expressions of benevolence
were instinctual and which were volitional, Upham agreed with Smith and
Hutcheson that domestic relations furnished important indices of benevo-
lence. Disturbances in domestic relations were considered manifestations
of what Upham termed "perversions of the benevolent affections" (473).
Upham, illustrating the effects of this problem, recalled a case history, orig-
inally offered by Benjamin Rush, of "a citizen of Philadelphia, who was
remarkable for his strong affection for his wife and children when his
mind was in a sound state, who was occasionally afflicted with this apathy,
and, when under its influence, lost his affection for them all so entirely,
that he said he could see them butchered before his eyes without feeling
any distress, or even inclination to rise from his chair to protect them"
(474). This description of a severe depressive state is noteworthy because it
illustrates, through the horror the reader was expected to feel, the primary,
instinctual form of benevolence that was understood to exist within the
family. The more general desire for good to all was thus an attenuated
form of the familial bond, and it was accordingly taken to be volitional
rather than instinctual.54
The relationship between the individual and society within Haw-
thorne's stories frequently reveals an interplay between two important sets
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of problems inherent to Common Sense thought: (1) the tension between
the introspecting individual and the community that affirms the reality of
the individual's inquiry; and (2) the question of how the force that ensures
social cohesion, benevolence (along with its originating site, the family), is
to be understood in relation to the introspecting individual. Although in-
trospection itself does not automatically create a hazard, when the process
takes place within a character whose commitment to social bonds is sus-
pect, the individual faces the epistemological crisis that ensues when one's
knowledge differs from the conventional and, in addition, the social diffi-
culty of reintegration into the community. This related pair of problems
arises in "Young Goodman Brown."
As does "The Haunted Mind," "Young Goodman Brown" presents
the reader with a simple course of action within the framework of a
strange, hallucinatory narrative: Brown leaves home in the middle of the
night, walks about in the forest, and then returns home. The return home,
hardly so peaceful as in the preceding stories and sketches, is shaped by the
significance of Brown's perceptions while in the forest, perceptions that
seemingly relate to Brown's unstated motivation for his midnight journey.
This motivation has spurred much critical debate. From the historicist
point of view, Brown appears to be acting out the guilt and anxieties of
third-generation American Puritans.55 The more prevalent discussions of
"Young Goodman Brown" have emphasized psychological terms insofar as
they are presumed to indicate Hawthorne's individualistic protest against
the strictures of a conformist community.56 Advocates of the historicist
approach—most notably Colacurcio, who admonishes, "We must psy-
chologize with caution"—object to interpretations of "Young Goodman
Brown" that universalize the psychological experience instead of situating
it in the historical circumstances of late-seventeenth-century Puritan
New England.57 But a reading of "Young Goodman Brown" within the
context of nineteenth-century psychology accounts for Brown's actions
and also obviates antagonism between historical and psychological inter-
pretations.
The nature of Brown's experience, whether regarded as a distorted
initiation ritual or as an immature test of his own faith, reveals multiple
levels of psychological disorder. The most obvious is Brown's dream ex-
perience or, alternately, his hallucinations and delusions in the forest. The
ambiguity of the narrative is most strikingly illustrated by the "something"
that fluttered down through the air, which Brown "beheld" as a pink
ribbon (Mosses, 83). By contrast, Hawthorne signals an answer to his ques-
tion, "Had Goodman Brown fallen asleep in the forest, and only dreamed
a wild dream of a witch-meeting?" when he states in the following para-
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graph that "it was a dream of evil omen for young Goodman Brown," later
referring to "the night of that fearful dream" (Mosses, 89). Brown's
"dream," whatever its relationship to late-Puritan guilt feelings, illustrates
what Upham would call a disordered intellectual action.
Upham discussed hallucinations of the visual, auditory, and tactile
variety in his descriptions of disordered intellectual action. As his tri-
partite psychology indicated, the disorders of the intellect logically would
precede those problems of sensibility, or emotion, and of will. Because of
the intellect's primacy, its problems were most closely associated with
the physical bases of many disorders, and Upham relied on this association
to cite a variety of physical causes for hallucinations or "excited con-
ceptions and apparitions" (232). These physical causes included retinal
sensitivity, neglect of periodic blood-letting, febrile states, and cerebral
"inflammations" brought on by such things as excessive alcohol consump-
tion. Most pertinent to Brown's problem is the "melancholy imagination"
described by Upham: "[These cases of melancholy imagination] in general
attract but little notice, although sources of exquisite misery to the subjects
of them. But such are the extravagant dreams in which they indulge; such
are the wrong views of the character and actions of men, which their busy
and melancholy imaginations are apt to form, that they cannot be reck-
oned persons of truly sound minds" (255). This account of melancholy is
of interest because of how its stress differs from that of present-day de-
scriptions of depression, which emphasize the sufferer's intractable dys-
phoric mood and associated physical disorders. The pivotal moments in
. Upham's description of "the melancholy imagination" are the "extravagant
dreams" that reveal "wrong views" of the people around them. Upham's
description of this socially and emotionally isolated state sounds almost
diagnostic of Brown.
Brown's melancholy is revealed after his forest experience: "A stern,
a sad, a darkly meditative, a distrustful, if not a desperate man, did he
become, from the night of that fearful dream" (Mosses, 89). But this mel-
ancholy, this final indication of Brown's disorder, is signaled at the be-
ginning by his overwhelming desire to go off into the woods to witness for
himself the imagined actions of witches. Hawthorne, recalling the obses-
sion of the witchcraft trials with empirical and spectral evidence, places
Brown within a culturally sanctioned Puritan tradition of witnessing for
oneself. When translated into the context of nineteenth-century American
psychology, an implicit critique of the Puritan tradition emerges because,
according to Upham, Brown's need to see for himself indicates a kind of
insanity. Of the three types of associated disorders of belief classified by
Upham, the first bears directly on the opening to "Young Goodman
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Brown": "The first class are those who seem incapable of believing any-
thing which they are required to receive on the testimony of others. They
must see it with their own eyes" (256). Brown's desire to test his Puritan
faith, as well as Faith's trust in him, is already symptomatic.
Hawthorne dramatizes Brown's self-imposed solitude by presenting
Brown's trial of faith as subsequent to his rejection of Faith's attempt to
dissuade him from the journey. The sense of isolation Brown presumably
felt prior to his experience, his presumptive motivation, is amplified by his
isolation in the forest. Brown's fantasy that all his neighbors, and even his
forebears, were involved in a grand conspiracy he somehow managed to
uncover is confirmed by his identification of neighbors and family mem-
bers at the witches' convocation. But Brown's madness is signaled from the
very start. The narrator suggests that Brown's perceptions are disordered
when, at the beginning of Brown's walk on the narrow forest path, it is
stated that there was "this peculiarity in such a solitude, that the traveller
knows not who may be concealed by the innumerable trunks and the thick
boughs overhead" (Mosses, 75; my emphasis). The steady equivocation of
the narrator would seem an attempt to replicate in the reader the un-
certainty of Brown in the forest. Thus Brown sees his companion's staff
writhe like a snake, though the narrator reports that his vision could "have
been an ocular deception, assisted by the uncertain light" (Mosses, 76); al-
though Goody Cloyse seems to appear, for example, the narrator is care-
ful to state that it was Brown who "recognized" her (Mosses, 78); the
voices of the old minister and Deacon Gookin are heard, but, despite his
best efforts, Goodman Brown, "pulling aside the branches, and thrusting
forth his head as far as he durst," was unable to discern "so much as a
shadow" (Mosses, 81); and, though Brown suspects he hears the voices of
his townspeople, the narrator reports that it may have been "the murmur
of the old forest" (Mosses, 82).
Brown's perceptual difficulties are both complicated and motivated
by his sense of himself as radically disenfranchised from his community. His
alienation from his community may be described in Common Sense terms
as based in the sentiment of malevolence or, alternatively, a lack of benevo-
lence. These terms, malevolence and benevolence, are important because
they directly address the question of the individual's relationship with the
community. Brown's perceptions lead to his feeling alienated from his com-
munity. But Hawthorne has indicated in "The Haunted Mind" and "Night
Sketches" that such alienation does not automatically spring from intro-
spection and association. The complicating factor in "Young Goodman
Brown" is Brown's basic emotional response to those around him: fear.
The overwhelming feeling projected by the narrative of Brown's ex-
perience in the forest is that of fear. Fear, in Upham's psychology, fell under
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the general heading of benevolence and malevolence; these constituted two
primary passions, with fear a category of the latter:
The passion of Fear like the other passions or affections that have
passed under examination, embraces both a simple emotion of pain
aroused by some object which we anticipate will be injurious to us,
and also additional to the painful emotion, the desire of avoiding such
object or its injurious effects. . . .  the fact that we experience pain in
viewing the object feared, accompanied by the desire of avoiding it,
seems very clearly to involve the idea that it is an object of greater or
less aversion. In other words, that we have more or less ill will towards
it . . . .
It is a state of mind of great power, and one which will not bear
to be trifled with. It may serve as a profitable hint to remark, that
there have been persons thrown into a fright suddenly, and perhaps in
mere sport, which has immediately resulted in a most distressing and
permanent mental disorganization.—In cases where the anticipated
evil is very great, and there is no hope of avoiding it in any way, the
mind exists in that state which is called DESPAIR. [370]
The congruence of Upham's description of fear and Brown's mental de-
generation is striking. Brown's fear of his neighbors manifests itself in
his initial distrust and his need to test his faith. Those same neighbors
whom he is later unable to trust are likewise fear-inspiring in the forest.
Brown's experienced lack of social engagement culminates in the despair
that persists throughout his life, so that "his dying hour was gloom"
(Mosses, 90).
But Hawthorne's rendering of fear as Brown's motivation and his
final state deserves a closer look since, despite the course of narrative
action, the only change within Brown is the making salient of psychological
features that had been latent from the beginning. To appreciate the com-
plexity of Brown's fear, we need to recall both the plot conventions within
Hawthorne's stories of departure from home and subsequent return, and
the semiotics of the sentimental formula as described by Fred G. See: "The
rules of this [sentimental] fiction develop the possibility of a natural return,
through maternal intervention, to that absent unity. Maternal intervention
becomes the matrix . . . at which we are gazing, and through which we may
return to an original myth of infancy: infans, without speech, without need
for language but replete with intention and understanding."58 See cor-
relates the function of return with what antebellum thinkers routinely pre-
sented as the site of benevolence—home and family—itself most sharply
denoted in the mother-child relationship. This return arrives with both
promise and threat. The promise is the fulfillment of primal desire and the
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recovery of that which is absent. But the threat may indeed be more signifi-
cant to the narrative function within "Young Goodman Brown": the loss
of language and, with the loss of language, the abandonment of interpreta-
tion. This threatened loss of language is overwhelming, particularly when
the self arises through the course of narration, as it does when
Hawthorne translates Common Sense ideas of selfhood into a mode of
narration.
The crises of Hawthorne's narratives of departure and return reach
their most highly developed state in "Young Goodman Brown." Through-
out these stories and sketches, the self arises as a structure that makes
narration not only possible but necessary as a means of situating the
self within a social milieu. When the self seeks fulfillment in sociality, the
narrative of its ventures into the world charts the varied deferrals of such
fulfillment, even when the self's travels are as modest as little Annie's
ramble and the motivations are as simple as her "longing after the mystery
of the great world." The operation of narrative deferral reaches its fullest
form in accounts of individual withdrawal, such as Goodman Brown's.
In purely psychological terms, Brown's withdrawal suggests a lack of sym-
pathy. It simultaneously suggests, however, in a manner concordant with
Common Sense psychology, that the self has a resource with which to defer
engagement with the community (or family). This resource, introspection,
becomes the necessary ground for narrative, and the disengagement of the
self from the social realm, a disengagement characterized by the silences of
Wakefield and Goodman Brown, is displaced by the artist's rhetorical
engagement with an audience. In the case of a relatively simple story like
"Egotism," which, like "Young Goodman Brown," presents interpretive
crises, questions about language use are foreclosed with the plot resolution
and the rendering of the protagonist's problems as a symptomatic em-
bodiment of moral and psychological difficulties. In "Young Goodman
Brown," however, the problematic epistemological questions of the know-
ing, introspecting self readily suggest additional questions about the
significance of interpretation, or, to use Budick's phrasing, "the process of
meaning making," and the social regulation of interpretation.59
Brown creates meaning when interpreting his natural and social envi-
ronment, and the reader makes meaning interpreting Brown's dilemma.
The obvious analogy here is one that, I think, may well be worth resisting
or at least deferring, for "Young Goodman Brown" presents more than a
simple allegory of reading. Instead, interpretation, a necessary function of
selfhood within Common Sense thought, works in Hawthorne's short
works to define the self as stable and social or, alternatively, to reveal prob-
lems of sociality when the self is fixated by the interpretive process and
seduced by the prospects of some original knowledge. The play between
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the dangers of solipsism and the demands for interpretation provides the
basis for Hawthorne's other, more complex depictions of the interpreting
self, such as that offered in The Scarlet Letter, in which Hawthorne poses
the problem of how introspecting, interpreting selves that require sociality
must create or find meaning within a tainted cultural framework.
3"But the Past Was Not Dead"
Aesthetics, History, and Community in
Grandfather's Chair and The Scarlet Letter
In "Young Goodman Brown," "Egotism; or, The Bosom-Serpent," and
the other short works discussed in the preceding chapter, Hawthorne high-
lights the value of domestic stability and the dangers enveloping those who
attempt explorations of themselves or their social environments without a
firm domestic grounding. Hawthorne's warning, repeated in so many of
his writings, bears emphasis: although the individual consciousness may
provide the site for psychological exploration by way of introspective pro-
cesses, any individual claims to knowledge of the truth must stand the
social test of reproducibility. If others cannot ultimately confirm individual
insights, those insights are depicted by Hawthorne as at best suspect and
potentially delusory, and at worst dangerous. Such an epistemological as-
sertion seems, however, more appropriate to the sciences than to aesthetic
works, and it even threatens to violate the spirit of Hawthorne's represen-
tations of individual psychological experiences. These representations
often lead Hawthorne's readers to find in his writings accounts of the in-
dividual consciousness as outposts of resistance against a society that re-
wards those in power with wealth and, of greater ultimate consequence,
with the (frequently self-serving) guardianship of popular truth. It is diffi-
cult to align this understanding of Hawthorne with the Common Sense
claim that epistemological certainty is properly the province of a relatively
complacent society rather than the potentially subversive individual. The
Hawthorne who exposes the Pyncheons' crude acquisitiveness in The
House of the Seven Gables, the creator of arguably the strongest female
character of nineteenth-century fiction in The Scarlet Letter—how is he to
be reconciled with such deeply conformist ideas and ideals as those present
in "Egotism," "Sunday at Home," and other, less frequently anthologized,
conventionally sentimental, and moralizing works?
This is the problem that Nina Baym identified when she speculated
that an epistemological break separates the romances of the 1850s from
Hawthorne's earlier works.1 The problem that Baym discussed is one that
Hawthorne's interpreters still must come to terms with, particularly be-
cause a consequence of presuming with Baym a radical epistemological
break is the allied presumption that Hawthorne anticipates decidedly
56
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twentieth-century concerns. A recent explication of "The Minister's Black
Veil," offered by the distinctly antihistoricist J. Hillis Miller as represent-
ing all of Hawthorne's writings, shows one consequence of this type of
thinking. Miller, attentive to those things that Hawthorne leaves unsaid
and therefore ambiguous, asserts that "the lifting of a veil only reveals an-
other veil behind, as Hawthorne's story 'shows.'"2 Because the chain of
signification allows for no specifiable end, Hawthorne's meaning, Miller
insists, is violated when subjected to methods that make claims to interpre-
tive specificity. Miller's remarks about Hawthorne are noteworthy because
they convey the power Hawthorne's ironic and multivalent style has held
for generations of critics.3
With the exceptions of Emerson and Melville, no other antebellum
writer so consistently made demands on readers to adopt new interpretive
modes, and Hawthorne's formal innovations, while proving a continuing
inspiration and challenge to critics, have played a large role in sustaining
scholarly interest in his work. Critics during the 1950s and 1960s estab-
lished the modernist reading of Hawthorne's ambiguities, one in which an
aesthetics of ambiguity meshed with meaning in Hawthorne's romances so
as to convey a radical skepticism about social authority when it is chal-
lenged by the individual consciousness. Critics since that time who have,
like Miller, adopted a deconstructive approach have found in Hawthorne's
works an analogously postmodern design, one in which problems of
formal uncertainty lead the perceptive reader toward the thematic consid-
erations of epistemological and existential uncertainties.4 The demands
that Hawthorne places on his readers cannot be dismissed; the reader must
adapt to uncomfortable doubts and equivocations about characters' moti-
vations and events within Hawthorne's stories. But, in the face of Haw-
thorne's fictions of sociality, it is difficult to conclude that Hawthorne's
writings display a postmodern indeterminacy. And, given the earlier criti-
cisms of communal verification of truth, as in "Young Goodman Brown"
(1835), and later endorsements of sociality, like those of "Ethan Brand"
and "The Great Stone Face" (both 1850), as well as Tanglewood Tales
(1853), a precise shift in Hawthorne's allegiances seems obscure. A chal-
lenge to the reader of Hawthorne thus emerges: How are Hawthorne's
epistemologically certain and moralistic writings to be reconciled with his
deeply ironic and ambiguously multivalent works, such as his romances
and stories like "Young Goodman Brown"?
To respond to this question, this chapter will juxtapose Hawthorne's
most radical social critique, The Scarlet Letter, in terms of its aesthetic,
historiographic, and psychological bases, against his highly moralistic
children's history, The Whole History of Grandfather's Chair. Grand-
father's Chair, like all of Hawthorne's writings for children, poses a di-
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lemma for scholars. It is difficult to correlate a strictly antiauthoritarian
interpretation of The Scarlet Letter with a reading of Hawthorne's conven-
tionally moral children's literature. Scholars generally have sought to deal
with this problem in one of three ways: (1) most popularly, by totally ig-
noring the children's literature; (2) by pronouncing it decidedly inferior
"hackwork," unfit for sustained scholarly attention; or, most recently, (3)
by finding beneath the surface of the children's literature "alternative re-
alities, worlds of magic, alchemy, and disguise, that encourage an escape
from the hegemony within and without the stories."5 The discussion of
The Whole History of Grandfather's Chair to be offered here will take a
different route, one informed by attention to the antebellum debate over
American history and, more significantly, to early-nineteenth-century
thinking about aesthetics.
Antebellum ideas about aesthetics are closely related on several levels
to the psychology discussed in the preceding chapter. Both were guided by
the precepts of the prevalent Common Sense moral philosophy, and fre-
quently their objects of inquiry overlapped. The overlap is not surprising,
given the fact that aesthetic responses combine those intellectual actions
necessary for interpretation with the readers' affective reactions. Psycho-
logical faculties were necessarily understood to be involved in interpretation
and in the creation of the work of art, as Thomas Upham's descriptions of
the imagination indicated. Upham was himself a published poet, and, along
with many others of his time, he advocated a national literature. The desire
for a national literature and a postcolonial artistic identity is not to be
lightly taken. The preceding chapter advanced the argument that when
Hawthorne's depictions of individual psychology are understood in the con-
text of antebellum psychology he, like many of his contemporaries, emerges
as an advocate of domestic and social stability. Antebellum literary nation-
alism may be similarly understood to have been, like Common Sense psy-
chology, a response to the threats against community cohesion experienced
by Hawthorne and his middle-class contemporaries.
Hawthorne's commitment to social cohesion creates, as in "Young
Goodman Brown," the potential for tension between it and the value his
writings ascribe to individual experience and consciousness. The place
where consciousness and social cohesion must meet, in Common Sense
terms, is in the social corroboration of individual insights. When the intro-
specting individual cannot corroborate insights socially, then the dilemma
of young Goodman Brown—or, in The Scarlet Letter, those of Hester
Prynne and Arthur Dimmesdale—arises. But Brown's situation also raises
a troubling question: When social judgments are themselves suspect, on
what bases are individual insights to be validated? Obviously, the Puritan
community that had been engaged in witch-hunts compromised its own
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claim to epistemological certainty, particularly according to the values of
nineteenth-century "liberal culture," as Bercovitch designates it in The
Office of the Scarlet Letter. This epistemological problem, one left unre-
solved by "Young Goodman Brown," remains prominent in The Scarlet
Letter. With The Scarlet Letter, Hawthorne was able to deliver a narrative
solution to this problem, and perhaps it is because of this resolution that
in Hawthorne's subsequent work the problem never recurs so strongly.
Within The Scarlet Letter, Hawthorne poses a number of other concerns
and formulations that arose in his other writings, most notably the con-
frontation with the found object that requires the artist's intervention for it
to communicate and thus be available for an audience's interpretations. As
I will argue, the foregrounding of interpretation does more than simply re-
capitulate certain Common Sense empiricist tendencies; it also translates
the issue of the self's confrontation with its social and material milieus into
the realm of semiotics and language. It is through the social power of lan-
guage that Hawthorne will resolve the tensions of The Scarlet Letter, and it
is because of this social power that Hawthorne's contemporaries under-
stood aesthetics to be important.
The moral and psychological preoccupations that shaped Hawthorne's
aesthetics reflect the Common Sense outlook, one that looked backwards
toward an imagined time when individual and communal allegiances main-
tained a balance with each other. The aesthetic principles that correlate
with this balance are distinctly eighteenth-century, and we may look to Dr.
Johnson's "Preface to Shakespeare" (1765) for an articulation of this posi-
tion. Johnson defended the value of individual genius against those who
would attack the individual genius—in this case, Shakespeare—for not
adhering to conventions of aesthetic unity: "The work of a correct and
regular writer is a garden accurately formed and diligently planted, varied
with shades, and scented with flowers; the composition of Shakespeare is a
forest . . .  filling the eye with awful pomp and gratifying the mind with
endless diversity."6 This organic metaphor dramatizes Johnson's claim that
Shakespeare's genius was a "natural" attribute, one which transcended the
"minute and slender" criticism for not attending to dramatic rules posed
by French neoclassical critics.7
But, as Johnson pointed out at the start of his essay, this defense of
Shakespeare ultimately relies on common experience as the means to vali-
date the truth of artistic judgments:
To works, however, of which the excellence is not absolute and defi-
nite, but gradual and comparative; to works not raised upon principles
demonstrative and scientifick, but appealing wholly to observation
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and experience, no other test can be applied than length of duration
and continuance of esteem. What mankind have long possessed they
have often examined and compared; and if they persist to value the
possession, it is because frequent comparisons have confirmed opinion
in its favour. . . .
The reverence due to writings that have long subsisted arises
therefore not from any credulous confidence in the superior wisdom
of past ages, or gloomy persuasion of the degeneracy of mankind, but
is the consequence of acknowledged and indubitable positions, that
what has been longest known has been most considered, and what is
most considered is best understood.8
Much as Common Sense psychology espoused the social ratification of indi-
vidual insights, Johnson's defense of Shakespeare was framed by a social
orientation toward aesthetic valuation. Johnson was, of course, no twenti-
eth-century social constructivist, and his claims about the value of com-
mon responses were not complicated by ideological criticism. Societal
responses here came as close as possible to duplicating the "demonstrative
and scientifick" methods of empiricist disciplines; they provided the most
reliable access to truth. And, in a similar fashion, early-nineteenth-century
American critics discussed and defended literature's value in social terms,
terms that presumed ultimate ideas about stable and universal truths.
A coherent body of critical thought prevailed in the United States
during Hawthorne's time, one described by William Charvat in his study
of early-nineteenth-century aesthetics as "the work of a practically homo-
geneous upper class which felt itself competent to legislate, culturally, for
other classes."9 Critics tended to be "men of the world—lawyers, legis-
lators, ministers, physicians, and teachers," rather than academicians or
journalists.10 Certain basic principles guided their evaluations of literature:
opposition to rebellion against the existing order, conformity to religious
and moral standards, a desire for philosophical optimism, intelligibility,
and a social rather than egocentric outlook. Their politically conservative
program further promoted the notion of didactics as an appropriate liter-
ary function." The prescriptive concept, that literary presentation of an
ideal social behavior inculcated virtue, formed the basis of the neoclassical
defense of literature's social function. Along these lines, Hawthorne's
fiction itself was accorded praise for its "fine moral tone."12 One contem-
porary critic who found reason to question "the mental and moral in-
fluence of the most faultless novels and tales of the fashion now current"
instead preferred Hawthorne's "higher fiction," which "breathes into
[things] a vital glow, writes upon them the image of the unseen and spiri-
tual, and robes them in a softer light, a richer charm, a purer beauty."13
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This praise for Hawthorne's imaginative fiction involved not mere recogni-
tion of its technical virtues but satisfaction over its presumed social effects.
Even those who have been identified as precursors to Emerson, such as
William Ellery Channing and William Cullen Bryant, affirm concepts con-
gruent with the theories advanced by explicitly hegemonic critics.14
Bryant's "Lectures on Poetry" (1825-26) furnish a valuable example
of how a desire for social stability could merge in aesthetic theory with an
affirmation of individual expression. The "Lectures" initially convey the
expressivist idea that "the great spring of poetry is emotion."15 Bryant
aligned individual emotion with ideas reminiscent of didactic criticism
when he suggested that the mind instinctively would recognize truths: "Do
we not know that poetry delights in inspiring compassion, the parent of all
kind offices? Does it not glory in sentiments of fortitude and magnanimity,
the fountain of disinterested sacrifices? It cherishes patriotism, the incite-
ment to vigorous toils endured for the welfare of communities. It luxuri-
ates among the natural affections, the springs of all the gentle charities of
domestic life. . . ."16 The distinctly social orientation, the affirmation of
domesticity and patriotism, and the condemnation of self-interest were all
values common to sentimental fiction and worthy of the approval of most
of the critics Charvat designates as spokesmen for "their own homogenous
patrician society." William Ellery Channing, in his "Remarks on National
Literature" (1823), argued along similar lines that literature "is plainly
among the most powerful methods of exalting the character of a nation, of
forming a better race of men; in truth, we apprehend that it may claim the
first rank among the means of improvement. We know nothing so fitted to
the advancement of society as to bring its higher minds to bear upon the
multitude."17 The social value of literature is here restated amid a general
call for literature as an expression of national character. The desire for
a postcolonial national identity when combined with a strong sense of
community-based recognition of truth provided an aesthetic counterpart
to Common Sense ideas about individual psychology. Admittedly, the no-
tions of national identity and an innate ability to recognize truth may be
identified with Romantic values. Nevertheless, it is important to under-
stand these statements not simply as precursors to Transcendentalism but
as expressions of a fully developed belief system in its own right.
The theoretical basis for this approach to literature found its most
complete statement in Archibald Alison's extremely influential Essays on
the Nature and Principles ofTaste.n Like Upham's Abridgement of Mental
Philosophy, Alison's work presented the inherent contradiction of Com-
mon Sense thought that simultaneously relied on a socially oriented, real-
ist epistemology and a potentially subjective, introspective methodology.
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Alison's central concept, association, reflects this inherent tension. Associ-
ation, generally taken to be an attribute of an individualist epistemology,
was definitively grounded in the social realm by Alison. Alison's method
was basically that of reader response—he attempted an empirical approach
to works of art when he stated that "repeated Experiments" are necessary
to judge accurately the effects of aesthetic phenomena.19 The effects of
these phenomena, the semiotic process by which associative trains are
formed, are predicated by two types of signs, the natural and the conven-
tional.
The natural sign provided the basis for his theory of universal re-
sponse to aesthetic phenomena. Thus, he commented on autumn: "Who
is there, who, at this season, does not feel his mind impressed with a senti-
ment of melancholy?" (Essays, 17). The train of association that began
with the sensory signs of autumn universally would lead to the specific
feeling of melancholy. Similarly, Alison argued that numerous "material
signs" (Essays, 181) engendered specific emotional responses: "The
Strength of the Oak, the delicacy of the Myrtle, the boldness of a Rock, the
modesty of the Violet, etc. are expressions common in all languages, and so
common, that they are scarcely in any, considered as figurative. . . . How
much the effect of descriptions of natural scenery arises from that person-
ification, which is founded upon such associations, I believe there is no
man of common taste who must not often have been sensible" (Essays,
183-84). Alison treated a variety of visual, auditory, and other sensory phe-
nomena in what essentially comprises a catalog of aesthetic responses.
These were understood to be universal responses based in common taste;
although Alison did acknowledge unique individual associations, the most
noteworthy are those which were shared. The word common was of strate-
gic value to Alison, for he opposed what he refers to as "philosophy"
against the "common opinion [which] is by much the most defensible"
(Essays, 316). Alison argued here that philosophical explanations of aes-
thetics were secondary to explanations based on experience, specifically
common experience. Thus, he followed Dugald Stewart's lead of grounding
association theory within a social context.20
Alison could appropriate the theory of association to social rather
than individual ends because he took as axiomatic the empirical validation
of aesthetic judgments. He proceeded from traditional responses to natu-
ral signs onward to various responses to conventional signs. Thus, his-
torical associations would enhance the effect of natural scenes: "The
majesty of the Alps themselves is increased by the remembrance of
Hannibal's march over them; and who is there, that could stand on the
banks of the Rubicon, without feeling his imagination kindle, and his
heart beat high?" (Essays, 27). Alison noted as one product of "national
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associations" the "effect of the celebrated national song, which is said to
overpower the Swiss soldier in a foreign land with melancholy and de-
spair" (Essays, 35). Further conventional responses might be found among
people who share an occupation; conditioned to regard the world from a
specific point of view, they would value certain things while rejecting
others as worthless (Essays, 87-89). In short, common mental habits were
crucial to Alison's aesthetics.
A focus on history and tradition as the bases for conventional sig-
nification fully accords with the didactic emphasis of so much early-
nineteenth-century criticism, for without a shared tradition the attempt of
the artist to evoke certain associated responses would have been futile.
Within the American context, the attempt to invent a new tradition still
had as its theoretical basis Alison's sign theory and a concomitant reliance
on social validation. The artist's work in the new tradition was twofold: to
use traditional associations in the production of aesthetic effects, and
to revise the traditional at the same time so as to make it more relevant to
American conditions. This artistic task largely shaped Hawthorne's use of
history in his children's writings.
Hawthorne's writings for children were not confined to histories—before
he wrote The Whole History of Grandfather's Chair and Biographical Sto-
ries for Children, Hawthorne had achieved sufficient recognition for his
children's fiction to encourage continued production for this audience.21
The Whole History of Grandfather's Chair, his most substantial nonfiction
juvenile project, first appeared in three separate volumes: Grandfather's
Chair, completed in late 1840, treated the history of the Puritans up until
the witchcraft trials of 1692; the two subsequent volumes, Famous Old
People and Liberty Tree, published in early 1841, gave an anecdotal history
through the American Revolution. Hawthorne expressed his didactic goal
most directly in the preface to a book that appeared the following year, Bio-
graphical Stories for Children: "This small volume, and others of a similar
character, from the same hand, have not been composed without a deep
sense of responsibility. The author regards children as sacred, and would
not, for the world, cast anything into the fountain of a young heart, that
might embitter and pollute its waters."22 The biographical stories that
follow, set within a fairly perfunctory narrative frame of a family with three
children, promote conventional values. So, for example, when the children
fight, they are told the story of Dr. Johnson, who, as a boy, refused his
gravely ill father's request that young Sam work in his stead selling books
at the public market in Uttoxeter. Johnson's refusal left him so greatly
stricken with remorse that fifty years later he went out on market-day to Ut-
toxeter to perform silent public penance. The narrator concludes, "My dear
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children, if you have grieved—I will not say, your parents—but, if you have
grieved the heart of any human being, who has a claim upon your love, then
think of Samuel Johnson's penance!" (True Stories, 248).
This manipulative tale with its message of filial piety conveys the
moral tone Hawthorne typically assumes with children. The imaginative
quality we customarily associate with children's literature is absent here,
as well as from Hawthorne's specifically fictional writings for youth;
Hawthorne's attempt to "revolutionize" children's literature primarily in-
volved "purifying and preaching."23 The contents as well as the stated
intent of Hawthorne's Biographical Stories and The Whole History fully
conform to the standard defense of literature's value as a device to promote
conventional social morality. And The Whole History of Grandfather's
Chair accords with the interest of his contemporaries in national litera-
ture.24 The work promotes a vision of life in which the individual is always
caught up within a social network, and the Common Sense emphasis on
sociality thereby converges with Alison's ideas of a national semiotics. The
literary artist's task becomes that of creating a set of associations that
anchor the individual within a community and establish community con-
tinuity by envisioning the present moment as the continuation and culmi-
nation of past traditions.
The literary conceit on which Hawthorne relies in The Whole His-
tory of Grandfather's Chair is one that is quite familiar to students of
Hawthorne: the silent object that stands in need of interpretation. The
object itself forms a physical link between the present and the past, and the
work of its interpreter becomes that of elaborating this link through story
telling. The most famous instance of reliance on a physical object is the
found package in the Salem customhouse, but Hawthorne also uses this
narrative device elsewhere, as in, for example, "The Antique Ring," "A
Book of Autographs," and the "Legends of the Province-House." In these
stories, the artists interpret the materials at hand, and through the trans-
mission of these interpretations, they create within the narratives a sense of
community. In the series of sketches, generally about prominent historical
figures, that comprise The Whole History, the social function of the artist
is similarly incorporated into the story. Four children surround Grand-
father, listen to his stories, and respond to his commentaries, drawing from
him additional reflections and interpretations. The narrative frame for the
individual stories is designed to create for its auditors—whether the grand-
children or the readers—a sense of membership within a national com-
munity. In addition, the physical device of Grandfather's old oak chair,
which seems to have witnessed many important events in early American
history, reinforces the notion of history's immanence and strengthens the
idea of connection between past and present.25
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The first volume of The Whole History of Grandfather's Chair, with
its focus on the Puritans, is most relevant to The Scarlet Letter in its treat-
ment of Puritan history. Puritan history was itself troublesome in Haw-
thorne's time, and the problem of legitimizing a sense of continuity and
community colors its presentation. Toward the beginning, Grand-
father tells a story that dramatizes a basic tension in Hawthorne's Puritan
histories. The gentle, highly cultured Lady Arbella, "too pale and feeble to
endure the hardships of the wilderness" environment "fit only for rough
and hardy people," is contrasted with the figure of John Endicott, whose
"heart was as bold and resolute as iron" (True Stories, 15-17). While she
withers away and dies, Endicott thrives in the harsh American wilderness.
The children are moved to tears at Lady Arbella's death, and Hawthorne
transmits the message that, of necessity, the Puritans placed little value on
the more refined civilized qualities associated with England.26
Grandfather's Chair thus conveys early-nineteenth-century ambiva-
lence toward the Puritans. As Lawrence Buell notes, the period's histories
of Puritan times were "enlivened by perpetual conflict between filiopietis-
tic and critical instincts."27 On the one hand, historians expressed an
allegiance to Puritan ideals of piety and civil liberty; Bancroft's history spe-
cifically praises the Puritan people (as opposed to their leadership) for
embodying these ideals. At the same time, however, a critical instinct
emerged as "liberal historians declared a semiindependence from [the Pu-
ritan leadership's] authority through their urbanity and their sympathy,
however patronizing, with the heretic."28 In retrospect, this conflict be-
tween filiopietism and criticism seems inevitable. The theological vision of
history that actuated the Puritan mission in the New World was trans-
formed into a secular vision of human progress: a teleology without telos.
This popular belief in the inevitably progressive course of United States
history conflicted with the desire to ground history in the ideals of the
Founding Fathers, Puritan and revolutionary. Political oratory of the 1830s
and 1840s emphasized this conflict; we have the example of one conserva-
tive politician of the period who expressed typical sentiments when he
declared that "the political history of the country . . .  is, in a word, the
history of a struggle, more or less remitted as the power of the opposition
has increased or declined, to maintain in their purity the original principles
on which the government is founded."29 This fear of falling away from
original principles is consistent with the rhetoric of social crisis so typical
of nineteenth-century political discourse. Yet the idealization of the past
coincided with a sense of evolutionary development, and it generated a
powerful intellectual tension in Hawthorne's time.30
A sense of progress, a projection of community endurance into the
future, was fueled by criticisms of the past, while idealization of the
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Founding Fathers affirmed a sense of communal coherence and continuity.
Thus, although Grandfather praises Puritan accomplishment, he has an eye
to their faults; accordingly, he commends Bancroft's history to the children
(True Stories, 33).31 But the approbation accorded the Puritans in Grand-
father's Chair is also consistent with an antebellum vision of American
history. As progenitors, they provided the values that would flourish as the
American Revolution. The desire to flee religious persecution, accompa-
nied by the tenacity with which they held to their beliefs, provided the
basic positive values asserted by Grandfather. This quality is most clearly
embodied in the figure of John Endicott.
Hawthorne's treatment of Endicott in Grandfather's Chair is enlight-
ening. On the one hand, Grandfather expresses his approval of Endicott as
a precursor of the revolution: "A sense of the independence of his adopted
country, must have been in that bold man's heart" (True Stories, 24). The
character of the country itself as naturally "independent" is conveyed, and
Endicott's act of cutting the cross out of the flag in protest against "Popish
idolatry" emerges as "a very strong expression of Puritan character" (True
Stories, 24-25). But by the dramatic juxtaposition of Lady Arbella's death
against Endicott's hardiness, Grandfather's Chair obliquely criticizes
the narrowness of Puritan concerns. This criticism is not nearly so pro-
nounced as is the depiction of Puritan intolerance in "Endicott and the
Red Cross"—the narrative procession of those who had their ears cropped,
cheeks branded, and noses slit in punishment—yet the ultimate point
is the same. Whether Hawthorne wrote for children or adults, the
nineteenth-century conflict between filiopietism and the instinct to criticize
the nation's progenitors informs his historical vision. Grandfather's Chair
is no aberration: its didactic purpose accords fully with both Alison's semi-
otics and a conventionally progressive view of history, and the values it
promotes are consistent with those of the tales and romances. These values
are most clearly evident in Hawthorne's treatments of Quaker persecution
in Grandfather's Chair and "The Gentle Boy."
Grandfather briefly describes the Quaker persecution of 1656-59:
"The children were amazed to hear, that, the more the Quakers were
scourged, and imprisoned, and banished, the more did the sect increase,
both by the influx of strangers, and by converts from among the Puritans.
But Grandfather told them, that God had put something into the soul of
man, which always turned the cruelties of the persecutor to nought" (True
Stories, 40). Grandfather appropriates the Quaker experience to serve the
later values of the Revolution, and he thereby generalizes the struggle
against unjust authority. As if to emphasize the point, the children find this
the most moving story they have yet heard. But unlike its depiction in
Grandfather's Chair, in "The Gentle Boy" the Quaker persecution is at-
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tributed to the "pious forefathers" and the Quakers themselves, whose
desire to come to New England manifested an "enthusiasm, heightened
almost to madness by the treatment which they received, [that] produced
actions contrary to the rules of decency."32 Quaker indecency is embodied
by Ilbrahim's mother, who, "neglectful of the holiest trust which can be
committed to a woman," gives him up for adoption in order to pursue her
religious fanaticism, itself an expression of her "disordered" imagination.33
This most reprehensible of religious enthusiasts stands as a dramatic coun-
terbalance to Puritan intolerance, and her preference for religious com-
mitment over her maternal role renders her actions the moral equivalent of
unjust Puritan authority.
Although Grandfather's Chair refrains from such harsh judgment of
Quakers, it, too, promotes the social values of benevolence, sympathy, and
compassion. What makes the children's history noteworthy is less its advo-
cacy of particular values, themselves common to Hawthorne's writings,
than the way it situates these values with reference to the inherent conflict
of antebellum historiography and also the work of the writer as creator of
a set of national associations. The overlap of these artistic tasks, the advo-
cacy of such transcendent values as domesticity and national progress, the
apparent subject matter of the storyteller in Grandfather's Chair, in effect
forestalls the conveyance of these values. In place of uncomplicated advo-
cacy, questions about the legitimacy of social authority as the adjudicator
of morality and experience simultaneously arise alongside the articulation
of conventional values. Antebellum historiography, aesthetics, and psychol-
ogy intersect within this children's book, and their inherent tensions are
momentarily obscured when problems of national identity and communal
relations are collapsed into the story propelled by the narrative frame, one
of family cohesion and continuity. But when Hawthorne reverses this
process in The Scarlet Letter, when he projects a story of the failure of do-
mesticity onto the backdrop of national formation, a strikingly different
narrative strategy emerges.
Among Hawthorne's writings, The Scarlet Letter offers the most sustained
attempt to resolve problems in the relationship between history, commu-
nity, and the individual consciousness. In effect, the historiographic and
aesthetic concerns treated in Grandfather's Chair are further complicated
by the psychological and narrative problematics of "Young Goodman
Brown." The vexed relationship between social authority and the individ-
ual conscience is reflected by the ethical questions the novel raises: When
our historical traditions are tainted by the actions of unjust authority, how
are we to constitute our present sense of communal tradition? When social
judgments are suspect, on what grounds are individual insights to be cor-
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roborated? Although these questions pose challenges to antebellum psy-
chological and aesthetic theories, I would argue that a Common Sense
outlook nevertheless shapes the novel's responses and that, while a critique
of Puritan social authority is maintained, the range of Hester Prynne's re-
bellion is circumscribed.34
"But the past was not dead."
Emily Miller Budick suggests the ethical and political dimensions of
Hawthorne's turn to history when she asserts that "Hawthorne restores to
conscious memory a history that the dominant culture has repressed."35
History returns, then, not as the force which substantiates contemporary
political and social authority but which instead threatens to overturn it.
Nowhere in the body of Hawthorne's writings is there stronger evidence
for this view of his use of history than in The Scarlet Letter. Its repeated,
almost obsessional, turns to the past are introduced in "The Custom-
House" by encounters with physical objects. Most notable is the encounter
with Surveyor Pue's manuscript and the scarlet letter itself, which seemed to
communicate "some deep meaning . . .  most worthy of interpretation."36
Hawthorne here provides a physical link between the narrative frame and
the story within while he also introduces a pair of demands on the reader's
sensibilities: the understanding that the past is always present, and the
idea that despite its presence the past does not speak for itself but rather
requires elaboration and interpretation. It is the job of the narrator, as in
Grandfather's Chair, to present and interpret events, but in "The Custom-
House" the narrator's own position predisposes him toward the goal of
restoration and complication described by Budick.
The story of Hawthorne's political appointment to the Salem cus-
tomhouse and his equally political dismissal from that position upon the
election of Zachary Taylor's Whig administration in 1848 is too well
known to need repetition.37 Certainly "The Custom-House" presents the
attitude that "the delicate harvest of fancy and sensibility" (34), the trans-
fer to the more subtle and significant work of writing, required his removal
from office. But his rendering of the episode is marked by a series of
narrative transitions that signal a reluctance to speak directly about politi-
cal matters. Hawthorne opens the sketch with a description of the Salem
customhouse that concludes with a reference to himself as surveyor: "The
besom of reform has swept him out of office; and a worthier successor
wears his dignity and pockets his emoluments" (8). This remark, which
would seem to promise a political expose, is promptly deflected by the ini-
tial gesture toward the past: "The old town of Salem . . .  possesses, or did
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possess, a hold on my affections." Hawthorne's later musings on the
surveyorship and the use of his name in an official capacity to mark mer-
chandise, which "carried [his name] where it had never been before, and, I
hope, will never go again" (27), likewise immediately precede his state-
ment that "the past was not dead." And, finally, after speculations on the
differences between Democratic and Whig handling of political appoint-
ments, Hawthorne retreats into "the lucubrations of my ancient pre-
decessor, Mr. Surveyor Pue" (43), the story that Hawthorne converts into
the succeeding narrative, "The Scarlet Letter."
These three moments in the narrative provide clues to the relation-
ship between present and past. Initially, the present appears to be more or
less simply predicated by the past, as Hawthorne suggests in his mildly
comic depictions of quaint local scenes. The "old gentlemen" who popu-
late the customhouse, the "dilapidated wharf" on which rests the custom-
house, with its view of "old salts," its "old paint," and an "old pine desk"
within—all these could attest to an innocuous relationship between past
and present (7). Even the image of Hawthorne himself as the "topmost
bough" of "the old trunk of the family tree," haunted by the "old dry
bones" of his Puritan forebears (9-10), at first seems sufficiently fanciful to
support the idea that he is merely conveying local color. But the more
Hawthorne describes the presence of the past, the more oppressive it be-
comes. The wood of the old wharf might appear venerable when it is
recalled as once living, when it is juxtaposed against the image of a family
tree. But when situated against "the phosphorescent glow of decaying
wood" (16), the metaphor with which Hawthorne condemns what re-
mains of intellect within the old customhouse men, the past becomes a
burden that threatens to utterly obscure the present moment. And so the
past returns to the narrative whenever the history of the present, that of
the political intrigue surrounding the Salem customhouse, impends. The
present moment may be characterized as one dominated by unjust political
authority; accordingly, Hawthorne disingenuously protests in his "Preface
to the Second Edition" that his treatment of the old men is not satirical but
rather reflects an attitude of "frank and genuine good-humor," and he
claims that "the unprecedented excitement in the respectable community
immediately around him" and "the public disapprobation" resulted from a
misapprehension of his intentions (I).38
But the return of the past does not simply shift attention from a cor-
rupt present in which "wearisome old souls, who had gathered nothing
worth preservation from their varied experience of life" (16) set the intel-
lectual standard. It also raises questions about the uses of tradition during
a time when community authority is threatened—not only from without,
as when nineteenth-century writers agonize over immigration, but from
within, as a result of moral decay. This concern over contemporary decay
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is hardly unique to Hawthorne: the opening sentences in Emerson's Nature
decry the obsession with "the sepulchres of the fathers" and "the dry
bones of the past."39 Emerson's tone may be more dramatic than Haw-
thorne's, but he, too, is haunted by ancestral "dry bones." Emerson's
solution to the problem of a "retrospective" age, his famed insistence that
we "demand our own works and laws and worship," is both more radical
and more in the tradition of an American rhetoric of freedom than
Hawthorne's. Hawthorne instead makes the decidedly non-Emersonian
suggestion that a preoccupation with the past would constitute an evasion
of the present, except for the point made by Budick, that this history is
itself one which the "dominant culture has repressed." Thus, as Evan
Carton points out when reading "But the past was not dead," we are
turned "toward Hawthorne's literary future as it returns to the past, draw-
ing both into the life of the present."40 The rewriting of Surveyor Pue's
brief manuscript thereby points to the past, to the future, and, most impor-
tantly, to a present preoccupied with concerns over the proper basis for
community cohesion.41
The two related sets of concerns raised by "The Custom-House" that
shape the presentation of Hester Prynne's story are the interpretive func-
tions associated with the artist's work and the social implications of history
writing. In the case of The Scarlet Letter, Hawthorne reveals a conflicted
attitude toward the function of history as warrantor of tradition. Hester
Prynne's story evokes at the very least a skepticism over the legitimacy of
social authority. Yet the act of redacting the found manuscript indicates
a conception of the past much like that displayed by Grandfather's Chair,
in which the telling of stories about the past reflects a desire for historical
continuity and a belief in consistent national character and ambition.
Hawthorne's insistence on the need for community stability demands a
mediation of the present by the past—he would reject the Emersonian di-
chotomy between "a poetry and philosophy of insight" as opposed to one
"of tradition"42—but the process is not closed to Hawthorne, who, as the
narrator of The Scarlet Letter, inserts himself into the historical process by
assuming the historian's role. By presenting the kind of traditional associ-
ations that Alison described as a foundation of common thought, Haw-
thorne recovers the past, and his interpretive involvement revitalizes
American historical associations. And in terms of narrative structure, "The
Custom-House" narrator's writing of history redeems a potentially alien-
ated character through his return into the social realm, a pattern of return
familiar from Hawthorne's shorter works.
The historical problem of American political and social authority is
introduced almost immediately in the first chapter of Hester Prynne's
story. The opening sentences carry forth from "The Custom-House" a
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critical attitude toward the past, citing the establishment of cemeteries and
prisons as the first tasks in establishing the colony and quickly following
with the conventional attributions of Puritan narrow-mindedness. Descrip-
tions of "the grim rigidity that petrified the bearded physiognomies of
these good people" as indicative of "that early severity of the Puritan char-
acter" implicitly convey a sense of historical progress (49). This belief in
progress is thereafter made explicit:
Morally, as well as materially, there was a coarser fibre in those wives
and maidens of old English birth and breeding, than in their fair de-
scendants, separated from them by a series of six or seven generations;
for, throughout that chain of ancestry, every successive mother has
transmitted to her child a fainter bloom, a more delicate and briefer
beauty, and a slighter physical frame, if not a character of less force
and solidity, than her own. The women, who were now standing
about the prison-door, stood within less than half a century of the
period when the man-like Elizabeth had been the not altogether un-
suitable representative of the sex. [50]
But even within this portrayal of coarse, "man-like" women, Hawthorne,
in a filiopietistic gesture, suggests a falling away from the strength and
tenacity of the Puritans. This vacillation, which recurs throughout The
Scarlet Letter, typifies Hawthorne's interpretation of the past. When he
notes the change from the "ponderous sobriety" of the Puritan "primitive
statesmen," along with the evolution of the people, he comments, "The
change may be for good or ill, and is partly, perhaps, for both" (237-38).43
Hawthorne thus begins the story of Hester Prynne by holding in suspen-
sion the same polarization of filiopietism and progressivist criticism found
in Grandfather's Chair.
Suspicions about the legitimacy of social authority quickly grow with
the account of Hester's punishment and ostracism. The remarks on Gov-
ernor Bellingham and the assembled Puritan authorities are to the point:
"They were, doubtless, good men, just, and sage. But, out of the whole
human family, it would not have been easy to select the same number of
wise and virtuous persons, who should be less capable of sitting in judg-
ment on an erring woman's heart" (64). This as well as subsequent re-
sponses to Hester, particularly by the Puritan leadership, suggest criticisms
of forebears and the idea that American history is progressive. At the same
time, however, Hawthorne does not neglect to label Hester as "erring," and
he thus maintains a skeptical attitude toward experience outside the bounds
of community sanction, even when the community is Puritan. A Common
Sense perspective mandates such skepticism about acts that cut oneself
off from communal validation, the only reliable source of psychological
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stability. When communal validation is undermined by an illegitimate
social authority, then dissenting or nonconforming characters are left the
task of replicating this validating psychological function. And when Haw-
thorne refers to "the whole human family," he suggests where the possible
solution to this problem might be found. In the characters of Hester Prynne
and Arthur Dimmesdale, we can see the results of their differing attitudes
toward the human family.
"The past is gone!"
The forest meeting between Hester and Dimmesdale provides a vital
transition as the two attempt to redefine their relationships with the
community—hence Hester's pronouncement, "The past is gone!" (202).
At this point, her personal history understandably provokes Hester's desire
for escape, and communal history, the recollection of Puritan authority,
approximates the deadening force prevalent in "The Custom-House."
Hester, her autonomous tendencies intensified by the scarlet letter, "her
passport into regions where other women dared not tread" (199), accord-
ingly musters her resolve in defiance against an oppressive Puritan com-
munity. The image of oppressive Puritan rigidity in The Scarlet Letter
drew its strength from the embarrassment of nineteenth-century American
historians over Puritan persecution of heretics, a feeling Hawthorne
reveals through his mention in "The Custom-House" of his forebears'
"cruelties" (9). Similarly, Grandfather's Chair summons up the image of
"the iron race of Puritans" (True Stories, 71), a characterization that was
already a cliche by Hawthorne's time. Contemporary reviews of The Scar-
let Letter casually spoke of a "sterner Puritan aspect," "the cold and rigid
Puritan," and "those stern old Popery-haters."44 Ambivalence toward the
Puritans was thus apparent not only in histories but in more popular lit-
erature as well, and the tendency in Hawthorne's time to typecast Puritans
exhibits itself in the characterizations and actions of The Scarlet Letter.
It is important, however, when recalling the crisis of the forest meet-
ing to distinguish this dramatized historiographic conflict—that between
filiopietism against criticism of the Puritans—from the theoretical opposi-
tion within contemporary psychological theory at work here—that of the
introspecting individual against community validation of truth. Appropri-
ate as it may seem to collapse these two separate oppositions by creating
the analogy between introspection and criticism of the Puritans on the one
hand, and filiopietism and a social orientation on the other, interpretive
specificity may be retained only when these registers are kept separate; this
is necessary even though there are moments when the narrative logic of
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Hester Prynne's story strongly gestures toward such an alignment. Despite
this logic, Hawthorne's shorter works show how a simple affirmation of
individual consciousness—even, as in "Young Goodman Brown," against
questionable authority—may lead the individual toward a perilous isola-
tion.
Isolation in The Scarlet Letter is most prominently associated with
Roger Chillingworth, the figure who consciously severs emotional ties. The
assertion that "he chose to withdraw his name from the roll of mankind"
ominously indicates how Chillingworth could subsequently generate his
vengeful plot, his "new purpose; dark, it is true, if not guilty" (118-19).
The cumulative effect of isolation on Chillingworth's character was to
create a moral revolution. The results of this revolution furnished "striking
evidence of man's faculty of transforming himself into a devil, if he will
only, for a reasonable space of time, undertake a devil's office" (170).
Chillingworth's forfeiture of human sympathy provides a dramatic caveat,
but in terms of Hester's and Pearl's fates it is Dimmesdale's deficiency that
is the more significant.45
A lack of sympathy governs Dimmesdale's actions and attitudes, and
the results are twofold: as a minister he embodies the debilitating Puritan
sovereignty that has victimized Hester, and he lies by not acknowledging
his relationships with Hester and Pearl. One does not need to recall the
young Hawthorne's loss of his father to interpret Dimmesdale's aban-
donment of his paternal obligations as paramount. By evading parental ob-
ligations while retaining his position of ministerial authority, Dimmesdale
personifies both the fanaticism that leads Ilbrahim's mother to reject con-
ventional maternal obligations and that of the Puritans who persecuted
Quakers. His inattention to Pearl may be, from Hawthorne's perspective,
the worst of his sins, but he expresses an egotism specific to Puritanism as
well. While in the forest, Dimmesdale conveys his misery to Hester, and
she responds by pointing out the social value of his work: "Your present
life is not less holy, in very truth, than it seems in people's eyes. Is there no
reality in the penitence thus sealed and witnessed by good works? And
wherefore should it not bring you peace?" (191). This statement sharply
reveals the difference between Hester's and Dimmesdale's characters. Her
appreciation of sociality gives Hester a firmer psychological foundation.
This feature of her character emerges in her fight to keep Pearl, her desire
to remain in Boston to be near Dimmesdale, and even her choice to keep
Chillingworth's identity secret because of spousal loyalty. It is thus no sur-
prise that she should regard Dimmesdale's good works in a more typi-
cally nineteenth-century Arminian manner as primary. Correspondingly,
Dimmesdale's idealistic faith mirrors that of the Puritan hierarchy and its
diminution of the value of earthly sympathy and social bonds. Because of
his skewed and unsympathetic outlook, Dimmesdale can lament of his
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"good works" to Hester, insisting "There is no substance in it!" (192). He
further signals his lack of benevolent impulses by refusing to respond to
Pearl's incisive question, "Will he go back with us, hand in hand, we three
together, into the town?" (212). Much as Ethan Brand resists the "mag-
netic chain of humanity," Dimmesdale cuts himself off from the "electric
chain" (153) the three formed the night they stood together on the scaf-
fold.46 But yet more specific evidence of his psychological state is provided
by his disordered perceptions.
When Dimmesdale first encountered Hester in the forest, "he knew
not whether it were a woman or a shadow. It may be, that his pathway
through life was haunted thus, by a spectre that had stolen out from among
his thoughts" (189). Such a question about his perception might seem
relatively innocuous or simply in keeping with Hawthorne's penchant for
ambiguity. But perceptual ambiguity is less a stylistic feature here than it is
a moral indicator, as suggested by Dimmesdale's history of fasting vigils, of
"constant introspection wherewith he tortured, but could not purify, him-
self. In these lengthened vigils, his brain often reeled, and visions seemed
to flit before him" (145). Dimmesdale's bizarre practices lead him to delu-
sions, and the presence of delusions reinforces the isolation that makes it
possible for him to resist acknowledging Pearl as his daughter. This crucial
moral deficiency and his associated solipsism are most dramatically sig-
naled by the way he sees and interprets the letter A in the sky: "We impute
it, therefore, solely to the disease in his own eye and heart, that the min-
ister, looking upward to the zenith, beheld there the appearance of an im-
mense letter,—the letter A,—marked out in lines of dull red light" (155).
Dimmesdale's disordered imagination leads him to discover "a revelation,
addressed to himself alone," and this is evidence of his "highly disordered
mental state" (155). Because of his perceptual difficulties—according to
Common Sense psychology, unimpaired perception is the basis of proper
mental functions—from that point on, it is appropriate for the reader to
regard Dimmesdale's mental processes as suspect.
The following morning, when Dimmesdale hears from the sexton of
"a great red letter in the sky,—the letter A,—which we interpret to stand
for Angel" (158) in celestial recognition of Governor Winthrop's death, a
multifaceted understanding is suggested. As the "head of the social system,
as the clergymen of that day stood" (200), Dimmesdale's disorder repre-
sents not simply an individual aberration but also a cultural problem. In
his comment that Dimmesdale "thus typified the constant introspection
wherewith he tortured, but could not purify, himself," Hawthorne makes
more explicit his criticism. The individual, glorified in the independent
ability to interpret scripture, is made solitary, even insane, by an excess of
that same freedom. Individual independence, sanctioned by Puritan theol-
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ogy, potentially leads to the kind of isolation that engenders disordered
perceptions.47 If we return to the situation of Goodman Brown, another
victim of the Puritan dilemma—and in another story told with ambi-
guity—a significant parallel comes into view. As with Brown's return from
his forest journey, all has changed on Dimmesdale's return to town.
Dimmesdale "took an impression of change from the series of familiar ob-
jects that presented themselves" (216). Unable to account for the change
that extended to all the townspeople, he felt himself to be a new person.
This transformation was "nothing short of a total change of dynasty and
moral code . . . At every step he was incited to do some strange, wild,
wicked thing or other, with a sense that it would be at once involuntary
and intentional" (217). Dimmesdale's wishes to whisper blasphemies to the
deacon and teach obscenities to the children may themselves have seemed
involuntary, but the originating acts, those that separated him from Pearl
and Hester, were intentional.
Although Hester Prynne does not share Dimmesdale's disorder,
Hawthorne states that "her imagination was somewhat affected, and, had
she been of a softer moral and intellectual fibre, would have been still more
so, by the strange and solitary anguish of her life" (86). The prospect of
possible relief from "solitary anguish" leads to her speculations in the
forest with Dimmesdale. When she says that their adultery "had a con-
secration of its own" (195), Hester affirms the priority of individual ex-
perience, even when it defies a repressive Puritan authority. But Hester's
use of a religious term, consecration, grounds her argument in the social
unity of the church; her attempt to legitimize their relationship by an ap-
propriation of theological discourse is subverted by the language's cultural
associations. Hawthorne further questions Hester's understanding when
he expounds on the scarlet letter's impact: "The scarlet letter was her pass-
port into regions where other women dared not tread. Shame, Despair,
Solitude! These had been her teachers,—stern and wild ones,—and they
had made her strong, but taught her much amiss" (199-200). The indica-
tion that Hester had been taught amiss is her statement "The past is gone"
(202), an assertion that defies the lesson of "The Custom-House."48 Her
similarly problematic attempt to free herself from the past by throwing off
the scarlet letter leads to Pearl's rejection, the refusal to recognize Hester
without it.
Pearl's demand that Hester resume wearing the scarlet letter under-
scores the strength that social authority wields in determining personal
identity, particularly within the most intimate of relations. Pearl's act there-
by subverts Hester's attempt to create a present moment unmediated by
either history or social demands. Hester's desire for newness is based on
her own strength of character, and it testifies to the false lessons learned
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from the scarlet letter. While the Puritan authority that mandated her
social isolation is criticized, Hester's excessive desire for action without
regard for the past indicates the troublesome results of isolation. Hester,
ostracized by the community, nevertheless maintains social contact from
her dwelling on the border between the town and the wilderness. The lo-
cation of her cottage reinforces Hawthorne's description of the struggle
between, on the one hand, "the wildness of her nature," her passionate
nature (to which Hawthorne repeatedly refers), and her freethinking, and,
on the other, "the chain that bound her" to the town, her gregariousness
(79-80).
The question of Hester's passions and their relationship to both so-
ciality and legal authority is raised by Janet Gabler-Hover when she com-
ments on the priority of ethics over law: "In The Scarlet Letter, passion is
seen to be complicit with law, and just as in the Custom-House, characters
who relinquish self-regulation for the substitutive regulation of the law
remain stagnant."49 Legal authority and psychology interpenetrate each
other, and the inception of passion, an emotional category, coincides with
the legalities associated with self-regulation. The earlier discussion of The
Last of the Mohicans describes how the psychological processes of self-
regulation may be aligned with visions of political and social order. In The
Scarlet Letter, though, Hawthorne raises questions about the political
metaphor embedded in the term self-regulation that Cooper and others
would take for granted. As Gabler-Hover suggests, to Hawthorne the
double bind created by the "powerful dialectic of passion and law" may be
circumvented through attention to the ethical realm.50 The emergence of
ethical action and the turn away from individual selfishness and unethical
social authority in The Scarlet Letter will finally be associated with the
return of Hester Prynne to the Puritan community, an act reminiscent
of Hawthorne's shorter narratives portraying the redemptive power of
return. What may be most strange about the emergence of the ethical in
The Scarlet Letter, however, is the way it is introduced by the most de-
structive character.
When Chillingworth discovers Dimmesdale's secret, he finds that
knowledge of Pearl's paternity leads to a new desire: "To make himself
the one trusted friend, to whom should be confided all the fear, the re-
morse, the agony, the ineffectual repentance, the backward rush of sinful
thoughts, expelled in vain! . . . All that dark treasure to be lavished on the
very man, to whom nothing else could so adequately pay the debt of
vengeance!" (139). The flaw in Chillingworth's thinking here is not new.
When during his visit with Hester in the jail he self-mockingly recalls the
fantasies of domesticity that led to their marriage, he exposes an inability
to perceive the difference between his self-involved abstractions and the
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less tractable interpersonal realm. This perceptual obtuseness shapes his
plan to become Dimmesdale's confessor and is disclosed by a double sub-
stitution. He reifies his desire for vengeance by identifying the process of
confession with economic exchange, regarding the anticipated disclosure
by Dimmesdale as a "treasure" that "could so adequately pay the debt."
This reification falsely grounds a fantasy that itself displaces what is for
Hawthorne a more psychologically and ethically proper understanding of
interpersonal communication. Chillingworth may here exhibit an inverted
set of values, and his dramatic situation with respect to Dimmesdale may
demand his prejudice and tenacity, but he nevertheless introduces the idea
of a confession as a dyadic, interpersonal process.
This interpersonal communication serves as a contrast to the demand
by Puritan authorities for Hester Prynne's public confession that is the
springboard for the action of the novel. An adulterous liaison creates the
situation in which Hester Prynne's confession is ordered, but the action of
the novel originates in her refusal to abide by Puritan notions of justice. By
transposing confession from the realm of public authority to that of the
interpersonal, Chillingworth's desire marks an important narrative move-
ment. Chillingworth's obvious shortcoming is that a lack of sympathy
makes it impossible for him to understand confession as communication
rather than exchange, and he thus reveals how in this important respect his
thinking parallels that of the Puritan authorities. The lesson of the scarlet
letter will emerge only during moments at the novel's conclusion when
confession is reinstated within the interpersonal realm from the legal and
contractual, and when sympathy is restored to the confessional process.51
"And Hester Prynne had returned, and taken up her long-forsaken shame."
In The Scarlet Letter, Hawthorne presents as a basic moral error any vision
of the world in which sympathy is overcome by an idealism, whether re-
ligious or secular. This issue is not unique to The Scarlet Letter: the same
tension largely informs The Blithedale Romance, and "The Gentle Boy"
levels Quaker and Puritan ideologies in favor of characters motivated by
compassion and sympathy.52 The opposition between idealism and sym-
pathy in The Scarlet Letter interacts with Hawthorne's illustration of the
Common Sense psychology tension between the introspecting individual
as the source of truth and communal validation of truth claims. All three
main characters in The Scarlet Letter are led by introspection to com-
mit transgressions, and these transgressions threaten to cut them off from
their social relationships, thereby invalidating their insights. For example,
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Hester's isolation "had made her strong, but taught her much amiss";
Dimmesdale's hermitical excesses lead to disordered thought; and Chill-
ingworth, who like so many of Hawthorne's scientists is motivated by a
too highly abstracted interest in the human condition, manifests a secular
idealism, which Hawthorne suggests prevented many physicians or scien-
tists from joining the Puritan venture: "They seldom, it would appear,
partook of the religious zeal that brought other emigrants across the Atlan-
tic. In their researches into the human frame, it may be that the higher and
more subtile faculties of such men were materialized, and that they lost the
spiritual view of existence amid the intricacies of that wondrous mecha-
nism" (119). This "spiritual view of existence" recalled by Hawthorne is
consistent with Common Sense Christian metaphysics. Hawthorne may
not have displayed much interest in the Christian theology supported by
Common Sense thinkers, but he was willing to extract from the prevalent
theology ethical principles.
The basic ethical principle at work in the conclusion of The Scarlet
Letter is that of sympathy, and its reemergence is understood to supply a
more constructive basis for social cohesion than did the legalistic Puritan
demand for justice. The source of sympathy, in Common Sense thought,
is the home, and it is through the operation of domesticity that the most
dramatic transformation of the novel may be understood. Pearl's meta-
morphosis from demon child to a young woman who would become a
wealthy heiress and then, after an apparent marriage into Old World no-
bility, a mother herself becomes possible only after she has been claimed by
her two fathers. The more important paternal acknowledgment is Dimmes-
dale's; his claim comes during the final scaffold scene when he asks to be
kissed, though not by Hester: "Pearl kissed his lips. A spell was broken. The
great scene of grief, in which the wild infant bore a part, had developed all
her sympathies; and as her tears fell upon her father's cheek, they were the
pledge that she would grow up amid human joy and sorrow, nor for ever do
battle with the world, but be a woman in it" (256). The breaking of Pearl's
"spell" and her subsequent restoration progresses from the parent-child re-
lationship Dimmesdale had previously evaded. His public acknowledgment
of their bond is precisely what Pearl repeatedly demanded during both the
midnight scaffold scene and the forest meeting, and, when Dimmesdale
equivocated, Pearl's response was to "show no favor to the clergyman"
(212). Dimmesdale's public confession restores Pearl, although, unlike
Hester's consistent commitment to parental responsibility, it is too little and
too late to redeem him. It also represents a dramatic inversion of his
demand, on Hester's initial emergence from the jail, for her confession. The
public response to Dimmesdale displays a shift from a problematic Puritan
social authority based on belief in justice to an authority that expresses sym-
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pathy. That this sympathetic regard for Dimmesdale is both present and yet
incomplete is shown by the narrative remarks following the townspeople's
interpretations of his death: "We must be allowed to consider this version of
Mr. Dimmesdale's story as only an instance of that stubborn fidelity with
which a man's friends—and especially a clergyman's—will sometimes
uphold his character" (259). However welcome their expression of sympa-
thy may be, it is deficient insofar as it fails to represent a general principle of
social authority. The emergence of a community in which sympathy serves
as a more general interpretive principle does not come until Hester Prynne's
return in the final chapter.
Hester Prynne's return is an annoying mystery to those who, like
Lawrence Buell, discover in The Scarlet Letter a defense of individualism.
To Buell, Hester's return "imitates Dimmesdale's submission to the rites of
the community," but she engages in this imitation only "nominally," and
thus she represents a principle of individual resistance against social au-
thority.53 But even critics like Sacvan Bercovitch and Emily Miller Budick,
who do not perceive in it an endorsement of individualism, are intrigued
by the conclusion. Bercovitch, explicitly citing the question of her return,
asserts that in the novel dissent is effectively drained of potentially revo-
lutionary impact and that Hester's return dramatizes a ritual of liberal con-
sensus. And Budick, by turning attention to the appearance of letters
within the novel—Hester's A and the words on her tombstone—finds in
the return a renewed insistence on interpretation. Although these critics do
not concur in their readings, there is a common ground: they all are drawn
toward discussions of the novel's conclusion in terms of a vision of com-
munity. Hawthorne's vision of community here is complicated by his ar-
gument against repressive social authority; but, whatever antiauthoritarian
implications the novel may at times suggest, it finally restates its under-
standing of individualism and sociality in terms that are in significant
respects consistent with conventional antebellum thought.
The two especially conventional aspects of the conclusion are its as-
sertions of the value of sympathy and the related narrative form evident in
his short works, the plot of departure and return home. In The Scarlet
Letter, like "Egotism," the return to the social realm follows an obscure
initial event that causes isolation. Unlike "Young Goodman Brown," how-
ever, which similarly offers a critique of Puritan social authority, The
Scarlet Letter shows Hester successfully reintegrating herself into the com-
munity. The difference between The Scarlet Letter and "Young Goodman
Brown" reflects a complex narrative strategy that takes into account the
social significance of interpretation.
Hester's return and final fate collapse associated conceptual problems
while resolving certain remaining plot issues. Chillingworth is dispensed
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of, but not before he has undertaken a paternal role by bequeathing his
fortune to Pearl. Not only does Pearl abandon her social role as outcast,
but it is suggested that she enters the world of European society, "married,
and happy, and mindful of her mother" (262). Pearl's happy domesticity—
"Hester was seen embroidering a baby-garment" (262)—restates the
Common Sense and sentimental formula, but it also bears on Hester's
stance. Her return to New England and her resumption of the symbol
come with her new function as a counselor to women. This is accompanied
by her assumption of a prophetic role, and she announces the advent of
"the destined prophetess," at which point, "when the world should have
grown ripe for it, in Heaven's own time, a new truth would be revealed, in
order to establish the whole relation between man and woman on a surer
ground of mutual happiness" (263). Hester's prophecy follows Common
Sense thought in aligning social harmony with domestic happiness, and it
simultaneously resolves the historiographic conflict of Grandfather's Chair,
that of filiopietism versus criticism, by suggesting the availability of an
alternative historical tradition. Hawthorne thus manages to displace the
image of Puritan Founding Fathers with one of Hester Prynne in a re-
visionist gesture of filiopiety.
In place of a Puritan community marked by intolerance, legalism,
and a lack of sympathy, Hawthorne creates a new community constituted
by people with "all their sorrows and perplexities" seeking out Hester
Prynne, who "comforted and counselled them, as best she might" (263).
The basis of this community is the voluntary confession of problems that
elicits a sympathetic response. Thus the trajectory of confession within The
Scarlet Letter, begun with Hester's and Dimmesdale's differing acts of
resistance against the compulsion of confession, is coterminous with the
emergence of sympathy as a principle of social organization that would
displace traditional authority. By thus displacing an illegitimate social au-
thority, the psychological and social problems of the novel are resolved
through a process of verbal communication, and Hawthorne presents the
Common Sense image of a community in which the insights of the intro-
specting individual may be validated by a proper social authority. He
thereby manages to resolve the problem of "Young Goodman Brown"
from within a Common Sense framework. What is especially noteworthy
about Hawthorne's resolution of these narrative and ideational conflicts,
however, aside from its economy, is the way it leads to a consideration of
the relationship between interpretation and community.
Hester Prynne's community is constituted through an interpretive
commitment to provide sympathy, and it is worth recalling this when read-
ing Hawthorne's earlier remarks about changes in gender relations. Hester,
inclined to "freedom of speculation," often found herself considering the
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"dark question" about "the whole race of womanhood. Was existence
worth accepting, even to the happiest among them?" (164-65). Haw-
thorne goes on to describe the processes and costs of such speculation:
As a first step, the whole system of society is to be torn down, and
built up anew. Then, the very nature of the opposite sex, or its long
hereditary habit, which has become like nature, is to be essentially
modified, before woman can be allowed to assume what seems a fair
and suitable position. Finally, all other difficulties being obviated,
woman cannot take advantage of these preliminary reforms, until she
herself shall have undergone a still mightier change; in which, per-
haps, the ethereal essence, wherein she has her truest life, will be
found to have evaporated. A woman never overcomes these problems
by any exercise of thought. They are not to be solved, or only in one
way. If her heart chance to come uppermost, they vanish. [165-66]
The novel's conclusion demonstrates that Hester had taken the path pre-
scribed by Hawthorne and fully recognized the preeminence of sympathy.
Sympathy performs several critical operations here. It orients the individual
toward self-regulation and away from potentially destructive isolation by
displacing the dangerous effects of passion. And, in the novel's conclusion,
sympathy guides the process of interpersonal communication, a process
governed by Common Sense ideas of social legitimation and bound by
a historical sense of cohesion that stretches backward in time to Hester
Prynne and forward to "the destined prophetess." The sympathetic com-
munity of interpreters is created by the work of the artist, whether it is the
narrator of "The Custom-House" or Hester Prynne, and the community's
work is preferable to that which might lead a woman's "truest life" to have
"evaporated." The Scarlet Letter thus reflects a commitment to a norma-
tive hermeneutics, one with a basis in sympathy. Hawthorne here offers a
radically Common Sense social ideal in place of either feminist or individu-
alistic antiauthoritarianism. Hawthorne's social ideal may be, as Budick
suggests, implicitly critical of the dominant culture and patriarchy, despite
the apparently antifeminist slant to the passage on the "nature of the op-
posite sex." But what Hawthorne dramatizes is less an obsession with in-
dividual freedom than the possibility of a community in which social
authority works to mediate between, rather than isolate, individuals who
themselves have successfully internalized regulatory functions.
4The Altrurian Romances
Evolution and Immigration in Howells's Utopia
Hawthorne's gesture toward the future at the conclusion of The Scarlet
Letter conforms to an American rhetoric of progress, though Hawthorne's
is a specifically moral progress, one implied by his vision of a relationship
between men and women that someday would rest on a "surer ground of
mutual happiness."1 His ideal of "mutual happiness" not only serves to de-
scribe domestic harmony; it also offers a figure of the proper social order,
an order that balances individual emotional and intellectual needs against
demands for community cohesion. Hawthorne thus imaginatively shifts
the popular early-nineteenth-century belief in American progress, based
on a historical outlook that criticized the Puritans while it simultaneously
preserved the Puritan ideal of America's special mission, toward a more
distinctly interpersonal and ethical level.
A focus on ethics and the interpersonal realm similarly characterizes
William Dean Howells's A Traveler from Altruria (1894) and its sequel,
Through the Eye of the Needle (1907), and in this respect these works
resemble Edward Bellamy's more famous Looking Backward as well as
other Utopian works published toward the end of the nineteenth century.2
Instead of focusing on socioeconomic solutions to American problems,
Howells primarily attends to questions of human nature. Howells uses this
emphasis in his two Altrurian Romances to critique the individualist
thought associated with late-nineteenth-century social Darwinism. Yet, de-
spite Howells's forthright criticism of prevalent American attitudes, certain
popular anxieties rather incongruously emerge from his Utopian vision.
The most prominent of these anxieties underlies the tension between
Howells's social criticism and his ambivalence about immigration, an im-
portant political and social issue in the decades after the Civil War. The
point of this discussion is not to deride Howells for being an unwitting
purveyor of repressive attitudes or for a supposed superficiality in his
treatment of social and psychological issues. Rather, the goal here is to use
the Altrurian Romances to examine "how the critical and the symptomatic
interact in a text or a work of art," because this interaction has sustained
importance in American culture.3
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The Altrurian Romances also suggest a certain dissatisfaction on
Howells's part with realist literary conventions insofar as these writings
differ markedly from Howells's prior novels that explicitly had treated
social and economic conditions. The Minister's Charge (1887), Annie Kil-
burn (1889), and A Hazard of New Fortunes (1890), for example, deal
with problems of the working poor and discuss ameliorative plans. Unlike
these novels, which adhere to a realist avoidance of direct commentary, the
Altrurian Romances are polemical, didactic, and even hortatory. Howells
bases his moral argument on the idea that America has fulfilled neither its
democratic political ideals nor its Christian ethical ideals. Yet, despite the
insistent didacticism and a focus on grievances and censure worthy of a
jeremiad, the plot and tone of the Altrurian Romances are surprisingly
comic.4 In addition to this inherent generic discord, the three successive
narrators within the Altrurian Romances exhibit markedly distinct emo-
tional and ethical outlooks. The differences between the narrators may be
due in part to the textual history of the Altrurian Romances.
The first installment of Howells's essay series, "A Traveller from Al-
truria," was printed in the November 1892 issue of the Cosmopolitan.5
Portions of "A Traveller" continued to appear on a monthly basis through
October 1893; these were immediately followed by eleven "Letters of an
Altrurian Traveller," from November 1893 through September 1894. A
Traveler from Altruria, an edition of the first twelve essays, was published
in 1894. Howells, after leaving his project untouched for more than a
decade, returned to complete the second Altrurian Romance, Through the
Eye of the Needle. Howells arranged the final six "Letters" into part 1 of
Through the Eye; he then wrote part 2 in less than a month early in 1907.
Possibly because of contemporary reviews that criticized his increasingly
socialistic outlook and caustic social commentary, Howells never published
a separate edition of the "Letters." In fact, the later addition, part 2 of
Through the Eye, introduces a narrator who uses a far milder tone—a
tone perhaps more appropriate to the setting, for only in this final section
does Howells explore his Utopian realm.6
The exiguous question of Altruria's authenticity propels the plot of
the Altrurian Romances. Aristides Homos, the traveler from Altruria, and
Mr. Twelvemough, the narrator, meet in a train station at the start of A
Traveler. Twelvemough describes himself as "a writer of romantic fic-
tion . . . occupied in manipulating the destinies of the good old-fashioned
hero and heroine, and trying always to make them end in a happy mar-
riage."7 The sort of writer for whom Howells the realist had little respect,
Twelvemough's humorous personality appeals mildly, though his narrative
consciousness reverberates with bromides and cliches.8
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By contrast, Homos, an immigrant from an unknown land, whose
behavior seems designed from the start to defamiliarize everyday experi-
ence, challenges Twelvemough's—and the reader's—conventional views.
For instance, Homos immediately embarrasses Twelvemough when he
helps a porter unload the train's baggage. Twelvemough, attempting to dis-
suade Homos from an unseemly indulgence in manual labor, initiates an
exchange:
"We must make haste a little now . . . we shall not stand so good a
chance for supper if we are not there pretty promptly."
"No?" said the Altrurian. "Why?"
"Well," I said, with evasive lightness, "first come, first served,
you know. That's human nature."
"Is it?" he returned, and he looked at me as one does who sus-
pects another of joking. [9]
This dialogue raises questions about human nature, the principal issue of
the Altrurian Romances. Howells himself notes the centrality of this ques-
tion in his introductory comments to a proposed one-volume edition of the
Altrurian Romances: "Human nature, which the individualists declare
cannot be changed, has been constantly changed for the better" (4). For
his Utopian dream to appear viable, Howells must argue that a society
based on a cooperative, rather than a competitive, vision of human nature
is both reasonable and practical.
The dialogue also explicitly introduces the topic of comedy and
jokes. Characteristic of debased human relations in a nonutopian society,
Homos's and Twelvemough's distrust is revealed by the suspicion of
"joking." This suspicion recurs throughout A Traveler, and, with an irony
that increases as the story progresses, each considers the other somewhat
barbaric. Because Homos helps waiters and other hotel workers, Twelve-
mough thinks Homos is deranged or, at best, devoid of good social taste.
In turn, Twelvemough's ability to rationalize the economic inequities of
American society in accord with his belief that social conditions reflect
human nature seems to Homos inhumane and hypocritical. Despite the Al-
trurian's increasingly evident censure and the narrator's "cold doubt of
something ironical in the man" (25), Twelvemough notes rather affection-
ately that all are amiably disposed toward Homos, whom he describes as a
kind of "spiritual solvent, sent for the moment to precipitate whatever sin-
cerity there was in us" (99). When Homos is introduced to several hotel
guests—a banker, a minister, a lawyer, a doctor, a professor, and a retired
manufacturer—they find they like him, even as they argue with him about
America.
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Homos's dialogues with these successful Americans, in which the
hotel guests defend American ideals and practices, constitute a major por-
tion of A Traveler. Homos early makes clear that he, along with all
Altrurians, admires the American political ideals expressed in the Decla-
ration of Independence. However, his belief that political egalitarianism
should provide the model for social and economic relations is abhorrent to
his listeners: "'Merely to conceive of its possibility is something that passes
a joke; it is a kind of offence.' . . . 'I don't know,' the banker continued,
'how the notion of our social equality originated, but I think it has been
fostered mainly by the expectation of foreigners, who argued it from our
political equality'" (40). The banker, although more liberal than his peers,
strikes a recurrent note with his comment that Homos, a foreigner, cannot
truly understand the United States.
Howells uses Homos's posture of naivete within a question-and-
answer format to reveal the discrepancies between economic realities and
political and ethical ideals. As Elsa Nettels comments, "Howells himself
was keenly aware of the contradiction within American society, which af-
firmed the principles of equality and justice for all, yet perpetuated an
economic system and a class structure that divided rich from poor, em-
ployers from laborers."9 Nevertheless, a reaffirmation of political and
ethical ideals forms the basis of the proposed evolutionary solution to
America's economic problems. During the lengthy public lecture with
which A Traveler concludes, Homos calls for working people to bring
about socialism through the ballot. Homos, referring to the capitalists of
Altruria's distant past as "the Accumulation," recounts Altruria's history
in a prescriptive manner: "The Accumulation had no voters, except the
few men at its head, and the creatures devoted to it by interest and igno-
rance. It seemed, at one moment, as if it would offer an armed resistance to
the popular will, but, happily, that moment of madness passed. Our Evolu-
tion was accomplished without a drop of bloodshed" (154). In place of the
violent class struggle associated with Marxism, altruism provides a social-
ist vision in which a change of human nature throughout all classes leads
to Utopia. For this reason, Homos rejects labor-union activity as simply one
more expression of self-interested behavior. Rather, the unifying image of
society as an extended family is posited as the basis for social change—
"Altruria, I say again, is a family" (170)—and Homos thus appeals to
what he treats as a latent force for social good in American life. Howells's
analogy of the family and society derives from what Kermit Vanderbilt has
called "an idealized Utopian view of the Ohio village which he occasionally
fancied as a psychological refuge from the urban-industrial complexities of
the new Boston, and later of New York."10 Accordingly, Homos discovers
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a realm of virtue in the Camp family, farmers who live near the resort
hotel but whose moral outlook tellingly contrasts with that of the corrupt
city-dwellers.
Although those who meet Homos are captivated by him, Twelve-
mough notes in his concluding comments that "the more cultivated people"
(179) were still uncertain about both Homos's authenticity and the exis-
tence of Altruria. With the start of Homos's narrative in "Letters of an
Altrurian Traveller," his authenticity as an Altrurian is no longer a narrative
issue. The change of narrator effects changes in setting and tone as well—
Homos travels to the city, where he vents his frequently acerbic observations
to his Altrurian correspondent. Like the preceding novel, the "Letters" are
not motivated by much of a plot; rather they resemble the scattered obser-
vations of a tourist, somewhat on the order of Howells's Atlantic columns
or his early successful travel book, Venetian Life (1866). From this es-
tranged position, the narrator is free to comment on the dreariness of New
York City—which he refers to as "Babylon"—and the comparative beauty
of the 1893 Chicago Exposition's "White City." In the "Letters," Homos
emphasizes Christian idealism in order to criticize the United States for not
being "a Christian country, though it abounds in good people" (184). The
focus on how Americans have fallen away from their Christian and demo-
cratic ideals gives Homos's narrative an urgency generally absent from A
Traveler. Unlike Twelvemough's account, in which social criticism is indi-
rectly conveyed by the foolishness and insensitivity of the narrator, Homos
critiques American culture in a more straightforward manner.
Twelvemough, returning in the role of editor, provides an introduc-
tory comment to Through the Eye of the Needle that explains how he
came to possess the manuscript, originally letters to and from Altruria that
he has fashioned into narratives. The first part of Through the Eye, based
on the later "Letters," continues to feature Homos as an observer of "the
plutocratic mind" (277). Although Homos focuses in the early chapters on
such material issues as urban housing, before long he becomes socially in-
volved with a group of upper-class New Yorkers and then romantically
involved with a wealthy widow, Eveleth Strange. Eveleth, displaying how
even a rich person can transcend her environment, soon agrees to marry
Homos. A romantic farce ensues in which the couple is faced with the un-
usual dilemma of how to handle Eveleth's unwanted wealth. After an
argument in which Homos insists she give up all her property, he leaves,
but Eveleth, with her reluctant mother in tow, catches up with Homos in
England. They get married on the voyage to Altruria.
Eveleth, the narrator of Through the Eye's second part, provides an
account of Altruria from the perspective of a sympathetic American. Part 2
of Through the Eye is again characterized by minimal dramatic action. A
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peaceful mutiny by their ship's crew after landing provides an opportunity
for evolutionary progress: the captain apologizes to the crew for their mis-
treatment, and, following a voyage back to the United States, he agrees to
return with them to Altruria. The bulk of Through the Eye consists of the
couple's desultory travels about Altruria to deliver talks on American life.
Eveleth's repeated surprises and small difficulties with Altrurian life
provide a bridge between the sympathetic reader and Utopia while, like
Homos's dialogues in A Traveler, it creates opportunities to discuss the dif-
ferences between American and Utopian practices. Some comic episodes
result when a yacht bearing wealthy Americans is beached, and they with
their crew are integrated, with resistance from both sides, into Altrurian
society. The conclusion features the resolution of Eveleth's lingering doubts
over Altruria's reality when the first ship returns as promised to Altruria.
In the absence of a unifying and compelling plot, the prevalent comic
tone and the guiding issue of human nature provide coherence to the
Altrurian Romances. Howells, like some literary theorists who were his
contemporaries, reveals an awareness that comedy can serve as a means to
socialize individuals and, conversely, that it can reflect individual discon-
tent with societal strictures. For example, in his "Essay on Comedy"
(1877), George Meredith identifies comedy's socially coercive purpose
when he refers to its "vigilant sense of a collective supervision."11 Simi-
larly, in 1900 Henri Bergson noted that comedy's "function is to in-
timidate by humiliating."12 Yet this conformist function—"a utilitarian aim
of general improvement"—simultaneously coexists with an individualist
impulse to undermine social order, particularly when the order is perceived
as unresponsive to human need: "Rigidity is the comic, and laughter is its
corrective."13 Freud perhaps most sharply describes the "corrective" as-
pects of the comic when he identifies two basic types of jokes, the "hostile
joke (serving the purpose of aggressiveness, satire, or defence)" and the
"obscene joke (serving the purpose of exposure)."14
Howells uses these two comic operations of hostility and exposure to
delineate community boundaries in the Altrurian Romances. In A Traveler,
one member of a group will frequently ridicule another's ideas in an at-
tempt to argue a point; the hostility of the joke suggests that social inter-
actions are too often characterized in our society by competition and
aggression. Homos's repeated questions, which Twelvemough regards as
suspiciously "ironical," are intended to expose something hidden—in par-
ticular, the true function of the social order. But these divisive aspects of
comedy also serve a larger social function. As Freud points out, the need to
share a joke is part of the comic process.15 Thus, when Howells ridicules his
narrator Twelvemough by showing him to be overly rigid, he shares an im-
portant joke with his readers.
88 THE SOCIAL SELF
Within the Altrurian Romances, this sharing process works to
create a new sense of community, one ultimately based on altruistic values
emerging steadily in the progression of consciousness in each successive
narrator. The conclusion of Through the Eye of the Needle, with the ab-
sorption of the sailors into the Altrurian community, provides a dramatic
enactment of the desired course of reading, in which the reader will ideally
join the community of Altrurians.16 Howells's wish to keep the available
community as large as possible is reflected by Homos's description of a
grotesquely abundant Thanksgiving dinner given by his wealthy New York
hosts. Rather than dwell on the plight of the poor and hungry—and
thereby convey a sense of bitterness—Homos calls attention to the ab-
surdly rigid and ritualistic aspects of the affair. The upper-class characters,
who adhere to social norms as if they were laws of nature, are "altruisti-
cally" displayed as foolishly mistaken, rather than evil, in their outlooks.
In addition to the use of comedy throughout the Altrurian Romances
to enforce social cohesion, the issue of human nature also serves to link the
three narratives. The distinctions between the three narrators on this issue
are as enlightening as the similarities between them. Their comments on
one another, mostly composed of Twelvemough's criticism of the Altrurian
outlook, suggest their implicit differences, primarily on the issue of human
nature. Twelvemough, along with most of his wealthy friends, compla-
cently appeals to human nature to justify class and gender inequalities:
"We do not expect to outlive [present economic conditions]. We regard
them as final, and as indestructibly based in human nature itself" (16).
Throughout his travels, Homos argues against this static vision of
human nature. According to Homos, the negative aspects of human behav-
ior are the result of fear and want; it is also human nature to be concerned
with the common good, as in Altruria. Homos, following realist tenets of
social criticism, insists that the environment is critical in the creation of
character. He notes with displeasure during his travels in New York the
"malign change here that has transformed the Italians from the friendly folk
we are told they are at home, to the surly race, and even savage race they
mostly show themselves here: shrewd for their advancement in the material
things, which seem the only good things to the Americanized aliens of all
races, and fierce for their full share of the political pottage" (261). Homos's
firm belief that environment shapes human nature is dramatized in the con-
flict between his outlook and that of Twelvemough: each, through his
respective state of mind, reflects his environment of origin.
But when Eveleth emerges as a narrator, the simple correspondence
between individual perspective and environment begins to break down. In-
stead, the progression of narrative altruistic consciousness, evident in the
change from Twelvemough's to Homos's narrative, continues, and Eveleth
THE ALTRURIAN ROMANCES 89
provides a narrative outlook that is more tolerant and open-minded than
those of her two predecessors. Although raised in "Egoria," the Altrurian
name for the United States, she sees the world in a more accepting and
hopeful manner than does Homos. Eveleth's ability to transcend her envi-
ronment points out the underlying tension in Howells's treatment of
human nature. In Howells's view, despite the formative quality of environ-
ment, something within human nature allows for individual variation.
Howells's attempt to balance his more old-fashioned faith in the individual
with a belief in environmental determinism gestures toward important
contemporary treatments of the topic of human nature.
The antithetical positions of environmental determinism and free will
defined the poles of the intellectual compass after the introduction of evo-
lutionist theory.17 This antithesis was considered crucial because determin-
istic theories threatened both orthodox religious views and the secular
belief in the centrality of the individual. Although Darwin's ideas became
well known in the United States after the publication of On the Origin of
Species, it was Herbert Spencer who set the terms for intellectual debate in
the latter decades of the 1800s. In addition to Spencer's own work, the
writings of John Fiske, Spencer's great American popularizer, established
the framework for Howells's treatment of human nature in the Altrurian
Romances.
Spencer's theories of human behavior arrived at a time when Com-
mon Sense psychology appeared inadequate in the face of the empirical
methodology of the new German physiological psychology. Its late-
nineteenth-century defenders tried to preserve the older Common Sense
approach to psychology, primarily because of its strong moral framework.
But the Common Sense stress on universal human qualities, such as mo-
rality, appeared weak because it relied on introspection to verify—and to
justify—its findings. Rather than scientific replicability, conformity to such
underlying philosophical principles as universal morality prevailed. The
Common Sense method of introspection can be said to have led logically to
the next step, that of experimentation; but, as was evident in the work of
Thomas Upharri, a reliance on physiological data was merely an implicit
possibility. With the late-nineteenth-century move toward physiology and
laboratory experimentation, and away from moral philosophy, the disci-
pline of psychology began to assume its modern form. The breakdown
of the older moral philosophy was furthered by the advent of Herbert
Spencer's universal theoretical framework.18
Evolutionary theory, particularly in the form of Spencer's social Dar-
winism, predominated during the 1870s and 1880s, and Darwin's own
views on the social implications of his work were relatively insignificant at
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the time because most Americans learned about evolution from Spencer. In
its subtitle, though, On the Origin  of Species contributed the influential
metaphor of "the struggle for life," a figure which conveyed the tragic
vision of life that came to be associated with evolutionary theory.19 Spencer
further amplified this tragic cast with the phrase "survival of the fittest,"
and he generalized this outlook when using evolutionary theory as the uni-
versal rule for social sciences as well as for the physical and the biological.
His vision of evolution was pre-Darwinian; he first published on the subject
before Origin, and his theories reflected a belief in the Lamarckian notion
of inheritance of acquired characteristics. According to Spencer, the ability
to adapt to the environment was the primary measure of biological compe-
tence. A passage from an early work, Social Statics (1851), that may have
been distressing to Spencer's American followers, reflects the importance
of environment in the formation of character, both individual and cultural:
"The barbarizing of colonists, who live under aboriginal conditions, is
universally remarked. The back settlers of America, amongst whom un-
avenged murders, rifle duels, and Lynch law prevail—or, better still, the
trappers, who leading a savage life have descended to savage habits, to
scalping, and occasionally even to cannibalism—sufficiently exemplify
it."20 The ease by which the colonists fall from the height of civilization
when they live in primitive physical conditions indicates the importance of
physical surroundings to moral character. In addition, Spencer's vague ac-
count reinforces the class bias that those who live in the greatest material
ease will show the highest degree of moral refinement.
Despite a general attention to human behavior and his books on psy-
chology and sociology, Spencer denigrates the social sciences as secondary
pursuits. To Spencer, as to twentieth-century behaviorists, mental
processes are epiphenomenal. And, on a larger level, the actions of social
groups are simply regarded as reactions to natural conditions: "Life
consists in the maintenance of inner actions corresponding with outer ac-
tions . . . the progress to life of higher and higher kinds essentially consists
in a continual improvement of the adaptation between organic processes
and processes which environ the organism."21 According to Spencer,
the social realm does not mediate between the individual and the natural
universe; instead, each stands in a direct relationship with nature. Further-
more, because the community, like the individual, is reactive, it merely
reflects the mechanisms of nature. As a result, the Spencerian vision natu-
ralizes social constructs, and it extends the concept of "survival of the
fittest" from natural to social analysis.
Whereas Common Sense psychology posited individuals within soci-
ety, albeit a society whose rules were ultimately sanctified by its meta-
physics, the evolutionary viewpoint displaced the individual-community
dynamic with an individual-cosmos relationship. Both individual and soci-
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ety stood in an equivalent relationship to nature; the actions of each were
determined by the same principles of evolutionary law. This process of anal-
ogy is central to Spencer's general theory of evolution. All the sciences are
supposed to work by these same principles, and methods of analysis were in
important respects interchangeable. This is, no doubt, why Spencer, trained
as an engineer, felt himself qualified to pronounce on a variety of social
issues. His Principles of Psychology (1855), for example, contains numer-
ous digressions on various physical and chemical phenomena and very few
clinical or behavioral observations. These digressions would seem rather
pointless were it not Spencer's aim to ground psychological theory in the
physical sciences. This integration of psychology into a holistic vision that
spanned the sciences and the social sciences responded to the disciplinary
needs of late-nineteenth-century psychologists in a way that Common Sense
psychology could not. Not only could recent physiological discoveries now
be integrated into the discipline, but historical changes also could be ac-
counted for. Yet, particularly to adherents of orthodox Christian visions of
human nature, Spencer's assertion that the higher mental faculties, such as
reason, were merely complex instinctual or reflex responses proved threat-
ening.22 No qualitative difference was posited between presumably unique
human characteristics and those of simpler organisms. Despite (from the
moralistic position) this apparent shortcoming, evolutionary theory could
not simply be ignored. The task of adjusting Spencer's ideas to an essentially
Christian framework was undertaken by Howells's friend, John Fiske.
In Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, first published in 1874, Fiske
made his most comprehensive attempt to preserve universal moral princi-
ples within an evolutionary framework. His analysis of social behavior
owed much to Spencer's analogy between the social and the biological
realms. But according to Fiske, the progress of human nature could be
charted not by simple adaptation to external circumstance but by specifi-
cally ethical criteria: "The fundamental characteristic of social progress is
the continuous weakening of selfishness and the continuous strengthening
of sympathy. Or—to use a more convenient and somewhat more accurate
expression suggested by Comte—it is a gradual supplanting of egoism by
altruism. "23 Fiske appropriated Comte's term, altruism, to place it in a di-
alectical opposition with egoism.1* This dialectical pattern accounts for
historical and social progress. Fiske thereby reconciled an evolutionary
view of human nature with Christian metaphysics and a progressive inter-
pretation of American history. Moreover the opposition has a clear ana-
logue in Howells's name for Utopia, Altruria, and the Altrurian name for
the United States, Egoria.
Fiske, like his Common Sense predecessors, located the basis for all
social feelings in the infant-parent bond. Fiske suggested that the pro-
longed period of human infancy, characterized by reliance on parents,
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forms the source of all altruistic feeling. And, when this feeling is encoded
by a set of ethical precepts, such as Christianity, the result is progress. The
more advanced altruistic cultures—to Fiske, the western European nations
along with the United States—are the result of "a slow process of breed-
ing, of adaptation, of acclimatization—mental and moral, as well as
physical" (Outlines, 202). This breeding process presumably is verifiable
by historical observation; Fiske charted the course of history from be-
ginnings in clans, to Greek patriotism, on to Christianity: "The spirit of
Christianity, first rendered possible by Roman cosmopolitanism, has made,
and is ever making, wider and deeper conquests as civilization advances"
(Outlines, 207). According to Fiske, the influence of the Christian religion
has been in large part responsible for what he considered the more ad-
vanced states of humanity.
Fiske identified cultures as primitive or modern according to their
adherence to egoistic or altruistic principles. To classify, Fiske compared
"the ideal types of perfect manhood at the two extremes of civilization
within our ken. The primitive man is the man of intense personality, with
an enormous sense of his own importance, easily roused to paroxysms of
anger, brooking no contradiction, disregardful of the feelings of others,
domineering over all within his reach. The modern type is the man of mild
personality, shunning the appearance of self-assertion, slow to anger,
patient of contradiction, mindful of the feelings of those around him"
(Outlines, 207-8).
In short, Fiske's modern man resembles Howells's Aristides Homos.
Fiske used his categorizations of primitive and modern not only to note
Western cultural changes but also to contrast Western with other world
cultures:
Over a large part of the earth's surface the slow progress painfully
achieved during thousands of prehistoric ages has stopped short with
the savage state, as exemplified by those African, Polynesian, and
American tribes which can neither work out a civilization for them-
selves, nor appropriate the civilization of higher races with whom they
are brought into contact. Half the human race, having surmounted
savagery, have been arrested in an immobile type of civilization, as in
China, in ancient Egypt, and in the East generally. It is only in the
Aryan and some of the Semitic races, together with the Hungarians
and other Finnic tribes subjected to Aryan influences, that we can find
evidences of a persistent tendency to progress. [Outlines, 255]
Although Fiske denied an inherent racial tendency toward progress, at-
tributing it to "a concurrence of favorable circumstances" (Outlines, 256),
his racial hierarchy corresponded to the conventional Western view of itself
as the disseminator of advanced culture.
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Fiske's vision of social evolution also affirmed an ideal character type,
an important consideration to both the earlier Common Sense psychology
and Spencerian psychology as well. Fiske preserved Common Sense ethical
idealism by aligning it with Spencer's notion of successful adaptation: the
altruistic personality represents the highest degree of cultural success. In
Fiske's model, the individual, empowered by the advanced culture, had
the option to choose moral, altruistic behavior. This would enable the in-
dividual to freely operate and consequently escape Spencer's tragic deter-
minism. Such an optimistic interpretation of evolutionary theory provided
the basis for the comic slant of the Altrurian Romances in place of
the tragic or tough-minded outlook more commonly associated with a
Spencerian stance.
As editor for the Atlantic Monthly and Harper's Monthly from the 1860s
through the 1880s, Howells naturally was familiar with evolutionary the-
ories. Despite his substantial acceptance of evolution, reflected particularly
in his ideas about realist criticism,25 Howells expressed qualms about the
ethical effects of Spencerian determinism and its disparagement of human
intellectual processes. In an 1874 review of Dickens for the Atlantic,
Howells reveals these misgivings when contrasting the comforts of re-
ligious belief against faith in an unsentimental evolution theory: "We sup-
pose that nowadays Evolution is to console and support us—not with the
hope of heavenly peace somewhere, but with the elevating consciousness of
primordial jelly."26 Years later, in his 1901 obituary for John Fiske, How-
ells was to maintain this same tone of concern: "John Fiske was first an
apostle to the scientific heathen, and preached Darwin and Spencer and
Huxley to the multitude. . . .  When he had dissatisfied himself with the
psychological outcome [of evolutionary science] he began to speak as one
having authority, and to say those things, new and glad, of God and of the
Soul which are possibly more important than anything said of either in our
darkened day."27
Howells found encouragement in Fiske's version of evolution theory,
particularly in its preservation of religious belief. Fiske's hierarchical classi-
fication of cultures according to altruistic criteria, which he had adapted
from Spencer, also appealed to Howells, but the most significant aspect of
Fiske's modification of Spencerian theory from Howells's perspective, a
corollary of the preservation of conventional religious belief, was its insis-
tence on the importance of free will. The individual's ability to transcend
external circumstance and exercise free will recurs thematically in How-
ells's later fiction. The plots of such novels as The Rise of Silas Lapham
(1885) and The Minister's Charge (1887) directly deal with the struggles
of characters to overcome deleterious environmental influences. And
even as early as 1872, in a review of a Lincoln biography, Howells cites
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Lincoln's success despite the limitations of his frontier environment as evi-
dence against strict determinism.28 Howells plainly wanted to believe that
humans could freely choose between good and evil in their actions—like
John Fiske, Howells was willing to concede a strong environmental influ-
ence on individual behavior, but he was unwilling to subscribe to utter
determinism.29
The polemics and the narrative structure of the Altrurian Romances
denote Howells's commitment to a vision of individual free will that nego-
tiates tensions between communal demands and personal freedom. The
progression of consciousness in the three narrative viewpoints suggests a
groundwork for individual freedom. Twelvemough, to whom perceptions
about the social effects of American economics arise as momentary in-
trusions, manifests only a minimal capacity for thought counter to his
identification with the leisure class. Homos, in marked contrast to Twelve-
mough, has a far more flexible and sympathetic view of people. But
Homos's perspective, though more advanced, is similar to Twelvemough's
in that each is a true product of his environment. A qualitative leap occurs
when Eveleth assumes the narrative role. Despite her wealthy American
background, she begins with a compassionate attitude toward people and,
unlike Homos, she shows an ability to change as she becomes more Al-
trurian. This narrative movement toward an ideal of free will and personal
freedom suggests that these ideals exist as great Utopian goals, but
Altrurian personal freedom is unlike the American variety. Although
everyone is obligated to spend three hours daily in communal work, the re-
maining time may be used for other pursuits. Thus, for example, in his
American lecture, Homos claims that Altrurians "regard all artists, who
are in a sort creators, as the human type which is likest the divine" (160).
But the Altrurian artist, though allowed to claim exclusion from the uni-
versal work rule, rarely does so. This expression of free will by conformity
to social rules characterizes Altrurian society. Hence, punishment for
crimes is unnecessary. An encounter with a murderer who is "'pursued by
remorse that gives him no peace'" (391) convinces Eveleth, after some
debate, that the Altrurian penitential method is best. Altrurians so thor-
oughly internalize their social code that external pressures are obviated.
Individual free will and social good simply do not conflict.
The reason individual and collective identities merge so seamlessly is
the institution of the family, a crucial feature of the ideal (for some) of the
Utopian village as refuge from a complex of changes occurring in late-
nineteenth-century American cities. As Homos repeatedly notes in A Trav-
eler, the family is the basis for Altrurian society: "The home is the very
heart of the Altrurian system" (162). Moreover, Altrurian society is re-
garded as a kind of extension of the family, as indicated by the title of their
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national anthem, "Brothers All." Altruria dramatizes Fiske's notion that
the family is the source of all benevolent impulses. And Altruria, by recog-
nizing the family's importance, represents the highest level of social
development within Fiske's comparative model. The action in Through the
Eye of the Needle centers on the idea of family: several weddings are
either planned or take place, and in the end the mutinous sailors return to
their new Altrurian home. In place of social divisiveness, the image of
family prevails, and individual differences are inevitably sublimated in def-
erence to the higher unity.30
The ideal of the family, however, displays two contradictory aspects.
Like the comic work of "social signification" that establishes behavioral
and attitudinal boundaries that define a community,31 the image of the
family involves either inclusion within the Altrurian community or ex-
clusion from it. In the Altrurian Romances, the community may be estab-
lished either within the text, as when certain characters share values or
understand a joke, or outside the text, as when, for example, reader and
author agree to find Twelvemough's conformity ludicrous, or, alternatively,
when the reader agrees that '"America and Altruria are really one at
heart'" (23). But not all may join the Altrurian family. The question of
who is to be included and who excluded from Howells's Utopian realm
hangs on a point of great significance to Fiske and Spencer—the hierarchy
of cultures.
Altruria, the realm of human freedom, uneasily rests on the pinnacle
of human development. By definition the main threat to Altruria arises not
from within but from the less highly developed outside world. This threat
is not one of direct attack; Altruria has remained unknown to other coun-
tries. But Aristides Homos, while apparently encouraging his American
listeners' Utopian impulses, insinuates the Altrurian anxiety about the pre-
cariousness of their well-being: "Ah, you mustn't go to Altruria! You must
let Altruria come to you" (177). Like late-nineteenth-century nativists in
the United States, Altrurians understand their primary threat to be the
arrival of immigrants.
Throughout Howells's career, immigration was an important issue,
particularly as it became more obvious to Americans toward the turn of
the century. In fact, the percentage of foreign-born Americans was barely
greater in 1910 than it had been in 1860—14.5 percent, as opposed to
13.2 percent, of the population.32 But the growing number of immigrants
from southern and eastern Europe in the late 1800s introduced a popula-
tion with different languages, social customs, and political traditions.
These differences stimulated resistance from more than one segment of the
population. One example of an upper-class anti-immigrant response was
the Immigration Restriction League, founded in Boston early in 1894. This
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organization advocated adoption of literacy tests to limit the influx of
"'Slav, Latin, and Asiatic races, historically down-trodden, atavistic, and
stagnant.'"33 Although President Cleveland eventually vetoed it, the popu-
larity of the ideas of the Immigration Restriction League was apparent in
Congress's passage of a bill that would have excluded illiterate immigrants.
Concern about immigration was not restricted, however, to upper-class
Americans. For reasons other than common cultural or ethnic motives,
such as anti-Catholic sentiment, working-class Americans also feared im-
migration. Ethnic differences were routinely used by employers to obstruct
unionization and to drive down wages. For example, Chinese laborers
were imported into Massachusetts during the 1870s by shoe manufactur-
ers for this purpose; and Slavic workers were effectively used by the coal
industry to destroy the miners' union in 1875. Such competition helped
stimulate anti-immigrant sentiment among supporters of trade union ac-
tivity.34 Immigrants also frequently introduced broad critiques of capi-
talism as well as ideas about labor organization that were at odds with
American trade unions, which tended to avoid political involvement and
economic analyses in favor of a narrower focus on wages and working
conditions.35
Howells's own responses to immigration reflect considerable ambiva-
lence. On the one hand, he must be recalled as the one who promoted the
English-language publications of the American Jewish journalist and nov-
elist Abraham Cahan.36 And his courageous defense of the Haymarket
anarchists in 1887 similarly bespeaks a commitment to cultural diversity.
Yet, on the other hand, contradictory impulses may be discerned in his jour-
nalistic writings. For example, in one early Atlantic column he sarcastically
expresses fear over the prospect of "the American race accomplish [ing] its
destiny of dying out before the populatory foreigner."37 In another, Howells
looks ahead to a future dominated by "the oblique-eyed, swarthy American
of that time."38 Similarly, in comments occasioned by some wanderings
through a local neighborhood, he observes with displeasure the effects of
Irish immigration ("It is pretty certain that the general character of the
population has not gained by the change"), he notes that "the encroachment
of the Celtic army" and "the well-known ambition of Dubliners to rule the
land—[will] one day make an end of us poor Yankees as a dominant plu-
rality," and he concludes with the following query: "We wait with an
anxious curiosity the encounter of the Irish and the Chinese, now rapidly
approaching each other from opposite shores of the continent. Shall we be
crushed in the collision of these superior races?"39
The kinds of anxieties about immigration and its effects that How-
ells, a Welsh immigrant's grandson, displays in these writings appear in
the Altrurian Romances, but the Utopian work transmutes them, first by
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handling with comic irony questions of immigration and foreign influence
in the United States. In A Traveler from Altruria, Homos, a foreigner,
is treated condescendingly by the self-deluded Twelvemough, to whom
there is no doubt that immigrants are inferior beings. At one point, Twelve-
mough describes domestics as "ignorant foreigners, fit for nothing else"
(17); and later, condemning some farmers from England who complain
about their poverty, an upper-class companion smugly opines, "these
foreigners have no self-respect" (86). More humorously, Twelvemough
expresses his fear of being "attainted" by the "enmity" and "explicit vul-
garity" of the distinctly more peaceful and sensitive Homos (72). But
despite Howells's ridicule of the xenophobic Twelvemough's narrow-
mindedness, Howells's exemplar Homos also expresses negative opinions
about immigrants. His comments about Italians, quoted earlier, are charac-
teristic of Homos's observations on lower-class, immigrant New Yorkers in
the "Letters." Whether the source is a mysterious ethnic essence or a result
of American economics, immigrants somehow undergo a "malign change"
in the United States that causes them to acquire only the most noxious
American characteristics.
The Altrurian anxieties over immigration appear in Homos's com-
ments about immigrants and his desire to encourage native utopianists in
the United States to build their own ideal society rather than emigrate to
Altruria. In A Traveler, Homos declares that "America and Altruria are
really one at heart" (23). This intrinsic unity leads Homos, in his conclud-
ing sermon, to maintain that, if American political ideals were applied to
the economic sphere, the "Evolution" that peacefully transformed Altru-
rian society could do the same for the United States. Yet Homos's en-
couraging affirmations of the altrurianism implicit in Americans only
obscure the significance of Altruria's social composition. Homos hints at
this when he notes in his sermon that he is the first Altrurian to travel
abroad as an Altrurian. Altruria has remained secret because it is a closed
society: although shipwrecked sailors are made welcome, immigration
clearly is not desired. When one of the farmers expresses his eagerness to
leave the inequities of the United States behind and emigrate, Homos re-
sponds by insisting, "You must let Altruria come to you." Similarly, when
Twelvemough introduces Eveleth's and Homos's narratives in Through the
Eye of the Needle, he observes that "a people living in conditions which
some of our dreamers would consider ideal, are forced to discourage for-
eign emigration, against their rule of universal hospitality, and in at least
one notable instance are obliged to protect themselves against what they
believe an evil example by using compulsion with the wrong-doers" (273).
Twelvemough's comment highlights his incongruous consonance with the
Altrurians on the issue of foreign contamination.
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The specific incident to which Twelvemough alludes, in which the
shipwrecked Thrall family and their servants are coerced into communal
labor, reveals the underlying fear of cultural corruption. Eveleth, reflecting
her adoptive Altrurian viewpoint, comments on the wealthy Thralls: "It
could not be said that they were molestive in the same sense as the sailors
[who had killed animals for food, to the distress of the vegetarian Altruri-
ans], but they were even more demoralizing in the spectacle they offered
the neighborhood of people dependent on hired service" (415). The fear
of demoralization by contact with people from capitalist society is usually
not so overtly stated in Through the Eye. More typically, when the crew of
the ship that had brought Aristides and Eveleth mutinies and asks to stay
in Altruria, Aristides explains to Eveleth that "the Altrurians are not anx-
ious to have the men stay, not merely because they are coarse, rude, or
vicious, but because they think they ought to go home . . . to found an Al-
trurian Commonwealth of their own" (371-72). The sailors, when allowed
to present their plea to stay, describe their situation in revealing terms.
Eveleth relates the first mate's account of their miserable working
conditions and the tonic effect of his arrival in Altruria: "When he got
ashore here in Altruria, and saw how white [Howells's emphasis] people
lived, people that used each other white, he made up his mind that he
would never go back to any ship alive" (376). In response, the captain
apologizes for the sailors' working conditions and remarks that he also
finds it difficult to return to the United States after his time in Altruria:
"Don't you suppose I would like to spend the rest of my days, too, among
white people?" (377). The captain adds that he was afraid to let his wife
come ashore "'to let her see what a white man's country really was, be-
cause I felt so weak about it myself" (378). The figural significance of
whiteness recalls Homos's earlier comments on the White City at the 1893
Columbian Exposition.40
Homos, utterly taken with the classical architecture of what he terms
"the Fair City," discovers there "the illusion of Altruria" because of its
classical design and cleanliness. Against this citadel of purity, he contrasts
the Midway Plaisance outside:
In the Fair City, everything is free; in the Plaisance everything must be
paid for.... The Orient, which has mainly peopled the Plaisance, with
its theaters and restaurants and shops, takes the tint of the ordinary
American enterprise, and puts on somewhat the manners of the ordi-
nary American hustler. It is not really so bad as that, but it is worse
than American in some of the appeals it makes to the American public,
which is decent if it is dull, and respectable if it is rapacious. The las-
civious dances of the East are here, in the Persian and Turkish and
Egyptian theaters;. . . One must be aware that the citizens of the Plai-
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sance are not there for their health, as the Americans quaintly say, but
for the money there is in it. [205]
Homos's stark contrast between the White City and the surrounding Plai-
sance, disingenuous insofar as it ignores the military display in the White
City sponsored by the German munitions maker Krupp, simultaneously
evokes the image of Utopian Altruria surrounded by the materialist world
and that of an America besieged by immigrants.41
The idea that the most advanced nation would have problematic rela-
tions with its neighbors is hardly unique to Howells. John Fiske's popular
lecture, "Manifest Destiny," published in Harper's Monthly while How-
ells was editor, presents a relevant treatment of this issue. Fiske, in keeping
with the Spencerian cultural hierarchy echoed in Cosmic Philosophy,
states that "the development of industry is largely dependent upon the ces-
sation or restriction of warfare."42 This peaceable quality, the triumph of
the altruistic over the egoistic in culture, has, however, a somewhat para-
doxical military mission: "In order that the pacific community may be able
to go on doing its work it must be strong enough and warlike enough to
overcome its barbaric neighbors, who have no notion of keeping peace."43
Fiske justifies his racial hierarchy through an appeal to the virtues of "local
self-government combined with central representation," which he credits
to the Teutonic influence, and he concludes with a frankly imperialist pre-
diction:
The work which the English race began when it colonized North
America is destined to go on until every land on the earth's surface
that is not already the seat of an old civilization shall become English
in its language, in its religion, in its political habits and traditions, and
to a predominant extent in the blood of its people. The day is at hand
when four-fifths of the human race will trace its pedigree to English
forefathers, as four-fifths of the white people in the United States trace
their pedigree to-day.44
Fiske's statement, which complements Howells's earlier fear of a future of
"oblique-eyed, swarthy" Americans, relies on an aggressive interpretation
of cultural authority.
By contrast, Howells's vision in the Altrurian Romances appears
more peaceful. Because it has remained mysteriously hidden in the Aegean
Sea, Altruria has no need for a military force, and its few shipwrecked im-
migrants pose only a limited threat to the prevalent culture. Expressing
Howells's idealization of small rural towns, Mrs. Gray, Eveleth's mother,
comments that life in Altruria, which at first she had feared, "took her
back to the America she used to know" (383). The nostalgic approval of
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Altruria given by Mrs. Gray, an early doubter of Homos, suggests How-
ells's attempt to find a Utopian future in an idealized, almost childlike, past,
in which everyone was a member of an extended family.
Altruria's organization into villages rather than industrial cities and
its glorification of farming rather than industry imply a desire to retreat to
a supposedly simpler rural life. Homos remarks in his lecture that farming
is the most honored pursuit in Altruria (161). And in the Altrurian Ro-
mances the only working people with whom Homos has any sustained
interactions are farmers. Despite Homos's sympathy with New York's poor
in the "Letters," urban and industrial workers are described generically
and are notably absent as characters.45 Howells's avoidance of this issue re-
flects the difficulties he had in earlier novelistic treatments of economic
problems. In Annie Kilburn, for example, Howells criticizes philanthropic
schemes to ameliorate the living conditions of workers. And in his most
programmatic attempt to present the social disarray of industrial society, A
Hazard of New Fortunes, it is the ultimately ineffectual Christian faith of
young Conrad Dryfoos that is compared favorably to the more radical poli-
tics of the immigrant Lindau. Howells does present Lindau with a certain
sympathy; yet, as his deeply accented speech signifies, Lindau's political so-
lutions were imported and not truly germane to America and its needs.
In place of potentially explosive working-class political solutions,
Howells uses Homos's direct address to his readers in the "Letters" to
affirm a faith in the American middle class: "It is from those who have not
been forced to toil so exhaustively that they cannot think clearly; it is from
the comfortable middle class . . . that the good time is to come" (192). In-
stead of "a wild revolt of the poor against the rich, of laborer against
capitalist, with all the sanguinary circumstance of such an outbreak"
(191), the middle class offers a relatively disinterested, almost Altrurian
outlook. Howells infuses the middle class with a nostalgic Midwestern
agrarian vision: "Of course the vast majority of Americans are of the
middle class, and with them you can still find the old American life, the old
American ideals, the old American principles; and if the old America is
ever to prevail, it must be in their love and honor of it" (190). Howells,
identifying the middle class with his symbol of a preindustrial America
free from the threat of cultural diversity, advances his vision of a place
where Christian idealism would go unchallenged and all threats would be
external.
Howells's critique of social Darwinist individualism and his appeal to
the "old America," his nostalgic vision of a rural society, are strategic re-
sponses to evolutionary determinism and a call for political change. When
determinism is used to justify as natural current social conditions, Howells
bristles. Thus he objects to such social Darwinist apologetics for economic
inequities as those voiced by Twelvemough in familiar terms: "'The divi-
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sions among us are rather a process of natural selection'" (14). And he also
objects to the vision of human nature as a static entity, while he argues
instead that change for the better is possible. In place of the newer evo-
lutionary determinism, Howells's ideal of an "old America" recalls the
earlier Common Sense outlook in which the individual will is bounded by
community morality instead of natural laws.
A desire for an effective community morality is also reflected on a
structural level by the comic tone and action of the Altrurian Romances.
The "vigilant sense of a collective supervision," noted by Meredith as an
attribute of comedy, along with a comic "utilitarian aim of general im-
provement," cited by Bergson, guides Howells's Utopian work. Rather than
engage in bitter, potentially alienating polemics, Howells argues that turn-
of-the-century American conditions are foolish and of benefit to no one,
not even members of the upper class. The new Altrurian community, ide-
ally to be composed of those readers willing to take up Homos's challenge
to build their own Altruria, presents itself as open to all who would em-
brace Altrurian ideals. This inclusive and optimistic tone is matched by
both the plot of Through the Eye of the Needle, in which the newest
members of the Altrurian family return home, and the progression of nar-
rative points of view in the Altrurian Romances, which shows evolutionary
development in the three successive states of mind of the narrators.
Howells's comic vision of the individual in society, an attempt at incorpo-
rating moral precepts within an evolutionary framework, represents a
distinct and telling alteration of the prevalent nineteenth-century accounts
of the evolution of human behavior. In Spencer's model, the individual and
the culture are both products of the natural environment. Fiske preserves
the cause-effect relationship between culture and environment, bu* he
posits culture as a mediating force between the individual and nature.
On the level of relations between cultures, Fiske maintains a Spencerian
outlook. The operation of Spencer's evolutionary law demands conflict be-
tween competing cultures.
In contrast to Spencer's and Fiske's emphases on war between cul-
tures, Howells addresses the question of the assimilation of immigrants
into American society. Howells accepts Fiske's idea of the culture as a me-
diating force, which he then problematizes by introducing the issue of
immigration and the idea that an individual be loyal to more than one cul-
ture. In Howells's Utopia, the national symbol of Altruria contains an
implicit call to give up ties to the old in favor of the newer, more highly
evolved society. But even the enthusiastic Eveleth, despite her desire to
become Altrurian, finds the process of assimilation slow and disorienting.
Her situation would appear to dramatize the difficulties faced by immi-
grants during Howells's time: with their dual allegiances to the new
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American society and to their ethnic cultures, the transformation to
American identity was difficult. Yet, despite his recognition of this prob-
lem from Eveleth's immigrant standpoint, Howells insists in the name
of cultural unity that immigrants have an undivided allegiance to their
adoptive homeland. The underside of the comic "collective supervision"
emerges in a strategy of exclusion toward those who do not accept mem-
bership solely in the dominant community. Earlier, in his Atlantic essays,
Howells had perceived with marked anxiety the presence of other ethnic
groups; similarly, in the Altrurian Romances any ethnic identity is a threat
to his Utopian vision.
Howells defends his vision in the name of evolutionary progress: Al-
truria is the most highly developed society, and, therefore, other cultures
will inevitably become like it. And, of course, the United States stands next
in line in the cultural hierarchy. Howells evokes a symbol he calls "old
America," but American identity has not necessarily resided in a common
cultural history or set of traditions. Symbols of national unity in America
often have derived from an orientation toward the future, a desire to create
a country that would live up to Utopian dreams. While politically conserv-
ative visions of the future have tended to emphasize organic and traditional
social structures, more progressive political outlooks customarily have
stressed democratic principles.46 In the end, Howells, by stressing the
desire to reconstruct society according to ethical ideals, aligns himself with
politically progressive forces. But in his appeal to an "old America," which
connotes an exclusion of other cultures and runs counter to his political
idealism, Howells reveals an ambivalence toward immigration and a gen-
eral discomfort with an urban industrial society.
By emphasizing communal consensus and morality, Howells tries to
eliminate the threat of cultural pluralism while he attempts to reproduce
the older Common Sense emphasis on legitimation of the individual. Like
Hawthorne, who used the image of the individual's return home to drama-
tize the reliance of the individual on the community, Howells ends the
Altrurian Romances with the return of the ship to its new Altrurian home.
But, unlike the Puritans in Hawthorne's romance, these sailors have come
to a New World that is already perfect. If they—and Howells's Altruria—
are to survive, they must shed completely their old identities, thereby
eliminating the threat of competing cultures. Perhaps it was this anxiety
that prompted Howells, referring to himself in the third person, to mention
in his introductory comments that he had to "admit the possibility of im-
perfection even in the ideal commonwealth of Altruria; or in other terms,
he suffered his dream of it to experience slight touches of nightmare" (4).
5The Ironic Construction of Selfhood
William James's Principles of Psychology
In their fiction, Hawthorne and Howells dramatized problems of the rela-
tionship between the self and the community within nineteenth-century
American thought. For Hawthorne, contemporary social issues and the
advent of association psychology complicated but did not overturn his
Common Sense understanding of the individual's reliance on the commu-
nity. The Common Sense analysis of the individual psyche, which con-
stituted a part of every educated person's instruction in moral philosophy,
remained powerful even after the Civil War. In large part the Common
Sense analysis held its ground because it articulated on a theoretical level
the tension between the individual and society, which has been an impor-
tant part of America's cultural heritage since Puritan times. This tension,
derived from the need to locate truth within the individual while the indi-
vidual paradoxically remained subordinate to community ethical and
behavioral standards, was depicted by Hawthorne in his short stories, his
children's histories, and, most prominently, The Scarlet Letter. For Haw-
thorne's fictional characters, claims to knowledge of truth that contradict
social conventions precede self-imposed isolation and even madness. Haw-
thorne's strongest character, Hester Prynne, evades this fate only through
membership in a reconfigured community and reconciliation with the
Puritans.
The Common Sense description of mental activity, with its emphasis
on introspection, worked well to describe an educated population that
shared common assumptions and cultural mores. But with growth and
the changes in nineteenth-century immigration patterns, it became in-
creasingly difficult to rely on the common associations advocated as an
aesthetic goal by Archibald Alison and others. While the diversification of
the American population challenged the notion of cultural unity, evolution-
ary theory threatened the religious and ethical bases of American life.
Despite its threatening aspects, however, evolutionary theory, with its
postulated hierarchy of cultures, situated the United States and England
at the pinnacle of human development, thus containing the menace of non-
anglophone immigrant cultures and reiterating the universalist tone, if not
the content, of traditional psychologies. But while evolutionist theory cer-
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tified the doctrine of anglophone superiority, it did so at the expense of the
individual free will. By arguing that anglophone cultures were objectively
superior because they had developed in response to natural conditions,
writers like Herbert Spencer abandoned the idea of individual volition in
favor of a thoroughgoing materialism. For William Dean Howells, among
others, the issue was unavoidably ethical: without a firm basis in the possi-
bility of free choice, individual morality was an impossibility. Despite his
general adherence to an evolutionist outlook, Howells was unwilling to
discard the possibility of free individual will. A tension between free will
and evolutionary determinism, though masked by a comic structure, per-
vades the Altrurian Romances and displays a cultural malaise. Howells
ineffectually attempts to resolve the issue by asserting a version of Kant's
categorical imperative: the truly enlightened individual would recognize
that the highest possible moral action is that which benefits all.1
The ultimate inadequacy of Howells's attempt to resolve this im-
portant late-nineteenth-century problem through a return to traditional
philosophy was underscored by the appearance in 1890 of William James's
The Principles of Psychology. This work's initial prominence was in part
attributable to its deft, comprehensive survey of the state of psychology, a
discipline then undergoing revolutionary change. But despite its now out-
dated physiological descriptions and the philosophical psychology, obsolete
even then, that it refutes, The Principles is still read. In large part the
appeal of The Principles is rooted in the problem it addresses: we still
wrestle with the conflict between explanations of human behavior based in
material circumstance and those based in a philosophy of individual will.
But The Principles also engages our interest because of its colloquial style
and narrative structure, an apparently personal account of an intellectual
struggle. We seem to witness, even accompany, James as he sorts through
empirical evidence and inherited beliefs to suggest how we are best to di-
agnose the human condition. An examination of the narrative structure of
The Principles, an unusual structure in what ostensibly is a college psy-
chology textbook, can provide insights into James's attempt to rearrange
the discipline of psychology. In addition, attention to the prevalent figures
of speech will indicate the effect of rhetorical structures on James's ideas
about the individual's relationship to the environment, social and material.2
Although it reflects James's extensive knowledge of philosophy, The
Principles is not simply a philosophical work. Remaining true to his back-
ground in medicine and physiology, and while maintaining an equanimous
tone, James weighs the claims of physiologists against those of moral phi-
losophers. James displays characteristic balance in the opening sentence of
The Principles: "Psychology is the Science of Mental Life, both of its phe-
nomena and of their conditions."3 This definition encompasses the division
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that pervades the structure of his study. On the one hand, James declares
the importance of the "phenomena" of mental life: "The phenomena are
such things as we call feelings, desires, cognitions, reasonings, decisions,
and the like" (15). As James notes, these assorted mental events comprise
the Common Sense fusion of faculty and association psychologies. Against
this old philosophical psychology, however, James introduces "the condi-
tions" of mental life, physiology. With his call for an exploration of the
material conditions associated with thought, James treats the new psychol-
ogy of the late 1800s on equal terms with the old. In the very first
statement of The Principles, James thus fuses two opposed approaches to
human psychology.
To appreciate the implications of this opening gesture, it is helpful
to recall the state of American psychology during the 1890s, a time
when academic disciplines were becoming increasingly professionalized.
Physiological psychology, a recent import from German universities, was
growing in popularity, largely because it meshed well with prevalent evo-
lutionary theories. With its emphasis on the body and the environment,
this new psychology threatened the older philosophical Common Sense
psychology, which, since its American inception with the works of Benja-
min Rush, had been highly oriented toward Christian morality.4 Because it
challenged the centrality of the moral free will, environmental determinism
in any form was abhorrent to Common Sense theorists. Accordingly, in
what was to be the final volley from the retreating ranks of Common Sense
psychologists, James McCosh of Princeton opened his two-volume Psy-
chology with the definition, "Psychology is the science of the soul."5 This
retrogressive assertion coincided with the declaration of a contemporary
that knowledge of psychology "is not possible by way of physiology";
physiological study would alter nothing to defenders of the old psychology
because "in any case the mental facts remain what they always were."6
And, at Harvard, the regnant psychology was Francis Bowen's amalgam of
Common Sense realism and Unitarian metaphysics.
More than constituting a simple theoretical problem for one with
contrary beliefs, the domination of psychology at Harvard by Francis
Bowen, who had taught there since the early 1830s, obstructed James's
professional goals. As Howard Feinstein notes, "at the small institution
that Harvard was in the 1870s, a new teacher who aspired to teach a new
discipline had to move a previously well-established professor out of the
way."7 Although James had achieved some professional security with his
promotion in 1876 to an assistant professorship in biology, he was anxious
to leave behind his scientific background and abandon physiology for phi-
losophy. The Principles of Psychology, conceived as a textbook for the
psychology course James wished to teach, was part of an overall effort to
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displace Bowen and the old psychology. Like many no-longer-young
professors, James further hoped his first full-length publication would
strengthen his bid for professional advancement, and in 1878 he con-
tracted with Henry Holt to write a psychology text. What was to have
been a two-year project extended to twelve and, ironically, James's suc-
cessful attempt to move psychology out of the realm of philosophy was
responsible for his own professional movement out of physiology and into
Harvard's philosophy department.
In The Principles, James legitimizes his professional designs by cir-
cumscribing the old philosophical view of the discipline. His technique
is to question established presuppositions. For example, though in his
opening sentence James cites the importance of mental "phenomena," he
rapidly surveys the established philosophical positions with respect to
mental faculties and finds them inadequate: "the faculty does not exist
absolutely, but works under conditions; and the quest of the conditions
becomes the psychologist's most interesting task" (17);8 therefore, "a
certain amount of brain-physiology must be presupposed or included in
Psychology" (18). James begins The Principles by defining his discipline,
only to undermine promptly his own definition—material conditions limit,
if not determine, the operation of mental faculties. Yet James also asserts
the presence of a quality that historically had been ascribed to the will:
"The pursuance of future ends and the choice of means for their attain-
ment are thus the mark and criteria of mentality in phenomena" (21). In
his opening chapter, then, James does not merely present his reader with a
fundamental approach and organizational scheme for the study of psychol-
ogy. Instead, his alternation between mentalist and materialist viewpoints
reveals his radical questions about the proper disciplinary focus for his
declared area of study.
With no clearly defined object of study, The Principles of Psychology
occupies the strange role of a textbook in search of its discipline.9
In The Principles, James guides the reader in a review of contemporary
psychological theories. The two primary viewpoints are the mentalist, es-
teemed for its long philosophical history and its affirmation of the human
will, and the materialist, justified by the findings of physiological experi-
mentation and the status of evolutionary science. Each had an established
theory of knowledge and a distinct methodology; neither was willing to
accept the definitions and the findings of the other. The psychology of
moral philosophers was clearly inadequate in the face of physiological psy-
chology. No location for the human soul could be found by anatomists,
and the philosophical categories or faculties did not correspond to the find-
ings of laboratory researchers. But physiological psychology was a prob-
lematic venture as well. Because it tended to view humans as nothing
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more than their physical bodies, it suffered from the same problem as did
evolutionary psychology: change could be accounted for only by chance or
by an altered environment. Most significantly, it eliminated the possibility
of free will.
The conflicted vision initially apparent in his introduction intensifies
as James articulates his criticism of both mentalist and materialist schools.
In chapter 5, "The Automaton-Theory," for example, he accuses those
who subscribe to a purely physiologic approach of their own kind of
"philosophic faith, bred like most faiths from an aesthetic demand" (138).
James goes on to debunk the supposed objectivity of scientists: "The
desire on the part of men educated in laboratories not to have their physi-
cal reasonings mixed up with such incommensurable factors as feelings is
certainly very strong." Playing on the cliche of scientists who seek the
purity of the laboratory, James suggests that their positivistic conclusions
arise more from an unrecognized desire to order the universe than to ob-
serve often inconsistent natural phenomena.
Because physiological research expanded the realm of psychological
research, James suggests it had a salutary effect. But because it excluded
from consideration many of the complexities of human existence, he indi-
cates it did not go far enough. To remedy this situation, James reintroduces
a methodological principle of philosophical psychology: "Introspective Ob-
servation is what we have to rely on first and foremost and always" (185).
Despite his defense of the introspective method, James acknowledges its
limits. Introspective evidence, although necessary, may be distorted by what
we now call psychological defenses and unconscious motivations. There-
fore, James warns, "we must never take a person's testimony, however
sincere, that he has felt nothing, as proof positive that no feeling has been
there" (208).
The relationship of physiology to mentation further complicates the
issue. James values the study of physiology because "no mental modifi-
cation ever occurs which is not accompanied or followed by a bodily
change" (18). James expands on this when he discusses the James-Lange
theory (first introduced in 1884). Briefly, this theory argues that "the
bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that
our own feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion" (1065).
The priority, both temporal and logical, of physiology over introspective
analyses reaches its peak with this theory. Indeed, James disparages earlier
psychological descriptions of emotional states: "I should as lief read verbal
descriptions of the shapes of the rocks on a New Hampshire farm as toil
through them again" (1064). Yet in the chapters on "The Automaton-
Theory" and "The Mind-Stuff Theory," James, hoping to "perhaps force
some of these materialistic minds to feel the more strongly the logical re-
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spectability of the spiritualistic position" (181), finds fault with those who
would admit only physiological evidence into psychology.
This oscillation between the polarities of materialist and mentalist dis-
ciplinary visions constitutes the structure of The Principles. Within such
individual chapters as "Habit," "Discrimination and Comparison," "Asso-
ciation," and "Instinct," for example, James shifts back and forth between
philosophy and physiology. This same pattern holds true for The Principles
as a whole. The movement from the early chapters on physiology to a more
traditional, moralistic treatment of habit characterizes the narrative flow.
Chapters 2 and 3 ("The Function of the Brain" and "On Some General
Conditions of Brain-Activity") provide the physiological basis that is subse-
quently applied to behavior in chapter 4, "Habit." James then devotes
chapters to criticism of materialist psychology ("The Automaton-Theory"
and "The Mind-Stuff Theory") and advocacy of the introspective method
("The Methods and Snares of Psychology"). With this call for a return to
introspection, James proceeds, in such chapters as "Attention," "Associ-
ation," "The Perception of Time," "Memory," and "Sensation," to discuss
topics hitherto defined as intellectual states. James follows these with chap-
ters on "The Emotions" and "The Will."10
Given the uncertainty of the proper subject matter of psychology, the
format of The Principles may seem arbitrary. But if we compare the or-
ganization of The Principles to earlier writings, a pattern emerges. In their
works, Common Sense psychologists such as Thomas Reid and Dugald
Stewart progress from treatments of the intellect to the emotions to the
will. Thomas Upham, in his popular psychology textbook, the Abridge-
ment of Mental Philosophy, adheres to this tripartite faculty psychology.
James ironically simulates this same mentalist structure to call into ques-
tion the old psychology. Given his interest in the physiological bases of
emotional response, it is no surprise that he devotes only one chapter each
to the emotions and the will.11
In the concluding chapter, James summarizes his beliefs about such
problems as the relationship of experience to thought, the possibility of
innate mental structures, and the origin of instincts. His closing remarks,
in which he again disparages association and Spencerian psychologies, are
revealing. Although he states that the evolutionary, "so-called Experience-
philosophy has failed to prove its point," he makes only conservative claims
for his own beliefs:
The causes of our mental structures are doubtless natural, and con-
nected, like all our other peculiarities, with those of our nervous
structure. Our interests, our tendencies of attention, our motor im-
pulses, the aesthetic, moral, and theoretic combinations we delight
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in . . . have all grown up in ways of which at present we can give no
account. Even in the clearest parts of Psychology our insight is insig-
nificant enough. And the more sincerely one seeks to trace the actual
course of psychogenesis, the steps by which as a race we may have
come by the peculiar mental attributes which we possess, the more
clearly one perceives "the slowly gathering twilight close in utter
night." [1280]
This apparent skepticism over "our insight" into psychology is noteworthy
in light of the chapter-by-chapter organization of The Principles. James
uses a faculty psychology structure to attack mentalist psychology as well
as materialist psychology. This ironic use of a faculty-psychology format
accords with the concluding tone of The Principles.
In addition, the search for an object of disciplinary inquiry itself has
an ironic structure. The kind of ironic structure I refer to here is that
described in Kenneth Burke's dramatistic "The Four Master Tropes."12 Ac-
cording to Burke, when dramatic roles are replaced by ideas, dramatic
conflict becomes dialectic. This dialectical conflict may ultimately be re-
solved by recourse to a Hegelian higher synthesis; or, like Adorno's
negative dialectic, the conflict may remain irresolvable. In an ironic con-
flict, no subsuming higher viewpoint is available, and we are presented
instead with a double vision. Each side fends off the attacks of the other,
but neither side is sufficiently powerful to prevail.
This lack of resolution characterizes The Principles. James uses two
opposed psychological viewpoints to create a mutual critique. He objects
to the idealism of the old psychology: too much scientific evidence exists to
allow one to discount physiology and environmental influences. Yet, in ma-
terialist psychology, James finds a correspondingly questionable inherent
idealism. Because neither overcomes the other and because the two preva-
lent viewpoints could not be unified, The Principles ironically fails in its
search for the proper basis of psychology. Neither the philosophical con-
ception of the individual nor the materialist stress on the body adequately
defines the disciplinary subject matter.
Notwithstanding his criticisms of the two major psychological ap-
proaches, James finds value in each. With its emphasis on the physical
conditions of mental actions, the new psychology proposed a scientific
basis for psychological research. One scientific concept, the reflex arc,
would be significant in the chapter on habit and, more remotely, to
the idea of the stream of thought. With its emphasis on environment and
physiological conditions, materialist psychology also challenged the notion
of subjectivity central to the old psychology. The old, soul-centered psy-
chology, derived from Christian beliefs, nevertheless incorporated elements
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James would find useful to his inquiry. The traditional philosophical
method of psychological investigation, introspection, proves essential to
James. In "Habit," for example, James initially bases his idea on the physi-
ological notion of the reflex arc, the neural pathway formed in response to
a stimulus.13 But before long, James begins to support his idea of habit
with devices typical of philosophical psychology, introspection and anec-
dote: "The writer well remembers how, on revisiting Paris after ten years'
absence, and, finding himself in the street in which for one winter he had
attended school, he lost himself in a brown study, from which he was
awakened by finding himself upon the stairs which led to the apartment in
a house many streets away in which he had lived during that earlier time,
and to which his steps from the school had then habitually led" (119). At-
tempting to persuade the reader by an appeal to common experience,
James continues in this vein: "We all of us have a definite routine. . . . "
Shared routine experience entices the reader to participate in the learned,
reasonable, balanced discourse of The Principles.
The introspective method founds its claim to truth on experience.
Unlike other experiences, however, the results of introspection cannot be
directly verified. This introspective method, retained by James, and later by
phenomenologists, from earlier moral-philosophy discourse, is best under-
stood in The Principles as a means of persuasion, an attempt to draw the
reader into the narrative.14 Throughout The Principles, James assumes
a populist, egalitarian pose from which he derides the motivations of
philosophers and scientists. Nevertheless, he also uses philosophical and
scientific methods, intimating to the reader that they are readily comprehen-
sible. His tone is evident in the footnote that concludes the introduction:
"Nothing is easier than to familiarize one's self with the mammalian brain.
Get a sheep's head, a small saw, chisel, scalpel and forceps (all three can best
be had from a surgical-instrument maker), and unravel its parts . . ."(24).
Matter-of-fact instructions suggest easy participation by the reader in a
symbolic unraveling of the brain.
James also relies on one other essential of the old psychology, the
will. Despite the substantial critique of the self implicit in materialist psy-
chology, James retains this primary expression of selfhood. Numerous crit-
ics, beginning notably with Ralph Barton Perry, have discovered in James's
recurrent episodes of depression and varied physical ailments during his
twenties the origin of his assertion of the will. His self-cure during that
difficult time provides the source. Because the physiologic approach to psy-
chiatric problems implied that melancholia, along with all other emotional
ills, had its basis in one's physical constitution, the outlook for James was
bleak. But during an emotional crisis in 1870, he invoked a philosophical
approach to amend the physical etiological assessment of depression.
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I think that yesterday was a crisis in my life. I finished the first part of
Renouvier's second Essais and see no reason why his definition of Free
Will—"the sustaining of a thought because I choose to when I might
have other thoughts"—need be the definition of an illusion. At any
rate, I will assume for the present—until next year—that it is no illu-
sion. My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will. For the
remainder of the year, I will abstain from the mere speculation and
contemplative Grublei in which my nature takes most delight, and
voluntarily cultivate the feeling of moral freedom.15
However one wishes to assess the incident, his refusal to allow physical de-
terminism to overwhelm the will thematically recurs in James's writings.
The debate during the nineteenth century over free will frames what
otherwise might seem a purely personal problem. By the late nineteenth
century, earlier defenses of free will appeared irrelevant. Despite notable
academic holdouts, such as proponents of Common Sense psychology,
evolutionist thought in the physical and the social sciences was the norm.
On the social level, the evolutionary doctrine of Manifest Destiny effec-
tively justified cultural hierarchies and the obliteration of Native American
cultures. Social Darwinism similarly rationalized the inequities of social
classes. Yet the power of the old individualism remained. One reason The
Principles of Psychology proved an acceptable alternative to the old psy-
chology was that, unlike materialist psychology, it stressed the individual
will. No doubt his defense of the will has resulted in the critical characteri-
zation of James as an individualist. But the solutions he suggests in The
Principles to the conflict between materialist and mentalist psychologies
indicate that James was no simple defender of the free individual will. In
his chapters on "Habit," "The Consciousness of Self," and "The Stream
of Thought," James offers an alternative to traditional conceptions of the
individual, and he implicitly justifies his textbook, so ironic in a Burkean
sense.
James's chapter on habit contains some of his most renowned statements
on mental health and education: "The great thing, then, in all education, is
to make our nervous system our ally instead of our enemy. It is to fund
and capitalize our acquisitions, and live at ease upon the interest of
the fund" (126). In what might appear positivistic and old-fashioned
bromides, James insists on the value of proper thought and, of yet greater
value, action: "With mere good intentions, hell is proverbially paved"
(129). These suggestions for the inculcation of a proper predisposition to
correct action merely conclude James's assertion of the centrality of habit
in human life; when excerpted from the chapter as a whole, they do not
convey his questions about human will.1* Accordingly, I will first turn to
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the opening statement of this chapter, in which James, following the lead
of evolutionist psychologists, suggests a close relationship between the be-
haviors of humans and those of other organisms: "When we look at living
creatures from an outward point of view, one of the first things that strike
us is that they are bundles of habits. In wild animals, the usual round of
daily behavior seems a necessity implanted at birth; in animals domesti-
cated, and especially in man, it seems, to a great extent, to be the result of
education" (109). By associating the higher activity of reason with animal
instinct—both instinct and habit serve the function of guiding ordinary
activity—James claims a theoretical kinship with evolutionary psycholo-
gists. More significantly he establishes a basis from which to examine
human thought as behavior that exists in response to the world.
This responsiveness is essential to a living organism. Evolutionary
science decreed that organisms unable to adapt to changes in surroundings
would be unable to survive. James calls this ability to adapt plasticity:
"Plasticity, then, in the wide sense of the word, means the possession of
a structure weak enough to yield to an influence, but strong enough not
to yield all at once" (110). Whereas a simple organism may have an ex-
tremely limited set of potential responses to a given situation, the almost
limitless possibilities of response offered by a complex organism must be
restricted for the very practical reason that one would spend all of one's
time confronting the world anew were it not for habitual response. As
James puts it, "the phenomena of habit in living beings are due to the plas-
ticity of the organic materials of which their bodies are composed" (110).
The complexity of the human body mandates habit. Without habit, the
principle of plasticity would reign, and mental chaos would result.
On both the literal and the figural levels, this assessment is rooted in
nervous-system sensitivity. In sensory organs, this function exhibits itself
when an external stimulus triggers a neuronal response, which initiates
transmission to the brain. Impulse transmission from the brain then leads
to an appropriate muscle response. A classic example of this process is the
rapid and unconscious muscle response that follows contact with fire.
James describes nervous system performance as "nothing but a system of
paths between a sensory terminus a quo and a muscular, glandular, or
other terminus ad quern" (113). He observes that habit relies on the physi-
ology of neuronal response: "A path once traversed by a nerve-current
might be expected to follow the law of most of the paths we know, and to
be scooped out and made more permeable than before . . . until at last it
might become a natural drainage channel" (113). By grounding habit for-
mation in the process of transmission and the science of physiology, James
strengthens his later suggestions about mental health and ethics.
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Concurrently, with the phrase "natural drainage channel," he invokes
a prevalent metaphor: fluid dynamics.17 James consciously makes use of
this metaphor; earlier he states that "the philosophy of habit is thus, in the
first instance, a chapter in physics rather than in physiology or psychology"
(110). He quotes from an essay on habit, his source for this metaphor:
"'Water, in flowing, hollows out for itself a channel, which grows broader
and deeper; and, after having ceased to flow, it resumes, when it flows
again, the path traced by itself before'" (111). James borrows a metaphor
from an essay on the philosophy of habit, applies it to neurophysiology,
and then, its physical basis established, returns to it in his later thoughts on
habit. This use of a fluid metaphor to describe psychological action is by no
means unique—Freud uses hydraulics as the underlying physical metaphor
for his theory of drives.18 But for James the metaphor of fluidity primarily
reveals the tendency toward equilibrium.
The metaphor of fluidity and the tendency toward equilibrium is ap-
parent in three important aspects of The Principles. In addition to the
routine, habitual flow of nerve impulses noted above, James relies on the
nature of fluidity and equilibrium to create his analytic framework. In
the attempt to produce a balanced vision, the ironic dialectic of The Prin-
ciples, with its recurrent shifts of perspective, enacts on a structural level
the metaphor of fluidity. The final, and ultimately most significant, effect
of the fluid metaphor relates to James's conception of the relationship
between the individual and the environment. Unlike Freud, whose drive
theory draws on the notion of a closed system that builds pressure until a
release must be found, James envisions an ongoing interaction between the
individual and the environment, in which habit facilitates the homeostatic
process by which levels of tension are equalized. Nerve impulses, like
water, flow according to the path of least resistance to equalize tension.
To James, the individual and the world interact dynamically. A useful
discussion of response to external stimulus, clearly influenced by The Prin-
ciples, is John Dewey's essay of 1896, "The Reflex Arc Concept in
Psychology." Dewey criticizes contemporary thought about the reflex arc
because it did not account for change. In its simplest form, the reflex arc
describes the way a sensory stimulus evokes a neurological response, such
as the movement to pull the hand away from a flame. But Dewey argues
that this classic stimulus-response model represents only a portion of the
entire process and that to use it to signify the whole of human behavior is
terribly misleading. According to Dewey, nothing can on its own act as a
stimulus—it takes an act of the mind to edit and choose from among the
variety of available sensory input. The completed response itself is then in-
corporated back into the stimulus, and perception is thereby changed. By
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definition perception is oriented toward future behavior. Instead of the
image of an active world working on a relatively passive human physiolog-
ical system, Dewey offers a classic pragmatist statement in which both
response and stimulus reflect an orientation toward the world. And the re-
sponse is itself integrated into the action that attends to stimulation.
By exchanging the image of the arc for that of a completed circuit,
Dewey asserts the future orientation characteristic of a pragmatist psychol-
ogy. The analogous philosophical formulation had been furnished in 1877
by Charles S. Peirce's "The Fixation of Belief." Peirce, defining belief as that
on which we are willing to act, rejects Cartesian doubt as the origin of
philosophy. Instead Peirce asserts that doubt and belief necessarily involve
action in the world: "Belief does not make us act at once, but puts us into
such a condition that we shall behave in a certain way, when the occasion
arises. Doubt has not the least effect of this sort, but stimulates us to action
until it is destroyed."19 Peirce rejects deductive reasoning and authority as
foundations for belief: the proper test of belief resides in interaction with the
world. Doubt ceases when action proves the validity of belief, and belief is
sustained so long as it provides a reliable predisposition to future action.
Like Dewey's reflex arc and Peirce's belief, habit has a proleptic ori-
entation. But James's idea of habit limits the operation of choice and free
will. This is evident in the fact that habit can persist beyond its value as a
useful behavior. Because habits are so difficult to change, James asserts,
habit provides the basis for behavioral continuity:
Habit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious con-
servative agent. It alone is what keeps us all within the bounds of
ordinance, and saves the children of fortune from the envious upris-
ings of the poor. It alone prevents the hardest and most repulsive walks
of life from being deserted by those brought up to tread therein. . . . It
dooms us all to fight out the battle of life upon the lines of our nurture
or our early choice, and to make the best of a pursuit that disagrees,
because there is no other for which we are fitted, and it is too late to
begin again. [125]
The reason habit maintains its behaviorally conservative function is that we
do not alter our habitual behavior, even when problematic, because we
cannot perceive alternatives. Only when we can believe—in Peirce's
sense—that an alternative exists can we act on it.
In habit James locates a basis for the comprehension and classification
of human behavior. With his claim that "the laws of Nature are nothing but
the immutable habits which the different elementary sorts of matter follow
in their actions and reactions upon each other" (109), James universalizes
habit. The physical and physiological analogies ground James's later, more
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philosophically and moralistically inclined statements. This strategy, follow-
ing the general tendency of the environmental determinism associated with
evolutionary thought, seemingly denigrates the function and place of free
will in human activity. James even eliminates the will as a possible origin for
most habitual activities when he claims that "though many, perhaps most,
human habits were once voluntary actions, no action, as we shall see in a
later chapter, can be primarily such. While an habitual action may once have
been voluntary, the voluntary action must before that, at least once, have
been impulsive or reflex" (113). When James's early tribute to the exercise
of will in the development of habit is considered in light of the chapter as a
whole, the compensatory nature of his emphasis on the will becomes appar-
ent: the importance of the will is inverse to its relative influence.
By restricting the operation of the will in accord with habit, James
diminishes the philosophical foundation for the self. To Common Sense
philosophers, the will was a vital human attribute because of its moral
function. While not acceding to the Spencerian view, according to which
human thought is epiphenomenal, James nevertheless renders this tra-
ditional basis of human selfhood and individuality problematic with his
formulation of habit. And if, as Peirce suggests, doubt is the only possible
basis for a reevaluation of belief, and doubt arises only when belief, ha-
bitual behavior, is shown to be deficient in its ability to provide suitable re-
sults, then the conservative nature of habit is confirmed. Without doubt no
alternative behavior is conceivable. The will, severely constrained by the in-
ertia of habitual action, is further restricted by the lack of awareness of the
very possibility of change.
This conservatism engendered by habit works at both the personal
and social levels. As Freud and later psychoanalytic thinkers have shown,
personal history profoundly shapes one's perceptions of reality. By recre-
ating behavioral matrices, the conflicted individual relives unresolved prob-
lems with family members long after these individuals are absent. The
social effects of habitual behavior are, perhaps, even more striking. James
declared that habit is the basis of social stability. People inevitably respond
to symbolic constructs that may have very little, if anything at all, to do
with their current living situations. An example is the recreation of au-
thoritarian relationships in society. Naturalized by the patriarchal family
structure, hierarchical social divisions appear more than simply the norm;
they seem comfortable in their stability and seductive in the implied prom-
ise of care associated with parent-child relations. James shows his keen
awareness of this function when he asserts that habit is the "most precious
conservative agent."
The conservatism of habit and the interplay between the individual
and the social environment shape James's discussion of the self. In a
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lengthy chapter that confronts the orthodox foundation of moral philoso-
phy, the self, James explores the conventional theoretical bases of selfhood
while he attempts to articulate an object for disciplinary inquiry. The first
half of "The Consciousness of Self" is worthy of sustained attention, not
merely because of its conclusions about selfhood but because the analytic
and discursive method is characteristic of The Principles of Psychology as
a whole.20
The chapter opens with a deceptively clear statement of intent and
design: "Let us begin with the Self in its widest acceptation, and follow it
up to its most delicate and subtle form, advancing from the study of the
empirical, as the Germans call it, to that of the pure, Ego" (279). James
outlines the investigation as three aspects of the self, its "constituents,"
"feelings and emotions," and "the actions to which they prompt" (280).
This tripartite division recapitulates the orderly division of Common Sense
psychology into sensory and intellectual functions, emotions, and the will.
James promptly subdivides the first category into different aspects of the
"constituents" of the self: the material, the social, the spiritual, and the
pure ego. By recalling the philosophical approach to the self, with its scho-
lastic categorizations, he ostensibly advocates an essentialist model of
selfhood. James, however, uses this traditional format to show the short-
comings of the old philosophical approach. Instead of a self derived from a
recondite essence, the self in James's hands becomes manifest through a
process of differentiation from externals.
James's discussion of the spiritual self exemplifies the method by
which he reveals the inconsistencies that lurk in traditional notions. He de-
fines the spiritual self as "a man's inner or subjective being, his psychic
faculties or dispositions, taken concretely" (283). To consider this entity,
more abstract than the material and social selves, James introspects. But
introspection opens the door to numerous potential problems, for if
thought is to ground the spiritual self, only a portion of it may provide the
basis for selfhood. Although we have an abundance of thoughts, James
notes that we identify only a few as peculiarly characteristic of ourselves.
These thoughts are "felt by all men as a sort of innermost centre within the
circle, of sanctuary within the citadel, constituted by the subjective life as a
whole. Compared with this element of the stream [of thought], the other
parts, even of the subjective life, seem transient external possessions, of
which each in turn can be disowned, whilst that which disowns them re-
mains. Now, what is this self of all the other selves?" (285). Having posed
this question about the essence of identity, couched in terms of possession,
James moves further into the introspective realm and begins to cite his own
experience. This self-exploration yields the disquieting confession that "it
is difficult for me to detect in the [introspective] activity any purely spirit-
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ual element at all. . . all [I] can ever feel distinctly is some bodily process,
for the most part taking place within the head" (287). After assuming
the role of an explorer in the most highly refined mental regions, James
returns to report that in this purportedly spiritual realm he finds only
assorted physical sensations. He concludes his introspection with the com-
ment that "our entire feeling of spiritual activity, or what commonly passes
by that name, is really a feeling of bodily activities whose exact nature is
by most men overlooked" (288). In his identification of the spiritual es-
sence as subtle physical activity, James refutes the notion of a metaphysical
origin for the so-called spiritual self.
By recalling the structures and categories of moral philosophers only
to refute them, James duplicates in "The Consciousness of Self" the larger
organizational strategy of The Principles. In a particularly ironic move,
James uses an introspective method to dispute the usefulness of traditional
categories. But introspection, with its implied invitation to the reader to
affirm the results of his scientific study, also serves a powerful rhetorical
role. In a gesture reminiscent of his early invitation to the reader to dissect
a sheep's head, James invites the reader to participate in his learned dis-
putation with the authorities. His refutation of Common Sense relies on
the strategy and method of Common Sense philosophy. Consequently, his
initial structure, derived from mentalist psychology categories, breaks
down, and James, without comment, abandons his neatly organized dis-
cussion.
In his treatment of the ego, James begins to define his alternative con-
ception of selfhood. He establishes the terms of his investigation by asking
whether "this consciousness of personal sameness may be treated either as
a subjective phenomenon or as an objective deliverance, as a feeling, or
as a truth" (314). In keeping with the empirical nature of his study and
his skepticism toward received wisdom, James focuses on the feeling of
continuity with earlier states of consciousness. He argues that the tran-
scendental ego derives from our feelings of "warmth and intimacy" with
recollected earlier states of consciousness (316). From this physical origin
James concludes, much as David Hume did a century earlier, that the sense
of continuous personal identity "must not be taken to mean more than
these grounds warrant, or treated as a sort of metaphysical or absolute
Unity" (318).21 The core of identity is twofold: an identification with ideals
of thought, attitude, or behavior; and a concomitant pleasure, based on fa-
miliarity, at the recollection of these mental states. The repetition of these
thoughts and associated feelings, with its source in the function of habit,
forms the essence of the self. And the transcendental ego, the necessary
premise of philosophical psychology, is revealed to be an error of logic, a
placement of final things first.
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Although habit describes the operation of self-identity, James never-
theless has questions about the object of self-love: "What is this abstract
numerical principle of identity, this 'Number One' within me, for which,
according to proverbial philosophy, I am supposed to keep so constant a
'lookout'?" (303). James answers his own question with his description of
an ideal self, a self that is "the true, the intimate, the ultimate, the perma-
nent Me" (301). Instead of originating in some hidden recess of the self,
this "true" self is comprised of those socially derived beliefs and attitudes
that one identifies as ideal and toward which one aspires. These beliefs and
attitudes, which comprise the best part of one's self, become the object of
one's self-love. Self-love is not "love for one's mere principle of conscious
identity"; rather, it is love for ideals that originate outside the self, thoughts
that are relatively "superficial, transient, liable to be taken up or dropped
at will" (307). James thereby deduces the paradox of self-love when the
core of selfhood consists of identification with externals.
The self, constituted by the physiology of habit and identification with
ideals, is generated in the structure of consciousness James describes in
"The Stream of Thought." Despite Thomas Reid's earlier use of the phrase
"stream of thought" specifically to describe the association of ideas, James
appropriates the term and successfully displaces the earlier definition.22 To
discuss the stream of thought, James invokes the introspective method of
the moral philosophers, stating, "We now begin our study of the mind from
within" (219). In his application of introspection, James demands empirical
honesty, and he criticizes earlier introspective psychologies for their adher-
ence to philosophical dogma and their lack of attention to the experience of
thought: "Most books start with sensations, as the simplest mental facts,
and proceed synthetically, constructing each higher stage from those below
it. But this is abandoning the empirical method of investigation. No one ever
had a simple sensation by itself. Consciousness, from our natal day, is of a
teeming multiplicity of objects and relations, and what we call simple sen-
sations are results of discriminative attention" (219). In much the same
manner as Dewey would later insist, James contends that thought be under-
stood as a unified process rather than as a compilation of simple com-
ponents or associated ideas. His basic assertion that "the first fact for us,
then, as psychologists, is that thinking of some sort goes on" (219) rejects
evolutionist psychology because it implies that thought is epiphenome-
nal. More significantly, James subordinates physiology in favor of an intro-
spective methodology. After going to great lengths in earlier chapters to
diminish its importance, James preserves a philosophical approach to psy-
chology. At the same time, he rejects conventional notions of subjectivity;
hence, he asserts that "thought goes on" (220), a statement explicitly void
of a human grammatical subject.
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James outlines five characteristics of thought: thought is personal, it
is always changing, it appears continuous, it seems to deal with things ex-
ternal to itself, and it involves some choice in perception. In abandoning
the old additive categorization of intellectual processes, James substitutes
the principle of movement from the internal to the increasingly external.
The traditional model, with its structural metaphor of a spatial hierarchy,
discarded, James substitutes the metaphor of fluidity, earlier introduced in
the chapter on habit. The fluid metaphor shapes the chapter title, "The
Stream of Thought," and the conception of the thought process. No longer
a logical point of origin, the individual becomes a channel of thought. The
individual's permeable boundaries are suggested by the movement from
the internal to the external in the categorization of thought components.
The fluid nature of thought reflects the physiological recognition that sen-
sation constantly modifies brain physiology: "Experience is remoulding us
every moment, and our mental reaction on every given thing is really a re-
sultant of our experience of the whole world up to that date" (228). James
revises the Heraclitan formula to read that each time it is a different "I"
who steps into the river.
The effect of the fluid metaphor appears in James's observation that,
despite (or perhaps because of) the constant alterations in thought, thought
appears to us as a continuous phenomenon. "Consciousness, then, does not
appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such words as 'chain' or 'train' do not
describe it fitly as it presents itself in the first instance. It is nothing jointed;
it flows. A 'river' or a 'stream' are the metaphors by which it is most natu-
rally described" (233). This continuous flow accounts for the sense of a
coherent, continuous identity. The unity of thought only appears to be
broken by observations of different objects. This distinction, between the
process of thought and the objects of thought, is vital to James's psychol-
ogy because it grounds his basic argument against association psychology,
which he accuses of confusing the two.23 The apparent continuity of
thought is the result of signification. As Peirce explains in his response to
the question of the existence of an intuitive self-consciousness, "Questions
Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" (1868), each thought
functions as a sign. Although cognition of external objects points toward
the existence of an originary consciousness, this consciousness cannot be
located in any pure form. The process of signification explains the final at-
tribute of the stream of thought: selection.
The importance of selection as a function of consciousness appears in
the observation that some things appear more interesting and worthy of at-
tention than do others. But this process by which things become salient
derives from a vision of the world as a place we construct based on our
choices: "Out of all present sensations, we notice mainly such as are sig-
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nificant of absent ones; and out of all the absent associates which these sug-
gest, we again pick out a very few to stand for the objective reality" (275).
Consciousness synecdochically works to create a vision of the world; sen-
sory input is edited, and signs are interpreted to habitually reconstruct the
world in a familiar manner. In the case of conscious selection, in the realms
of aesthetics and ethics, the power to evade an utterly deterministic phi-
losophy rests on the capacity not simply to choose but to perceive the very
possibility of choice. In these realms the tension between habit and will
reaches its highest pitch.
The individual usually defines himself or herself on the basis of these
choices, apparently derived from a unified consciousness. But, as James
has shown, consciousness is not so much unified as it is a process of refer-
ence. Despite this referentiality, and the question of the ultimate source of
consciousness, we must return to James's preliminary observation with
respect to the stream of thought: "Every thought tends to be part of a per-
sonal consciousness" (220). Thought is inherently based in our corporeal
structure, and no proximity or similarity with another can span the divi-
sion between human minds. Whatever philosophical problems might be
implied by an insistence on the integrity of the subject, from James's psy-
chological viewpoint, the existence of a self has a biological basis.
In The Principles of Psychology, James recasts the contemporary conflict
of mentalist and materialist psychologies and offers an alternative vision of
the individual's relationship to the community. Without relying on the dis-
credited mentalist model of selfhood, James retains the function of the self.
He manages this by positing a performative model of selfhood: from one
moment to the next the self is reconstituted by the apparently continuous
phenomena of experience. In what amounts to a semiotic model of self-
hood, James, after deconstructing the essentialist self in "The Self," calls
the stream of thought the basis of selfhood.24 The trope of fluidity informs
James's descriptions of both neuronal physiology and the consciously ex-
perienced stream of thought. The self, always in flux, interacts with the
world, and in these interactions it strives for an equalization of pressures, a
resolution of tensions. This fluidity likewise shapes the dialectical, ironic
structure of James's narrative. In The Principles, the oscillation from one
position to another denotes the balance characteristic of fluid behavior. As
each position becomes untenable, however, it is abandoned. The narrator
does not lose his identity when he adopts contradictory positions; instead,
the narrative flow back and forth indicates a normal mental function. And
the reader, invited by the narrator to join in the search, participates in this
enactment of selfhood.
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But James's attempt to invite the reader through an appeal to intro-
spection and experience introduces a potential difficulty. Historically, the
introspective method of philosophers operated as a form of proof—the ex-
perience of the individual writer was validated through an appeal to
consensus. And readers were similarly advised which aspects of their expe-
riences were to be accorded philosophical legitimacy. The problem with
this method was that it legitimized only one type of experience, that of the
dominant social group. With its reliance on introspection, The Principles
seems to revert to an essentialist vision of selfhood, and James's attempt to
involve the reader apparently conflicts with the fluid, dialectical structure
of his textbook. But if we regard James's use of introspection more as a
technique of communication and less as a attempt to prove the truth, his
psychology breaks from the dominant mentalist-materialist polarization of
late-nineteenth-century psychology. With this break, James sets forth a
socially oriented model of the self primarily derived from individual ex-
perience. This theoretical maneuver proves valuable because it does not
seek to validate experience through the consensual evaluation of the domi-
nant class or social group. Instead, without ordering them into the kind of
social hierarchy associated with Spencerian psychology, it legitimates the
variety of lived experiences, because membership in no one community is
automatically accorded greater intrinsic worth. And the possibility of
willed individual action, albeit limited by habit formation and conditioned
by the social environment, remains intact.
6Selfhood, Pragmatism, and Literary Studies
Who Do We Think We Are?
And What Do We Think We're Doing?
Poststructuralist and revisionist theorists of literature and culture have ef-
fectively challenged the concept of the self as a unified locus of intention.
If the self may no longer be considered the center of intentionality in an
older, more positivistic sense, then we are left to inquire whether it still has
value in discussions of literary theory. Is it possible—and useful—to talk
about the self as something other than artifact and artifice, as other than an
antiquarian dream to be disrupted while the discipline progresses toward
new knowledge? The first issue at hand, if such a possibility exists, would
appear to be the need for some terms that do not immediately involve us in
a pendulum swing between the grandiosity of imperial selfhood and the
implied powerlessness of historical overdetermination. Such a terminology
that avoids these polarities and accommodates the specificity of experience
may be found in the work of pragmatists and symbolic interaction theo-
rists.
A useful starting place for a discussion of selfhood in literary dis-
course is provided by William James's chapter on the self in his redaction
of the much longer Principles of Psychology, the one-volume Psychology:
The Briefer Course. James distinguishes between "the self as known, or
the me," and "the self as knower, or the L"1 The self as the object of
inquiry—as opposed to the yet more elusive self that functions as a know-
ing subject (which James treats in his chapter on "The Stream of
Thought")—that self which we investigate is of particular interest because
of how it is constituted. Its constitution is especially complex because, as
James comments, "a man has as many social selves as there are individuals
who recognize him."2 James thus implies that individual self-image in-
volves a process by which one internalizes the perceived attitudes of
others. This distinctly social account of selfhood serves as the starting
point for George Herbert Mead, who further explores the communicative
and interactive aspects of selfhood.
To Mead, like James, the self as an object of reflection begins with
internalized attitudes. According to Mead, "The individual experiences
himself as such, not directly, but only indirectly, from the particular stand-
points of other individual members of the same social group, or from the
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generalized standpoint of the social group as a whole to which he be-
longs."3 Mead here proposes the image of a self that is, in effect, the site of
an ongoing discussion. He distinguishes his semiotic conception of self-
hood from those that identify the self as a simple composite of corporeal
existence, stating, "It is obvious when one comes to consider it that the self
is not necessarily involved in the life of the organism, nor involved in what
we term our sensuous experience."4 Instead, as the words "not neces-
sarily" imply, the self has resources beyond bodily experience, social
resources that arise from the communicative structure of the self. Because
Mead's theory suggests that the self is the site of flux involving the inter-
nalized attitudes of others, it avoids the image of a self that revolves
around some static core or essence. Instead, the self continually undergoes
change in response to a variety of symbolic structures, and, moreover,
these symbolic structures themselves are continually reproduced, and peri-
odically transformed, through internalized dialogues. Mead's description
of mental operations as dialogue stresses the importance of language, but
his is not a language that awaits mastery by the exemplary individual. Lan-
guage as a cultural medium also reflects specific situations in ways that
may be of greater consequence to the critic who examines the instabilities
and differences in language over time and between communities. The fact
that language is itself mutable and therefore demands interpretations by its
users forms the basis of symbolic interaction theory.
Symbolic interactionism, a theory derived from the work of Mead
and developed by Herbert Blumer, takes into account social forces without
insisting that these forces operate on individuals in a deterministic manner.
Blumer, arguing against behavioristic reductions, states that "human beings
interpret or 'define' each other's actions instead of merely reacting to each
other's actions. Their 'response' is not made directly to the actions of one
another but instead is based on the meaning which they attach to such ac-
tions. Thus, human interaction is mediated by the use of symbols, by
interpretation, or by ascertaining the meaning of one another's actions."5
According to Blumer, interaction is based on the interpretation of symbols,
and as a result any situation can generate multiple interpretations. These
interpretations—and misinterpretations—become part of how the self per-
ceives the social and material environment.6
The contingent nature of selfhood, the tenacity of symbolic identifi-
cations, and the importance of interpretive processes are evident through-
out nineteenth-century literature. Particularly dramatic examples of how
these things play out in response to one another may be found in Uncle
Tom's Cabin. The title character of Stowe's novel finds that defining him-
self in terms of a religious identity is vital to his sense of self, which then
furnishes the grounds for his choices of action. When it comes to resolving
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the conflicting demands of membership in human and spiritual communi-
ties, Tom has to balance his very human wish for freedom from slavery
against his spiritual commitment to being a Christian, an identity that at
times conflicts with his desire for freedom. As Stowe repeatedly points out,
Tom is consistently willing to sacrifice the possibility of freedom, and even
his life, for his evangelical Christian ideals, and, accordingly, Tom finds
himself in situations that display his idealism in increasingly dramatic fash-
ion. The purest example of his evangelical motivation occurs after Augus-
tine St. Clare promises Tom his freedom. Tom is naturally overjoyed at the
prospect of freedom and a return to his family, but, to St. Clare's (and the
twentieth-century reader's) astonishment, Tom chooses to stay in order to
bring about his master's conversion. Tom's decision to remain St. Clare's
slave most forcefully dramatizes his willingness to make sacrifices so as to
be a member of the evangelical community.
From a symbolic interactionist perspective, such an imagined process
of community membership can be complex and subtle. Because member-
ship in social groups is symbolic, identification with a community is not
necessarily based on shared or commensurate experiences. Individuals also
may identify with either higher motives or abstracted communities of
people not immediately present. William James calls this process of identi-
fication the "potential social me," a phrase that succinctly conveys the
process of compensation for perceived inadequacies by identification with
an ideal.7 In Uncle Tom's Cabin, a desire for identification with the ideal
shapes the climactic scene, in which Tom is beaten to death by two slaves
who readily follow Legree's command. These slaves, exposed only to the
power of the slave master, respect no force other than that which could
enslave and brutalize, and under these circumstances, they cheerfully
perform Legree's brutal work. But Legree's inability to coerce Tom into re-
nouncing Christianity overwhelms the two slaves, who then inquire as to
the source of Tom's strength. Exposed for the first time to Christian theol-
ogy, the two immediately embrace the Christianity espoused by the dying
Tom. Their sudden conversion experiences reflect a belief that conversion
comes unexpectedly through the grace of God.
Their conversions also mark, from a symbolic interactionist perspec-
tive, the way attention can suddenly shift. Legree's failure to break Tom
exposes a shortcoming in the slave master's power, and the two slaves,
seeking to resolve the unprecedented cognitive crisis created by this failure,
find that Tom's Christian beliefs achieve greater salience. The processes af-
fecting cognitive shifts form the bases of John Dewey's "The Reflex Arc
Concept in Psychology" as well as William James's chapters on "Atten-
tion" in both of his psychology texts, but C.S. Peirce offered what may
well stand as the most influential philosophical consideration of the matter,
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in two essays, "The Fixation of Belief" and "How to Make Our Ideas
Clear." In these essays, Peirce explores the questions that accompany a
recognition of the fact that perceptions of the environment change when
the individual recognizes shortcomings in cognition and interpretation.
Peirce concludes that belief is that (and only that) on which we base action:
"The essence of belief is the establishment of habit, and different beliefs
are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give
rise."8 Thus, Peirce dismisses speculative or metaphysical doubt as merely
illogical thought about belief; only the recognition of ineffective behavior,
as in the case of Tom's torturers, who see that their acts do not lead to the
desired result, authentically predicates a crisis in belief. In Uncle Tom's
Cabin, the answer to such cognitive and interpretive problems routinely is
provided by Stowe's version of Christianity. The two formerly brutal slaves
offer Tom their apologies and some physical comforts as their imaginations
are captivated by the symbolic identification that sustains Tom. The novel
remains fascinating in part because it dramatizes how it is possible to ally
oneself with ideal categories, whether in religious or other terms. Sudden
instances of conversion, of redefinitions of selfhood in accord with new al-
legiances, make for exciting (or implausible) action within stories. More to
the point for a symbolic analyst, they serve to highlight the subtle ways
that ideologies compel people to live their lives according to sets of beliefs
that may do little to improve their physical well-being and may even pro-
mote self-destructive behaviors.
Uncle Tom's Cabin thus accentuates a couple of important features
of selfhood. The first is that identity does not remain static. For example,
it may change with the apparent abruptness of Sambo's and Quimbo's
sudden conversions, or it may show a steady process of refinement toward
an ideal state, as it does with Tom. In both cases, though, their senses of
self repeatedly alter in response to the situations in which they find them-
selves. Another way of saying this is that selves may be understood as
agglomerations of multiple social roles in addition to other, more distinctly
symbolic identifications. The second significant feature of this model of
selfhood is that there are moments when irreconcilable conflicts between
social roles and other symbolic identifications become too apparent to be
accommodated without some kind of transformation.
Interpretations of the ways in which identifications with social
groups and belief systems shape conflicts in nineteenth-century literature
require some understanding of social and intellectual history. Thus, to
Stowe and those of her readers steeped in an evangelical Christianity,
Tom's acts of self-sacrifice would serve as a model of ethical behavior. And,
as I have argued earlier, from the perspective of antebellum Common Sense
psychology, Hawthorne's solipsistic characters, such as young Goodman
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Brown, Arthur Dimmesdale, and Roger Chillingworth, display unethical
and potentially insane behaviors. In both sets of situations, selfhood and
ethical issues are closely linked. The link between conceptions of selfhood
and ethics is worth pursuing, particularly as it emerges in response to the
question of the potential impact on literary and cultural studies of non-
essentialist models of selfhood. To begin an exploration of this link, we
first must turn our attention to questions about the work done by students
of literature and culture.
Despite revisionist disturbances of so much received disciplinary wisdom,
the definitions of the terms theory and practice have remained relatively
inert. Theory and practice, in their common uses, have designated the
work of the critic in specific and presumably complementary ways. As a
rule, theory has come to denote the reading and writing of metacritical
along with philosophically oriented, discourses. Practice, by contrast, has
routinely signified the reading of texts usually understood to reflect a more
traditionally literary character. Because practice normally refers to critical
engagements with poetry and narrative, as well as other prose deemed to
possess sufficiently literary merit to qualify it as literature, theory ends up
referring to discourse about almost anything else that ultimately pertains
to literary studies. What the terms theory and practice share in common is
a description of the primary activities associated with each—reading,
interpretation, and, at times, writing. Theory and practice then can be dis-
tinguished from each other not by an account of how the critic engaged in
either activity actually passes time; rather, their objects of inquiry differ.
This distinction between the respective objects of inquiry associated
with theory and practice is itself derived from disciplinary and generic
categories. Thus, the difference between theory and practice rests on a
foundation of genre definitions. Poststructuralist critiques of language and
writing have rendered problematic any definitions, such as those of theory
and practice, that ultimately rely on discriminations between the genres
of literary and nonliterary languages and texts. In perhaps the classic
poststructuralist disruption of such traditional discriminations, "White
Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy," Derrida states, "From
philosophy, rhetoric," thus succinctly reversing the historical progression of
pre-Socratic rhetoric to Greek philosophy.9 From a Derridean perspective,
the philosophical attempt to use language to transcend itself appears as an
effective story, nothing more (nor less) authoritative. We may be in a better
position to locate that which has been designated as theory if we transform
Derrida's title and look for philosophy in the text of literature. The word
philosophy here designates one necessary function of literary discourse:
guidance toward certain types of interpretations of language structures.
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This does not refer to the kind of specific methodological procedures used
in textual explication. Rather, this kind of guide is that which usually cre-
ates academic interest in a text. To best illustrate this, we may return to
Uncle Tom's Cabin and Jane Tompkins's well known essay about it.
In "Sentimental Power: Uncle Tom's Cabin and the Politics of Liter-
ary History," the point that ultimately had the greatest impact was Tomp-
kins's contention that sentimental fiction fails as great literature only when
it is interpreted by the apparently "universal standards of aesthetic judg-
ment" associated with patriarchal academic criticism. Sensitivity to the
way popular sentimental novels represents "a monumental effort to reor-
ganize culture from a woman's point of view" is the mark of a good
reader, one who grasps the importance of being attuned to the ways the
most interesting literature makes particular interpretive demands of its
readers.10 The particular demand of Uncle Tom's Cabin—the philosophy
in the text of this literature—is its insistence that readers interpret the
words of the novel in a certain way and, most crucially, its insistence that
readers interpret the world differently. What helped make Tompkins's ar-
gument so persuasive was that it asserted a theory of reading inhered
within Stowe's novel. Generally speaking, the argument that a particular
text elicits a particular type of interpretation has created the kind of inter-
est among critics that may lead to the text's inclusion in the conversation of
critics and, consequently, the literary canon.
If theory may be adduced from literary texts, and metaphor is the
ground of philosophy, then the basis for a distinction between theory and
practice must be found elsewhere. One way to reestablish such a distinc-
tion is to look at ends rather than origins. The practice of academics may
be found not in some particular type of reading but rather in the work that
fills so much of our days: teaching. The designations reading and teaching
more effectively describe the critic's work than do troublesome and tortu-
ous distinctions between different types of reading.
Although there has been a recent increase in attentiveness to peda-
gogy in English departments, it is important to note that an interest in
pedagogy is hardly a new thing. Academics engaged in rhetoric and com-
position, unlike those who are predominantly occupied with literary
studies, historically have been attuned to the importance of pedagogy.
Pedagogy also has assumed importance in reader-response theories, many
of which have provided insights that both derive from and readily translate
into classroom practices. The link between composition and reader-
response ideas goes beyond a simple attention to pedagogy. Theorists in
both areas have responded to a common question: How may teachers come
to terms with the experiences, attitudes, and needs of individual students?
The disciplinary problems these theorists have encountered in their
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attempts to respond to individual experiences and needs substantially
derive from certain entrenched notions of selfhood, in particular the un-
spoken formalist commitment to the ideal reader. One of the many reasons
that formalist ideas about idealized, coherent selfhood have persisted is
that formalist theory proposed an interpretive methodology that was read-
ily and successfully translatable into classroom activity. As Gerald Graff
explains it, close attention to the text appeared to obviate similar attentive-
ness to cultural tensions and histories: "The explicative method made it
possible for literature to be taught efficiently to students who took for
granted little history by professors who took for granted a little more his-
tory."11 The display of textual explication through the classroom lecture
has endured in large part because it effectively shows how formalist expli-
cation can translate emotional responses into an apparently standardized
format. The vocabulary of aesthetics furnishes a guide, not especially dis-
similar from that of nineteenth-century faculty psychology, as to which of
the individual's affective responses are legitimate and which ones are not.
Formalist explication also has endured because the alternative to the disci-
plinary guidelines it suggests appears to be the chaos of undisciplined,
personal responses.
The foremost pragmatist theorist of the twentieth century, John
Dewey, offered an alternative to formalist pedagogy that remains relevant
and provocative. Dewey's postulate that education must be responsive to
experience is counterpoised by the idea that the teacher's role is to create
situations in which a "directed, cumulative, ordered reconstruction of ex-
perience" may take place.12 An especially suitable subject matter for the
"reconstruction of experience" among traditional, college-aged students
is that of selfhood. This need not necessarily involve depictions of role
models. Rather, the question of education, in its broader sense, and its
relationship to constructions of selfhood may be explored in works that
create conceptual difficulties at the same time as they reinforce certain late-
twentieth-century ideals. Once again, the works of Harriet Beecher Stowe,
a writer who was very attentive to the implications of education, are
germane.
Stowe's attitudes toward education appear to have shifted somewhat
between the publication of Uncle Tom's Cabin (1851) and that of the
lesser-known Pink and White Tyranny (1871), and her ideas about educa-
tion raise questions about selfhood. A significant constancy unites these
two works, a tenacity of moral purpose that leads Joan Hedrick to label
Stowe's writing a "ministry" comparable to those of her father and broth-
ers.13 Although Stowe routinely exhibited a concern about societal char-
acteristics and policies, from her Protestant perspective individuals and
their individual souls would have been the appropriate objects for religious
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and moral education—it is within each particular individual that the
processes of conversion or regeneration would presumably occur. Stowe's
particular bent as a moral educator has been described as distinctly middle-
class.14 But consistent as Stowe's commitments to middle-class values and
the theological goal of education may have been, there was room for certain
significant changes in emphasis, changes that display an altered under-
standing of selfhood.
In Uncle Tom's Cabin, the most important process an individual can
undergo is that of conversion, and the conversion process itself is one that
arises in an unexpected and mysterious manner. The conversions of Sambo
and Quimbo during Tom's dying moments are typical of the novel: conver-
sion suddenly erupts, here largely in response to the charismatic Tom. The
idea that conversion comes abruptly also is borne out by the differing re-
sults enjoyed by Miss Ophelia and Eva during their attempts to evangelize
Topsy. Miss Ophelia's rigid and judgmental character is described by Stowe
as typical of New England, and her theology reflects "a severe and some-
what gloomy cast."15 Her inability to respond successfully to Augustine St.
Clare's challenge to inculcate Protestant dogma into the character of Topsy
contrasts unfavorably with Eva's immediate success. Eva's success, accord-
ing to the story, derives from her love for Topsy, and, somewhat analo-
gously, Augustine St. Clare's own conversion at the moment of his death
comes with the presence of Tom and the memory of his mother. The sud-
denness of conversion reveals Stowe's well-known Calvinistic tendencies,
and it is also consistent with what Henry May identifies as "the tearful re-
vivalistic vein which had . . .  become increasingly dominant in American
Christianity."16 Stowe's ideal of religious education would maintain this
emotional component, but only with respect to the need for the educator's
love. The emotionalism of the sudden conversion in Uncle Tom's Cabin
would later be displaced by an emphasis on gradualism and rational
processes.
In Pink and White Tyranny, the source of religious change is the
education process despised in Uncle Tom's Cabin. Education in the later
novel unfolds in two arenas, the personal and the social. The story of per-
sonal education largely revolves around Lillie Ellis. The novel begins with
her courtship and marriage to the virtuous and wealthy John Seymour, and
the bulk of the action that ensues shows John's attempts to indulge this
shallow young woman, whose depredations include reading French novels,
lying about her age, and attempting to get her husband to serve wine with
dinner. In contrast to Lillie, John's sister, Grace, "was one of those women
formed under the kindly severe discipline of Puritan New England," a dis-
cipline that here leads to more fortunate results than it did with Miss
Ophelia.17 Consistent with her adherence to "high principle," Grace, after
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almost three hundred pages of forbearance, finally tells her distressed
brother that he must treat Lillie as "a moral invalid," advice he quickly fol-
lows (315). Lillie's moral invalidism presages her rapid physical decline,
and on her death-bed she gives evidence of John's effectiveness by voicing
her moral awakening.
Education as a means of promoting individual conversion experi-
ences also fortuitously meshes with Stowe's ideas about class and ethnicity.
In Pink and White Tyranny, it is the function of the upper class to spiritu-
ally elevate the lower, thus assuring their salvation, their integration into
Protestant America, and their acceptance of an American class hierarchy.
One of Lillie's first shocks comes on learning that her new husband man-
ages and teaches his workers at a Sunday school, an institution that became
widespread after the Civil War. Lillie argues that John is exposing himself
to disease, and, besides, his students are repulsive: "That working-class
smell is a thing that can't be disguised" (79). John, however, insists that
"they are the laborers from whose toils our wealth comes; and we owe
them something" (79). John's attitude of noblesse oblige obviously reflects
Stowe's interest in education, but Lillie's disgust with immigrant laborers
and their culture also finds expression within the novel. For example,
when pointing out John's consternation at discovering Lillie's lie about her
age, Stowe expresses a typically nineteenth-century attitude about race and
ethnicity: "The Anglo-Saxon race have, so to speak, a worship of truth;
and they hate and abhor lying with an energy which leaves no power of
tolerance." By contrast, "The Celtic races have a certain sympathy with de-
ception. They have a certain appreciation of the value of lying as a fine art"
(96). The Seymours' Irish domestics also lack a developed work ethic;
without Grace's oversight, Bridget and the others "declined in virtue"
(131). Virtue comes to the working people and is maintained through pa-
ternalistic oversight, Sunday school education, and the good examples of
the thrifty Grace and the abstemious John.
The shift from Uncle Tom's Cabin to Pink and White Tyranny is
clear: whereas in the earlier novel salvation comes not from the privileged
but from the lowly—a slave and a female child—in the later work it is the
function of the privileged to benevolently manage the lower class. In addi-
tion, the gradual effects of moral education are depicted as reliable in Pink
and White Tyranny, departing from the precipitous emotional conversion
experiences of Uncle Tom's Cabin associated with the presence of charis-
matic characters. The first of these two changes reinforces the idea that
Stowe displayed a commitment to the nineteenth-century American class
system; Stowe may have been a committed abolitionist, but there were
limits to her fictional elevation of the lowly. The second suggests that, as
Henry May has remarked about Oldtown Folks, Stowe's writings reveal
SELFHOOD, PRAGMATISM, AND LITERARY STUDIES 131
the way she wrestled with her Calvinist heritage. In the case of Pink and
White Tyranny, her religious thinking reflects a greater sense of the impor-
tance of environment, the typical post-Civil War reaction to Darwinist
thinking that Howells's writings also displayed. If immigrants and the
working class can be educated, Stowe appears to be arguing in Pink and
White Tyranny, they will not disrupt the preindustrial New England so-
ciety she had earlier celebrated in her nostalgic Oldtown Folks.
These changes in Stowe's depictions of fictional characters and their
responses to education and religious experiences represent only one facet
of selfhood in fiction. The persons of both author and reader may here
arise in a discussion of the dynamics of selfhood in literature. In the case of
Stowe, we may note how her work, particularly Uncle Tom's Cabin, is a
profound critique of antebellum American society. At the same time,
though, we can note how her work, especially the later novels, reflects
typically nineteenth-century social thinking: a fear of lost social cohesion,
a desire for class stability, and an implicit vision of an ethnic hierarchy.
How we as readers react to the dissonance between Stowe's antipatriarchal
ideal of abolitionism and her more conventional social ideals depends, at
least in part, on our desire for writers who advocate social change and who
are themselves suitable subjects for advocacy. The greater the desire to
advocate the works of a neglected writer on moral grounds, the more
problematic are the kinds of attitudes present in Stowe's later novel, atti-
tudes that symptomatize cultural power rather than criticize it. The com-
plexity of the situation may, however, encourage a flexible view of au-
thorial selfhood, and it can promote a recognition of the unpredictable
effects of writing on the reader, an awareness of the ways identity may be
fissured and conflicted according to one's allegiances. The fact that these
allegiances arise in response to the reader's historical situation encourages
a critical return to the topic of selfhood and individualism in American
culture.
John Dewey's return to the question of individualism is worth recall-
ing, for it features a nuanced understanding of how individualism has been
used in American culture while it maintains the position that a progressive
individualism may prove an effective resource for social critics. In a collec-
tion of essays written during the late 1920s and early 1930s, Indi-
vidualism, Old and New, Dewey notes the discrepancy between American
rhetoric of individual opportunity and the facts of economic oppression for
so many. Dewey observes that, in practice, individualism "has become the
source and justification of inequalities and oppressions."18 The possibility
of social reform nevertheless exists: "A stable recovery of individualism
waits upon the elimination of the older economic and political individual-
ism, an elimination which will liberate imagination and endeavor for the
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task of making corporate society contribute to the free culture of its mem-
bers. Only by economic revision can the sound element in the older
individualism—equality of opportunity—be made a reality."19 Dewey's ob-
servations on American uses of individualism are instructive because, even
though he is well aware of the way individualism has been used to justify
corporate practices, he feels that it provides a resource useful to democratic
practices. And the place for the development of this resource is the school.
From Dewey's perspective, the school can serve as a proving ground
to test theories and to create the conditions for social progress and democ-
racy. Dewey is quite straightforward about this second point. A typical
comment from an 1897 essay, "My Pedagogic Creed," presents the view
that his writings in successive decades would apply and amplify: "Educa-
tion is the fundamental method of social progress and reform."20 Dewey's
writings on the subjects of democracy, social progress, and education con-
sistently present the idea that schools can help socialize students to parti-
cipate in a democratic society. Richard J. Bernstein observes that as far as
Dewey is concerned democracy and education are essentially linked:
"Democracy is a reflective faith in the capacity of all human beings for in-
telligent judgment, deliberation, and action if the proper conditions are
furnished'" (my emphasis).21 These proper conditions will be approached
as entrenched economic and social disparities are diminished.
Bernstein's cautionary remark about the limits of education is note-
worthy because Dewey was well aware that education by itself could not
transform society. As he stated in Individualism, Old and New, "Only by
economic revision can the sound element in the older individualism—
equality of opportunity—be made a reality." This comment is especially
germane during a time when scholars increasingly are exploring the politi-
cally and socially transformative capacities of their work. Discussions of
politics in the profession may be a welcome change from times of com-
parative quiescence. Yet intellectuals and social critics would do well to
recall that, as Nancy Fraser observes, we occupy "specifiable locations in
social space" and thus are not "free-floating individuals who are beyond
ideology."22 Fraser's contention is instructive as a reminder that teaching
and related activities have social implications. At the same time, though,
this suggests that, although teachers may engage in educational practices
that comport with democratic ideas, we should be cautious when assessing
the effects of our occasional sessions with our students.
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3. William James, The Principles of Psychology (1890; reprint, Cambridge:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1983), 277.
4. Ibid., 233.
5. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Essays and Lectures, ed. Joel Porte (New York:
Library of America, 1983), 10; hereafter cited in text.
6. The question of the extent of Stowe's radicalism is treated in Myra Jehlen,
"The Family Militant: Domesticity versus Slavery in Uncle Tom's Cabin," Criti-
cism: A Quarterly for Literature and the Arts 31 (Fall 1989). Along related lines,
Mark Seltzer has raised questions about the New Historicist tendency "to replace an
identification of women with the natural with an identification of women with the
social" (Mark Seltzer, "The Still Life," American Literary History 3 [1991]: 462).
For a more general discussion of nineteenth-century domestic fiction and the tension
between its oppositional stances as contrasted with its textual inscriptions of social
authority, see Richard Brodhead, Cultures of Letters: Scenes of Reading and Writing
in Nineteenth-Century America (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1993), chapter 1.
A fuller consideration of how this tension manifests itself in Stowe's fiction will be
offered in chapter 6 of this study.
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8. Ibid., 201.
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with this European medley" of settlers in the wilderness, but his acceptance seems
qualified (ibid., 77).
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(New York: Mentor, 1961), no. 10, 77.
11. Martha Banta, "Introduction," in The House of Mirth, by Edith Wharton
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994), vii.
12. W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (New York: Bantam, 1989), 3.
13. Bruce D. Dickson Jr. notes the relationship between the most well known
idea of this chapter, first published as an essay in 1897, and Emerson's "The Tran-
scendentalist"; see Bruce D. Dickson, Jr., "W.E.B. Du Bois and the Idea of Double
Consciousness," American Literature 64 (1992): 299-309.
14. Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams (Boston: Houghton Mif-
flin, 1973), 457.
15. Ibid., 498.
16. Ibid., 9.
17. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Society and Solitude, new and rev. ed., vol. 7 of
Complete Works (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1887), 20.
18. The twentieth-century reception of Scottish Common Sense philosophy
and its effects on literary criticism will be discussed in chapter 2. Association psy-
chology, which reiterated rather than resolved the tensions inherent in Common
Sense psychology, will be treated in chapter 3. For general accounts of American
psychology before 1900, see William R. Woodward and Mitchell G. Ash, eds., The
Problematic Science: Psychology in Nineteenth-Century American Thought (New
York: Praeger, 1982); Gardner Murphy, Historical Introduction to Modern Psy-
chology, rev. ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1949); and Jay Wharton Fay, Ameri-
can Psychology before William James (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press,
1939).
19. William J. Scheick observes that "Emerson's antinomian stress on feeling
always was balanced, in his artistry as well as his thought, by a Unitarian emphasis
on order"; see William J. Scheick, The Slender Human Word: Emerson's Artistry
in Prose (Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press, 1978), 23. On the dialogical struc-
ture of Emerson's "polarized self," see Evan Carton, The Rhetoric of American
Romance: Dialectic and Identity in Emerson, Dickinson, Poe, and Hawthorne
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1985), 25-46.
Distinguishing between Emerson's conception of the hero and that of British
Romantics, Sacvan Bercovitch observes that American selfhood is "a mode of per-
sonal identity intended to embrace both the individual and society, without al-
lowing either for Romantic-antinomian hero-worship or for the claims of social
pluralism"; see Sacvan Bercovitch, "Emerson the Prophet: Romanticism, Puritan-
ism, and Auto-American-Biography," in Emerson: Prophecy, Metamorphosis, and
Influence, ed. David Levin (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1975), 20-21. Ber-
covitch emphasizes the continuity between Emersonian thought and American
Puritanism, describing Transcendentalism as the secular development of certain
Puritan presentations of the self. The Puritan tension between the individual (who
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interestingly corresponds to the Common Sense psychology of Emerson's time, in
which individual perceptions were to be validated consensually. More recently,
David M. Robinson describes the trajectory of Emerson's career in terms of "a
growing valorization of the social aspects of experience," a trajectory that suggests
Emerson is "best regarded as a moral or ethical philosopher"; see David M. Robin-
son, Emerson and the Conduct of Life: Pragmatism and Ethical Purpose in the
Later Work (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993), 6. Maurice Gonnaud's An
Uneasy Solitude: Individual and Society in the Work of Ralph Waldo Emerson
(trans. Lawrence Rosenwald [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1987]) uses
Emerson's journal entries to dispute the characterization by Stephen Whicher and
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thus unworthy of sustained critical interest; see especially chapter 13, "A Surrogate
Optimism."
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nally oriented society to an individualistic one characteristic of a market economy
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tical realm by that of individualism until after the 1820s. William Appleman
Williams argues that the transition to a decisively individualistic laissez-faire eco-
nomics began in the 1820s primarily as a result of increasing conflict between the
established upper class and upwardly mobile entrepreneurs; see William Appleman
Williams, The Contours of American History, (Cleveland: World, 1961), 225-35.
Lawrence Frederick Kohl similarly asserts that "the central concern of the Jack-
sonian generation was the transition from a society based on tradition to a society
based on an ethic of individualism" (Lawrence Frederick Kohl, The Politics of Indi-
vidualism: Parties and the American Character in the Jacksonian Era [New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1989], 6).
21. Abraham Lincoln, "The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions:
Address before the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois," in Abraham
Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings, ed. Roy P. Basler (Cleveland: World, 1946),
77.
22. R.W.B. Lewis, The American Adam: Innocence, Tragedy, and Tradition
in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1955), 91.
23. For critical treatments of these interests, see Lora Romero, "Vanishing
Americans: Gender, Empire, and New Historicism," American Literature 63
(1991): 385-404; Nina Baym "How Men and Women Write Indian Stories," in
Recent Essays on The Last of the Mohicans, ed. H. Daniel Peck (New York: Cam-
bridge Univ. Press, 1992); and Jane Tompkins, Sensational Designs: The Cultural
Work of American Fiction, 1790-1860 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1985),
94-121.
24. James Fenimore Cooper, The Last of the Mohicans: A Narrative of 1757,
in The Leatherstocking Tales, vol. 1 (New York: Library of America, 1985), 469;
hereafter cited in text.
25. "About half [of critics evaluating Cooper] have decided that despite su-
perficial allegiances to republican democracy, Cooper was at heart an American
aristocrat; half, that his inconsistencies can be described by regarding him as an or-
thodox Jacksonian democrat" (Stephen Railton, Fenimore Cooper: A Study of His
Life and Imagination [Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1978], 10).
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serves in the later novel as "an index of the speaker's morality" (Louise K. Barnett,
Authority and Speech: Language, Society, and Self in the American Novel [Athens:
Univ. of Georgia Press, 1993], 36). Cooper also asserts here that the operation of
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Magua as failing to master his passions, a failure reinforced by his obsession with
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30. Fiedler, Love and Death, 187. The question of sociality leads Charles
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of the individual with his social and historical role in the world . . . demands
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a Profession (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), 301-32; a more
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39. Georg Lukacs, The Theory of the Novel, trans. Anna Bostock (Cam-
bridge: MIT Press, 1971), 66.
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41. On these and other characteristics of modernist thought, see Michael H.
Levenson, A Genealogy of Modernism: A Study of English Literary Doctrine,
1908-1922 (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984); and Sanford Schwartz,
The Matrix of Modernism: Pound, Eliot, and Early Twentieth-Century Thought
(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1985).
42. Kenneth Burke, Counter-Statement, 2d ed. (1953; reprint, Berkeley: Univ.
of California Press, 1968), 68.
43. Ibid., 111.
44. Parrington, Main Currents, 2: 445.
45. F.O. Matthiessen, American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age
of Emerson and Whitman (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1941), xv; hereafter
cited in text.
46. Myra Jehlen, "Introduction," in Ideology and Classic American Litera-
ture, ed. Sacvan Bercovitch and Myra Jehlen (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press,
1986), 2. Other significant theoretical reassessments of Matthiessen's American
Renaissance include William Cain, F.O. Matthiessen and the Politics of Criticism
(Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 179-201; Jonathan Arac, "F.O. Mat-
thiessen: Authorizing an American Renaissance," in The American Renaissance
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47. Pease, Visionary Compacts, 24. Richard Pells argues that insincerity was
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1950s [New York: Harper and Row, 1985], 120). Donald Pease, in the opening
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usable Past: Theory and the Study of American Literature (New York: Methuen,
1986), 37-47. While the argument that careerism was among the motivations of
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Literature (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1994), 18.
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53. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk, 189.
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56. Ibid., 602.
57. Ibid., 612.
5 8. See, for example, Frank Lentricchia, Ariel and the Police: Michel Foucault,
William James, Wallace Stevens (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 70-75.
Along these lines, Brook Thomas remarks, "Historicists who do attempt
to replace unmasked ideologies with ideological positions of their own find them-
selves contradicting their own historicist premises, sometimes going as far as to
reemploy teleological narratives, even if told from different points of view" (Brook
Thomas, The New Historicism and Other Old-Fashioned Topics [Princeton:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1991], xii.)
59. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Acting Bits/Identity Talk," Critical Inquiry
18.4 (Summer 1992): 774.
60. Ibid., 788.
61. Sacvan Bercovitch, The Office ofThe Scarlet Letter (Baltimore: Johns
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62. Ibid., xiii.
63. Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosopyy: A Genealogy of Prag-
matism (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 7.
64. Emily Miller Budick, "Sacvan Bercovitch, Stanley Cavell, and the Ro-
mance Theory of American Fiction," PMLA 107 (Jan. 1992): 89. Also see idem,
Engendering Romance: Women Writers and the Hawthorne Tradition (New
Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1994), 1-9.
65. Steven Mailloux, Rhetorical Power (Cornell Univ. Press, 1989), 133.
Mailloux illustrates this movement, along with a consideration of its theoretical
consequences throughout his discussion of "rhetorical hermeneutics" in Rhetorical
Power. Two noteworthy instances of similar interpretive strategies may be found in
Janet Gabler-Hover, Truth in American Fiction: The Legacy of Rhetorical Idealism
(Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1990) and Louise Barnett's Authority and Speech.
By remaining receptive to the ideas of referentiality implicit in nineteenth-century
rhetoric, Gabler-Hover opens her inquiry to the way major fictional works "invite
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cations of reading.
2 Hawthorne's Drama of the Self
1. Henry James, "Hawthorne," in Literary Criticism: Essays on Literature,
American Writers, English Writers, ed. Leon Edel and Mark Wilson (New York:
Library of America, 1984), 426; hereafter cited in text.
2. Henry James, The American Scene (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press,
1968), 196.
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interest is James's lack of commentary in The American Scene, on Irish immi-
grants; see Leon Edel, "Introduction," in James, Scene. James limits himself to a
very few remarks about the Irish, such as his observations about the threat to
Boston of "the Irish yoke" and his associating himself, albeit ironically, with the
departed "Boston of history, the Boston of Emerson, Thoreau, Hawthorne" (Scene,
245).
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geois science during the eighteenth century" (Jiirgen Habermas, The Structural
Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois
Society, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence [Cambridge: MIT Press,
1989], 29).
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the commercial maritime activities of seacoast towns to the development of a series
of factory centers and mill villages" (Mary H. Blewett, Men, Women, and Work:
Class, Gender, and Protest in the New England Shoe Industry, 1780-1910
[Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1990], 21). For discussions of the new industrial
morality and the ideological complexities and struggles associated with antebellum
industrial development, see Alan Dawley and Paul Faler, "Workingclass Culture
and Politics in the Industrial Revolution: Sources of Loyalism and Rebellion," in
American Workingclass Culture: Explorations in American Labor and Social His-
tory, ed. Milton Cantor (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1979), 61-75; also see
Jonathan A. Glickstein, Concepts of Free Labor in Antebellum America (New
Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1991).
6. Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1991), 387.
7. Gary B. Kulik makes the point that the history of labor objections to capi-
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terns of Resistance to Industrial Capitalism, Pawtucket Village and the Strike of
1824," in American Workingclass Culture, ed. Cantor, 232).
8. Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Snow-Image and Uncollected Tales, vol. 11 of
The Centenary Edition of the Works of Nathaniel Hawthorne, ed. William Char-
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vat, Roy Harvey Pearce, and Claude M. Simpson (Columbus: Ohio State Univ.
Press, 1974), 299; hereafter cited in text as Snow-Image. Cf. similar sentiments
about Irish immigration in Nathaniel Hawthorne, The American Notebooks, vol. 8
of Centenary Edition (1972), 39-41, 63.
9. For his discussion of James's effect on the history of Hawthorne criticism,
see Michael Colacurcio, "Introduction: The Spirit and the Sign," in New Essays on
The Scarlet Letter, ed. Michael J. Colacurcio (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press,
1985), 1-28. This essay continues the attack on those who attend exclusively to the
aesthetic elements of Hawthorne's writings, an argument developed in Michael
Colacurcio, The Province of Piety: Moral History in Hawthorne's Early Tales
(Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1984).
10. Fred G. See, using modern psychological terms, suggests the complexities
of this process: "Hawthorne developed a thematics of desire which neither accepted
nor repudiated the metaphysical dimension central to the writers of domestic senti-
ment, like Mrs. Stowe, whose works he famously condemned" (Fred G. See, Desire
and the Sign: Nineteenth-Century American Fiction [Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
Univ. Press, 1987], 7).
11. Arlin Turner, Nathaniel Hawthorne: A Biography (New York: Oxford
Univ. Press, 1980), 36. Thomas C. Upham is not to be confused with Charles
Wentworth Upham, well known to Hawthorne scholars for his involvement in
Hawthorne's removal from the Salem customhouse in 1849. In addition to his fa-
miliarity with Upham, Hawthorne read works by Common Sense philosophers,
such as Dugald Stewart, Thomas Brown, Francis Hutcheson, and Lord Kames; see
Randall Stewart, Nathaniel Hawthorne: A Biography (New Haven: Yale Univ.
Press, 1948), 17; also see Marion L. Kesserling, Hawthorne's Reading, 1828-
1850: A Transcription and Identification of Titles Recorded in the Charge-Books
of the Salem Athenaeum (New York: New York Public Library, 1949), 45-54.
12. Bercovitch, Office; Emily Miller Budick, "Hester's Skepticism,
Hawthorne's Faith: or, What Does a Woman Doubt? Instituting the American Ro-
mance Tradition," New Literary History 22 (1991): 199-211.
13. Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Letters, 1813-1843, vol. 15 of Centenary
Edition (1978), 494.
14. Edwin Haviland Miller, Salem Is My Dwelling Place: A Life of Nathaniel
Hawthorne (Iowa City: Univ. of Iowa Press, 1991), 16. For alternative characteriza-
tions, see James R. Mellow, Nathaniel Hawthorne in His Times (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1980); and Gloria Erlich, Family Themes and Hawthorne's Fiction: The
Tenacious Web (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1984).
15. Lauren Berlant, The Anatomy of National Fantasy: Hawthorne, Utopia,
and Everyday Life (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1991); T. Walter Herbert,
Dearest Beloved: The Hawthornes and the Making of the Middle-Class Family
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1993).
16. The most influential treatment of Common Sense realism and its effects
on American literature, Terence Martin's The Instructed Vision: Scottish Common
Sense Philosophy and the Origins of American Fiction (Bloomington: Indiana
Univ. Press, 1961), established this assessment of Hawthorne's relationship to
Common Sense thought. According to Martin, the philosophy of Common Sense
offered an "extremely effective means of controlling the imagination," and as such
it created problems for American writers by making "fiction more difficult to
imagine as an independent, autonomous kind of expression" (vi-vii). His thesis
posits an antagonistic relationship between writer and society, and it privileges a
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Romantic individualism as the means by which American writers could best escape
conformity and conservatism. In particular, Martin focuses on Hawthorne as one
who sought an alternative to the conventional notion of "the imagination as a place
of terror"; instead Martin proposes that the imaginative realm has the capacity to
"desocialize experience" so as to allow one to approach reality "exempt from
social prescription" (107-8; 143). See n. 35, below, on this characterization by
twentieth-century critics of Hawthorne's purported iconoclasm.
17. Fay, American Psychology, 52. These texts were fixed by the "Report of
the Yale Faculty in 1827"; after 1827, they were supplemented by American texts
that tended to follow the Scottish models.
The conservatism of Scottish Common Sense realist philosophy and psychol-
ogy has led most twentieth-century commentators to condemn its influence,
particularly its Christian moralizing. The classic twentieth-century attitude is ex-
pressed by Herbert Schneider, A History of American Philosophy (New York:
Columbia Univ. Press, 1946), 232-57. More balanced, revisionary assessments are
offered by Elizabeth Flower and Murray G. Murphy, A History of Philosophy in
America (New York: Capricorn, 1977), 1: 203-73; also see Daniel Walker Howe,
The Unitarian Conscience: Harvard Moral Philosophy, 1805-1861 (1970; reprint,
Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan Univ. Press, 1988), 27-40. On the pedagogical in-
fluences of Common Sense thinkers, see Lawrence Cremin, American Education:
The National Experience, 1783-1876 (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), 19-28;
also see James Berlin, Writing Instruction in Nineteenth-Century American Col-
leges (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1984), 19-41.
18. The feminist reassessment of sentimental literature has begun to lead to a
rethinking of the relationship between early sentimental novels, such as The Co-
quette and Charlotte Temple, and the prevalent Common Sense thought of the
time, which was at its most enthusiastic, skeptical of the moral effects of popular
fiction. This trajectory can be noted in Cathy Davidson's change from her earlier
suggestion that The Coquette represents an attempt by its author Hannah Foster, to
subvert patriarchal social forms (see Cathy Davidson, "Mothers and Daughters in
the Fiction of the New Republic," in The Lost Tradition: Mothers and Daughters
in Literature, ed. Cathy N. Davidson and E.M. Broner, [New York: Ungar, 1980],
115-27) to her later self-revision in which she states, "The Coquette, however, does
not openly challenge the basic structure of patriarchal culture but, instead, exposes
its fundamental injustices through the details and disasters of the plot" (Cathy
Davidson, Revolution and the Word: The Rise of the Novel in America [New
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986], 144).
19. G. Stanley Hall's well-known polemics against his precursors are best
understood as responses to the philosophy of Princeton's James McCosh. Hall ad-
vocated basing philosophy on psychology—and psychology on physiology—like his
German contemporaries. In its time, Hall's fervor was not inappropriate, given the
fact that most texts were dominated by orthodox Christian beliefs. See G. Stanley
Hall, "Philosophy in the United States," Mind (1880): 89-105.
20. Martin cites Reid's attack on the theory of association of ideas as problem-
atic to writers of fiction since without the power of association imaginative work is
secondary to reality. This was not the point Reid tried to make when, in his Essays
on the Intellectual Powers of Man, he refuted Hume's skepticism of the possibility
of knowledge based on the reasoning process; the fallibility of reasoning powers
could not be avoided or corrected, according to Hume, since the only way to evalu-
ate them was through a second chain of reason, itself subject to the same risk of
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error. Reid saw the flaw in Hume's argument as a logical consequence of the Lock-
ean idea that the mind does not know things by direct means and that consequently
all the mind can know are ideas. Hume followed this idea to the logical conclusion
that the reasoning process was a closed system that had no demonstrable link with
material reality. Reid's retort was to argue for a system in which information about
the world was available through the external senses. This argument is, of course,
crucial to theoretical coherence—or its absence—in Common Sense thought. Reid's
critique of association was, however, basically irrelevant to questions of imagina-
tion. And, later, Dugald Stewart and other Common Sense thinkers recognized this
and had no problem with incorporating association of ideas into their philosophical
and psychological scheme.
21. The distinctions between the disciplines of philosophy and psychology did
not have the same force in the nineteenth century as they do today. Psychology as
we know it developed in the latter half of the nineteenth century, a fusion of ele-
ments derived from moral philosophy, biology, and physics. In this discussion,
psychology will generally be used to designate that field of philosophy which dealt
specifically with descriptions of mental functions (i.e., exclusive of logic).
22. See Fay, American Psychology, 90-128. Upham's textbooks were still in
print and for sale in 1886; his Disordered Mental Action "gained wide distribution
as a cheap reprint in Harper's Family Library" (Marvin Laser, "'Head,' 'Heart,'
and 'Will'" in Hawthorne's Psychology," Nineteenth-Century Fiction [1955]:
133). Wayland's book sold 130,000 copies by 1860. And Hickok's "was the text-
book for many of the older generation of present-day [1930s] American psy-
chologists" (Fay, American Psychology, 120).
23. Horatio Bridge, Personal Recollections of Nathaniel Hawthorne (New
York: Harper Bros., 1893), 53; Nehemiah Cleaveland, History of Bowdoin College
(Boston: J.R. Osgood, 1882), 132.
24. Upham practiced what he preached—in 1819, his American Sketches, a
collection of poems based on American themes and locales, appeared. With respect
to his more well known writings, Herbert Schneider remarks that Upham was "the
first great American textbook writer in mental philosophy" (Schneider, History,
240). Unfortunately, Upham has been afforded relatively little consideration by
Hawthorne scholars. Frederick Crews established the critical climate of the 1960s
with his attack on those who argued the importance of Upham's psychology (Frede-
rick Crews, The Sins of the Fathers: Hawthorne's Psychological Themes [New
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1966], 259-60). Martin dismisses Upham, saying his
work essentially restates that of Reid and Stewart (Martin, Vision, 25). Discus-
sions of Hawthorne's philosophical milieu elicit only passing mention of Upham
in John E. Holsberry, "Hawthorne's 'The Haunted Mind': The Psychology of
Dreams, Coleridge and Keats," Texas Studies in Literature and Language 21
(1979): 307-31; and John Franzosa, "Locke's Kinsman, William Molyneux: The
Philosophical Context of Hawthorne's Early Tales," ESQ 29 (1983): 1-15. Atten-
tion to Upham's advocacy of free will and the possibility of moral improvement as an
influence to dispute the claim that Hawthorne was a fatalist is offered by Claudia D.
Johnson, The Productive Tension of Hawthorne's Art (University: Univ. of Alabama
Press, 1981), and Joseph Schwartz, "A Note on Hawthorne's Fatalism," Modern
Language Notes 70 (1955): 33-36. Rita K. Gollin (Nathaniel Hawthorne and the
Truth of Dreams [Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1979], 19-30) offers
the most balanced discussion of Hawthorne's relationship to Common Sense psy-
chology, although she addresses the work of Dugald Stewart rather than Upham's
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and is primarily concerned with questions of imagination; accordingly, she finds that
Stewart's ideas about dreams influenced Hawthorne.
25. See Fay, American Psychology, 96; also see Schneider, History, 241.
Earlier works on abnormal psychology that stressed proper treatment of psychi-
atric patients had been produced by Isaac Ray (A Treatise on the Medical Jurispru-
dence of Insanity [1834; rpt. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1962]) and, more
notably, by Benjamin Rush (Medical Inquiries and Observations upon the Diseases
of the Mind [Philadelphia: Kimber and Richardson, 1812]). Although Rush was
more original, in that he believed physiological problems to be the bases of mental
disorders, Upham was the first to discuss psychiatric problems within the context
of an overall psychological theory.
26. Upham's discussion of the will, not introduced as a separate category
until 1834, was, for its time, an innovative feature.
27. Thomas C. Upham, Abridgement of Mental Philosophy, including the
Three Departments of the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will: Designed as a Textbook
for Academies and High Schools (New York: Harper, 1886), 19; hereafter cited in
text.
28. Dugald Stewart, Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. 2
of The Collected Works, ed. William Hamilton (Boston, 1884), 8.
29. The emphasis on classification might seem an archaism to those more fa-
miliar with literary expressions of psychological theory. This impression would
quickly be dispelled upon examination of The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), the manual of the American Psychiatric Associ-
ation, which gives all the names of officially recognized psychopathologies and
assigns each a code number.
30. Thomas C. Upham, Outlines of Imperfect and Disordered Mental Action
(New York: Arno, 1973), 257.
31. Ibid., 259.
32. Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter, vol. 1 of Centenary Edition
(1962), 36; hereafter cited in text.
33. One example of this occurs in Hawthorne's preface to The Marble Faun,
in which the author seems to despair over the possibility of communicating with a
sympathetic audience.
34. Parrington, Main Currents, 2: 447.
35. Hawthorne's artistic expression of psychological states has led critics to
classify him as a Romantic. Some assessments of Hawthorne as a Romantic artist,
such as those of Frederick Crews, Terence Martin, and Richard Harter Fogle
("Art's Illusion: Coleridgean Assumptions in Hawthorne's Tales and Sketches, in
Ruined Eden of the Present, ed. G.R. Thompson [West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue
Univ. Press, 1981], 109-28), were understandable responses, developed during the
1950s and 1960s, to earlier depictions of Hawthorne as a latter-day Puritan. It is
important to recall that Crews's argument—like Martin's—was a protest against
the normalization of Hawthorne during the "Christian revival of the 1950s"
(Crews, Sins, 5). Leslie Fiedler stated this revisionist position most explicitly when
he objected to the then recent scholarship (including Randall Stewart's biography)
that rejected the image of Hawthorne as reclusive, "putting in its place an active,
practical, hard-working Hawthorne: a bon bourgeois, good husband and father,
with a taste for athletics and backroom politics" (Fiedler, Love and Death, 486).
The assessment to which Fiedler objected was itself in large part a response to
Parrington's earlier charges against Hawthorne on the grounds of his purported
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aestheticism and social isolation. Interestingly, even more historically oriented in-
quiries during this era reflected this revisionism; see Henry Nash Smith, Democ-
racy and the Novel (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1978); and Leo Marx, The
Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America (New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1964).
A qualified assessment of Hawthorne as a Romantic nevertheless remained
prevalent through the 1970s and the early 1980s. For example, Nina Baym argued
for a vision of Hawthorne as Romantic artist who simultaneously embodied the
unromantic image of professional writer (Nina Baym, The Shape of Hawthorne's
Career [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1976]); Claudia Johnson asserted that
Hawthorne "shared the dark vision of his Puritan ancestors" (Johnson, Productive
Tension, 4) while he simultaneously made use of Romantic aesthetics; and David
Pancost similarly argued that "Hawthorne's metaphysics, like his concept of artis-
tic creation, is a mixture of a conservative philosophical tradition and a more
radical Romanticism" (David W. Pancost, "Hawthorne's Epistemology and On-
tology," ESQ 19 [1973]: 12). The radical Romanticism referred to by Pancost
may well be understood as an expression by Hawthorne of certain elements of
the Common Sense philosophy—such as interest in the imagination and intro-
spection.
36. Nathaniel Hawthorne, Twice-Told Tales, vol. 9 of Centenary Edition
(1974), 121; hereafter cited in text as Tales.
37. James Mellow notes that in Hawthorne's fiction one repeatedly does
"encounter that mysterious father" in questions of uncertain paternity (Mellow,
Hawthorne in His Times, 14). But Hawthorne not only presents this problem in
his fiction; at times he resolves it with images of family reconciliation, such as the
final scaffold scene between Pearl and Dimmesdale in The Scarlet Letter, which
precedes little Pearl's vast inheritance from Chillingworth, her other, legal, father;
see discussion of The Scarlet Letter in chapter 3.
38. The "Haunted Mind" has inspired intermittent critical interest. Martin
regards it as representative of Hawthorne's rejection of Common Sense phi-
losophy's supposed hostility to fiction (Martin, Instructed Vision, 145-48). A Jung-
ian approach to "The Haunted Mind" is employed in an attempt to universalize
the experience in Barton Levi St. Armand, "Hawthorne's 'The Haunted Mind': A
Subterranean Drama of the Self," Criticism 13 (1971): 1-25. Hyatt Waggoner's ac-
count, less dogmatic than the two mentioned above, treats the story as a model for
Hawthorne's idea of mental activity; see Hyatt H. Waggoner, The Presence of
Hawthorne (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1979), 17. Norman Hostet-
ler follows Martin's characterization of "The Haunted Mind" as an affirmation of
Romantic psychology (Norman H. Hostetler, "Imagination and Point of View in
'The Haunted Mind,'" American Transcendental Quarterly 39 [1978]: 266). For
a most thorough discussion of philosophical background, particularly Lockean in-
fluence and the importance of association psychology, see John E. Holsberry,
"Hawthorne's 'The Haunted Mind.'" It is worth recalling here that American aca-
demics had no special difficulty aligning their Common Sense allegiances with an
acceptance of Lockean empiricism; see Howe, The Unitarian Conscience, 36-40.
39. In essence, his argument was that the arbitrariness of association could
easily lead to solipsism. Instead, he posited a theory of natural signs by which there
would be continuous interaction between the individual mind and the world.
40. Nathaniel Hawthorne, Mosses from an Old Manse, vol. 10 of the Cen-
tenary Edition [1974], 268; hereafter cited in text as Mosses.
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41 . A flurry of interest was initiated by the mention of some of these as pos-
sible influences on Hawthorne in Daniel J. Barnes, "'Physical Fact' and Folklore:
Hawthorne's 'Egotism; or the Bosom-Serpent,'" American Literature 43 (1971):
117-21. Sargent Bush, Jr., disagreed with earlier critics who focused on single de-
finitive sources for "Egotism," arguing instead that there was a considerable body
of bosom serpent lore; see Sargent Bush, Jr., "Bosom Serpents before Hawthorne:
The Origins of a Symbol," American Literature 43 (1971): 181-99. Thomas
Werge added poetic precursors, and Jackson Campbell Boswell insisted his list of
classical precursors completed the discussion; see Jackson Campbell Boswell,
"Bosom Serpents before Hawthorne: Origin of a Symbol," English Language
Notes 12 (1975): 279-87, and Thomas Werge, "Thomas Shepard and Crevecoeur:
Two Uses of the Image of the Bosom Serpent before Hawthorne," Nathaniel Haw-
thorne Journal 4 (1974): 236-39.
A more psychologically oriented analysis is provided in Sharon Cameron, The
Corporeal Self: Allegories of the Body in Melville and Hawthorne (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1981), 102-3, which argues that the physical disorder
does not represent a social condition but indicates a psychic fracture customarily
repressed. Edgar Dryden (Nathaniel Hawthorne: The Poetics of Enchantment
[Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1977], 25) acknowledges the social power of sympa-
thy while also arguing that the basic problem is internal rather than interpersonal.
42. Hawthorne, American Notebooks, 22, 228.
43. Hawthorne, Letters, 1813-1843, 495.
44. Imagery of chains or linkage resonates throughout the body of Haw-
thorne's writings. For example, in The Marble Faun, Hawthorne describes how
the crazed Donatello had thrown the model over the edge of the precipice and
Miriam's subsequent expression of guilt: "We two slew yonder wretch. The deed
knots us together for time and eternity, like the coil of a serpent" (Hawthorne,
The Marble Faun: Or, the Romance of Monte Beni, vol. 4 of Centenary Edition
[1968], 174). The narrator then expands on the consequences: "It was closer than
a marriage-bond. So intimate, in those first moments, was the union, that it seemed
as if their new sympathy annihilated all other ties, and that they were released from
the chain of humanity." And, as a result of this release, "moral seclusion . . .  had
suddenly extended itself around them" (175). Similarly, in The House of the Seven
Gables, the image Hawthorne uses to stand in for the principle that connects
people in society, the "whole sympathetic chain of human nature," reflects an
underlying ambivalence (Hawthorne, The House of the Seven Gables, vol. 2 of
Centenary Edition [1974], 141). This image of linkage recalls a similar concept ex-
pressed in the sentimental novel The Coquette: "'Are we not all links in the great
chain of society, some more, some less important; but each upheld by others,
throughout the confederated whole?'" (Hannah Foster, The Coquette [New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1986], 40). The image of the chain and linkage will be dis-
cussed further in the next chapter.
45. The critical discussion of "Wakefield" generally seems to focus on the
psychology of the character. For example, Arnold Weinstein stresses an existential,
psychologistic reading of the story when he claims that the absence of motive and
interiority reflects Hawthorne's obsession "with the notion of his own insubstan-
tiality, his ghostliness, his secret identity as Nobody" (Arnold Weinstein, Nobody's
Home: Speech, Self, and Place in American Fiction from Hawthorne to DeLillo
[New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993], 19).
46. Barnett, Authority and Speech, 1.
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47. Ely Moore, "Labor Unions," in Social Theories of Jacksonian Democ-
racy: Representative Writings of the Period, 1825-1850, ed. Joseph L. Blau (In-
dianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1954), 290.
48. Ibid., 292.
49. Kesserling, Hawthorne's Reading, 53-61.
50. Norman S. Fiering, "Irresistible Compassion: An Aspect of Eighteenth-
Century Sympathy and Humanitarianism," Journal of the History of Ideas 37
(April-June 1976): 195.
51. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. D.D. Raphael and
A.L. Macfie (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1976), 38-40.
52. Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty
and Virtue (1725) (Hildesheim: Georg 01ms, 1971), 250; 159. Hutcheson fol-
lowed Shaftesbury in condemning self-love as inimical to benevolence. Others,
such as David Hartley, argued that self-love and benevolence need not conflict. For
a presentation of the range of views of this debate, see D.H. Monro, A Guide to
the British Moralists (London: Fontana, 1972), 31-144.
53. Thomas Brown, Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (An-
dover: M. Newman, 1822), 3: 340.
54. The family in Hawthorne's work has been treated at length by Gloria
Erlich and T. Walter Herbert. Their studies seem to have been motivated in part by
the perception that psychological approaches to Hawthorne, no matter how po-
tentially interesting, are necessarily incomplete and even ineffective when not
historically grounded. Both Erlich and Herbert rely on family documents and
attend primarily to Hawthorne's personal history; and they agree on the idea that
Hawthorne needed to cultivate personal and artistic independence to become suc-
cessful, though Herbert is more inclined to describe Hawthorne's writing as an
exploration of "the entanglement of misery and beatitude that was native to the
domestic ideal" (Herbert, Dearest Beloved, xvi).
55. This is the basic position in Michael Davitt Bell {Hawthorne and the His-
torical Romance of New England [Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1971]) and
Michael Colacurcio (Province, 283-313). Crucial background on Hawthorne's
awareness of spectre evidence may be found in David Levin, "Shadows of Doubt:
Spectre Evidence in 'Young Goodman Brown,'" American Literature 34 (1962):
346. A historical study that takes a different tack in its emphasis on the significance
of revival meetings as "demonic aspects of Protestant zeal" during Hawthorne's
time is Frank Shuffleton, "Nathaniel Hawthorne and the Revival Movement,"
American Transcendental Quarterly AA (1979): 315.
56. To some extent, discussions that assert the integrity of Brown's dream
against community values are attenuated versions of Crews's argument; Crews's
Freudian understanding was that "Young Goodman Brown" served as "a psycho-
logical paradigm for other struggles" (Crews, Sins, 99), one more enactment of the
Oedipal conflict. An exception to this critical tendency is Norman Hostetler's
analysis of Brown's perceptual problems as a reflection of Lockean psychology,
which notes that the ability of Hawthorne's characters to align sense perceptions
with mental processes "frequently governs their ability to develop a sound moral
relationship with other people" (Norman H. Hostetler, "Narrative Structure and
Theme in 'Young Goodman Brown,'" journal of Narrative Technique 12 [1982]:
221).
57. Colacurcio, Province, 285.
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58. See, Desire and the Sign, 39-40.
59. Budick, "Sacvan Bercovitch, Stanley Cavell," 89.
3 "But the Past Was Not Dead"
1. Baym, Shape, chapter 1.
2. J. Hillis Miller, Hawthorne and History: Defacing It (Cambridge: Basil
Blackwell, 1991), 82.
3. Recent historicist inquiries have moved beyond pure questions of source
and ideology to treat more fully their relationships to Hawthorne's stylistic innova-
tions. Sacvan Bercovitch treats stylistic uncertainty as a correlate of liberal dissent:
"Ambiguity brings [the tendency toward fragmentation] under control, gives it
purpose and direction, by ordering the facts into general polarities" (Bercovitch,
Office, 26). Also, in her study of nineteenth-century rhetoric, Janet Gabler-Hover
makes the case for a general acceptance of universal moral truths (consistent with
Hawthorne's schooling in conventional rhetorical theory) as a counterbalance
against Hawthorne's more famous ambiguities: "This faith in and reverence for the
truth was an omnipresent theme throughout the nineteenth century, and, strangely
enough, despite the increasing scientific skepticism as the century wore on about
the epistemological status of such concepts as truth, the rhetorical conception of
truth was sufficiently entrenched within the culture to ensure that truthful lan-
guage retained its integrity for many Americans" (Gabler-Hover, Truth, 36).
In addition, Michael Colacurcio argues that Hawthorne's tales dealt with
moral problems from an assumed Puritan point of view to be judged from a Roman-
tic outlook in order to provide a mutual critique and an alternative to a positivistic
epistemology; see Colacurcio, "Introduction: The Spirit and the Sign," 1-28. Other
historicist studies that emphasize the historical bases of Hawthorne's fictions simi-
larly controvert simple characterizations of Hawthorne as a proto-modernist or a
Romantic; see Kenneth Dauber, The Idea of Authorship in America: Democratic
Poetics from Franklin to Melville (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1990); Rita
Gollin, "Hawthorne and the Anxiety of Aesthetic Response," Centennial Review
28 (1984): 94-104; and Gordon Hutner, Secrets and Sympathy: Forms of Disclo-
sure in Hawthorne's Novels (Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1988).
4. See, for example, John Carlos Rowe, Through the Custom-House:
Nineteenth-Century American Fiction and Modern Theory (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Univ. Press, 1982); and Michael Davitt Bell, "Arts of Deception: Haw-
thorne, 'Romance,' and The Scarlet Letter," in New Essays, 29-56.
5. Larzer Ziff, Literary Democracy: The Declaration of Cultural Independ-
ence in America (New York: Viking, 1981), 118; Laura Laffrado, Hawthorne's
Literature for Children, (Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1992), 8.
6. Samuel Johnson, Johnson on Shakespeare, vol. 7 of The Yale Edition of
the Works of Samuel Johnson, ed. Arthur Sherbo (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press,
1968), 84.
7. Ibid., 87, 80.
8. Ibid., 59-60.
9. William Charvat, The Origins of American Critical Thought: 1810-1835
(Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1936), 1. Charvat based his research on
American and popular foreign literary magazines. M.F. Heiser observed that
neoclassical aesthetics, much like Common Sense philosophy, "contained in its ad-
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mission of 'rational individualism' the seeds of its own dissolution" (M.F. Heiser,
"The Decline of Neoclassicism, 1801-1848," in Transitions in American Literary
History, ed. Harry Hayden Clark [Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1953], 154).
Accordingly, Charvat noted that the influence of Wordsworth and British Roman-
ticism was gradual and acceptable to Americans because Wordsworth's philoso-
phy relied so heavily on Scottish and English thought (Charvat, Origins, 70-76).
Wordsworth's religious orientation, didacticism, and intelligibility made his ideal-
ism and belief in the edifying power of nature more palatable to American critics of
the 1820s.
10. Charvat, Origins, 4.
11. Ibid., 7-23. Rush Welter observes a corresponding "conservative commit-
ment to public schooling [that] was often essentially illiberal, a means of coming to
terms with modern evils that was intended primarily to curb popular discussion"
(Rush Welter, The Mind of America, 1820-1860 [New York: Columbia Univ.
Press, 1975], 284). The comparable argument that education served the pur-
poses of "elite control" is made in Joel Spring, The American School, 1642-1990,
2d ed. (New York: Longman, 1990), 108. For a less polemical version of this
argument that nevertheless makes the similar observation that education was
understood to be especially important in the promulgation of republican values, see
Cremin, American Education, chapters 4-7 passim.
12. Review of Twice-Told Tales in the Salem Gazette (14 March 1837), in
Hawthorne: The Critical Heritage, ed. J. Donald Crowley (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1970), 53.
13. Andrew Preston Peabody, review of Twice-Told Tales in the Christian Ex-
aminer (Nov. 1838), in Hawthorne: The Critical Heritage, ed. Crowley, 64.
14. The treatment given Coleridge's Aids to Reflection is instructive. First
published in England in 1825, it was presented in this country in 1829 with an
influential preface by James Marsh. Marsh asserted that Coleridge's work was pri-
marily a means to associate "the study of words with the study of morals and
religion" (James Marsh, "Introduction" in Aids to Reflection, by Samuel Taylor
Coleridge [Burlington, Vt.: C. Goodrich, 1840], 10). Once again, as the writings of
Thomas Upham attest, the imagination, though not proscribed, was circumscribed
by the social realm.
15. William Cullen Bryant, Representative Selections, ed. Tremaine McDow-
ell (New York: American Book, 1935), 190.
16. Ibid., 197.
17. William Charvat, The Profession of Authorship in America, 1800-1870,
ed. Matthew J. Bruccoli (1968; rpt. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1992), 64;
William Ellery Channing, The Works of William E. Channing (Boston, 1890),
126.
18. First published in 1790, Alison's book received little attention before a
laudatory review appeared in 1810. The first reference to it in American magazines
came in 1818 (Charvat, Origins, 48-51). Washington Irving helped popularize
Alison in the United States, and Bryant's "Lectures" reflected his knowledge of
Alison as well; see Harry H. Clark, "Changing Attitudes in Early American Liter-
ary Criticism: 1800-1840," in The Development of American Literary Criticism,
ed. Floyd Stovall (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1955), 26; 29.
Hawthorne's library record indicates an awareness of Alison's theories and famil-
iarity with the contemporary magazines that advanced the critical positions
identified by Charvat; see Kesserling, Hawthorne's Reading, 43-64.
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19. Archibald Alison, Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste (Edin-
burgh, 1817), 1: xvi; hereafter cited in text as Essays.
20. A similarly normalized association appears in the opening chapter of
Henry Home, Lord Kames, Elements of Criticism (New York, 1859), 29-37.
21. Hawthorne's first children's story, "Little Annie's Ramble," was published
in 1835. Aside from other short pieces directed toward a juvenile audience, Haw-
thorne wrote a "Universal History" for the Peter Parley series in 1836. After the
Grandfather's Chair series, Hawthorne wrote his moralized versions of classical
myths, A Wonder Book for Girls and Boys (1851) and Tanglewood Tales (1853).
22. Nathaniel Hawthorne, True Stories from History and Biography, vol. 6 of
The Centenary Edition (1972), 214. This volume also contains The Whole History
of Grandfather's Chair; hereafter cited in text as True Stories).
23. Carol Billman, "Nathaniel Hawthorne: 'Revolutionizer' of Children's Lit-
erature?" Studies in American Fiction 10 (1982): 111. Billman specifically refers to
Hawthorne's bowdlerizations of classical tales in A Wonder Book and Tanglewood
Tales. Children's literature in the United States did not take the imaginative turn it
did in Europe during the early nineteenth century, and she notes that Hawthorne's
writings were no exception to this tendency: "He domesticates characters and situ-
ations and draws moral lessons from sometimes inconclusive stories" (Billman,
"'Revolutionizer,'" 112). Hawthorne's statement about revolutionizing children's
literature was made in a well-known overture to Longfellow suggesting they col-
laborate (21 March 1838): "Possibly we may make a great hit, and entirely revo-
lutionize children's literature" (Hawthorne, Letters, 266).
24. Between 1820 to 1850, "somewhere between 25 and 30 American ro-
mances were based, wholly or in part, on the history of seventeenth-century New
England" (Bell, Hawthorne, ix).
25. "The frame, in which Grandfather and the children identify themselves
with history, has the same purpose as 'The Custom-House': it forges an imaginative
link between the present and the past that serves not only to reanimate the past with
the life of the present, but to implicate the present in the life of the past" (John W.
Crowley, "Hawthorne's New England Epochs," ESQ 25 [1979]: 64). Elsewhere
Hawthorne uses physical devices such as the town pump, the scarlet letter, the house
of the seven gables, and the Province-House to link the present with the past.
26. A similar situation is repeated in The Scarlet Letter. Although most of the
women outside the prison door counsel death for Hester Prynne, one advises
mercy. Apparently unable to withstand the rigors of the New World, the dissenter
later dies. See Frederick Newberry, "Tradition and Disinheritance in The Scarlet
Letter^ ESQ 23 (1977): 1-9; Bell, Hawthorne, 117-20.
27. Lawrence Buell, New England Literary Culture: From Revolution
through Renaissance (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986), 214. John
Me Williams situates Grandfather's Chair in the "commemorative tradition" of his-
tories and argues that only occasionally do Grandfather's responses reflect am-
bivalence; see John P. McWilliams, Jr., Hawthorne, Melville, and the American
Character: A Looking-Glass Business (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984),
38-39. Nina Baym, who has treated Hawthorne's children's writings extensively
and has championed their worth for scholars, similarly asserts that only with the
writing of The Scarlet Letter did Hawthorne reflect ambivalence; see Baym, Shape,
chapter 3.
Those who conversely locate in Grandfather's Chair a historical vision that
would inform The House of the Seven Gables and The Scarlet Letter include
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Crowley ("Hawthorne's New England," 60), and Ziff (Literary Democracy, 118).
More recently, both Laura Laffrado and Lauren Berlant assert the subversive
potential of Grandfather's Chair. Berlant sees in the children's history a counter-
balance to official history, one authorized not by an allegiance to official sources
"but because of his unique voice, as one among many sources of knowledge," a
testimony to alternative, popular sources (Berlant, Anatomy of National Fantasy,
197). Laffrado similarly argues for the subversive impact of the body of Haw-
thorne's children's literature, and she suggests that Grandfather's Chair displays
the power of the narrator to transform reality in the service of a deeper truth: "In
his diligent and sincere attempt to write such narratives, Hawthorne managed to
slip the bonds of the present and enter the full reality of all times and places" (Laff-
rado, Hawthorne's Literature, 40).
28. Buell, Literary Culture, 217.
29. Quoted in Welter, Mind, 27.
30. George Dekker regards it as the tension informing The Scarlet Letter
(George Dekker, The American Historical Romance [New York: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1987], 171), and Sacvan Bercovitch identifies its expression as "the ritual of a
culture on an errand—which is to say, a culture based on a faith in process" (Sacvan
Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad [Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1978],
23).
31. Grandfather's debt to George Bancroft may have been theoretical, but
Hawthorne's was more material: Bancroft had a hand in Hawthorne's political ap-
pointments during two Democratic administrations.
32. Hawthorne, Twice-Told Tales, 68-69.
33. Ibid., 95, 88.
34. The most prominent of recent critical works on ideology in The Scarlet
Letter, Bercovitch's The Office of The Scarlet Letter, notes that "Hawthorne makes
it the office of the narrator to abandon and, after her return, to enclose her still re-
sisting self in history and community" (150). Hester's rebellion is thus ritualized,
and American dissent effectively contained.
35. Budick, "Hester's Skepticism," 207.
36. Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter, 31; hereafter cited in text.
37. James Mellow notes, "Throughout the pitched battle that centered on his
dismissal, Hawthorne maintained an attitude of aggrieved innocence, the bewilder-
ment of a man who has been thoroughly wronged"—the same tone Hawthorne
assumes in the preface to the second edition. But, Mellow continues, "As a shrewd
politician, he had been anticipating his probable removal for several months."
Mellow, Hawthorne in His Times, 292.
38. Given the vitriolic response of the Salem Whigs to Hawthorne's fictional
attack, the return of the past also functions to mute the threat of the present. For
example, the Salem Register (21 March 1850) was scandalized by Hawthorne:
"The most venomous, malignant, and unaccountable assault is made upon a vener-
able gentleman, whose chief crime seems to be that he loves a good dinner. . . .
This chapter has obliterated whatever sympathy was felt for Mr. Hawthorne's re-
moval from office" (quoted in Stewart, Nathaniel Hawthorne, 98).
39. Emerson, Essays, 7.
40. Carton, Rhetoric of American Romance, 154.
41. A.N. Kaul remarks that Hawthorne uses the historical setting so as to
comment on a nineteenth-century cultural problem: "The loss of a sense of
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community, obsession with self, exploitative individualism—Hawthorne's major
themes—are thus the dangers latent in democratic society" (A.N. Kaul, The Ameri-
can Vision: Actual and Ideal Society in Nineteenth-Century Fiction [New Haven:
Yale Univ. Press, 1963], 153). More recently, Charles Swann has observed along
similar lines that "For Hawthorne, social being is at the core of all identity and of
all virtue" (Charles Swann, Nathaniel Hawthorne: Tradition and Revolution [New
York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991], 84).
42. Emerson, Essays, 7.
43. As John Me Williams comments, "by connecting past to present directly,
[Hawthorne] could remind contemporaries that they need not worship patriarchal
demigods and could not create themselves anew" (MeWilliams, Hawthorne, Mel-
ville, 107).
44. E.A. Duyckinck, review in Literary World (30 March 1850, in Haw-
thorne: The Critical Heritage, ed. Crowley, 155; George Bailey Loring, review in
the Massachusetts Quarterly Review (Sept. 1850), in Hawthorne: The Critical
Heritage, ed. Crowley, 168; Orestes Brownson, review in Brownson's Quarterly
Review (Oct. 1850), in Hawthorne: The Critical Heritage, ed. Crowley, 179. Also
see examples of the stereotypical "narrow Puritan" in Bell, Hawthorne, 85-104
passim.
45. The word sympathy had specific technical meaning to Common Sense
philosophers and sentimental novelists alike. It recurs with great frequency in The
Scarlet Letter, e.g., "The feeling that it so evidently manifested, rather than the
direct purport of the words, caused it to vibrate within all hearts, and brought
the listeners into one accord of sympathy" (67). Although scholars have observed
the importance of sympathy, they have at times displaced the concept onto a specifi-
cally Romantic setting; see Pancost, "Hawthorne's Epistemology," 8; also see Roy
R. Male, "Hawthorne and the Concept of Sympathy," PMLA 68 (1953): 138.
More recently, Lester Hunt notes Hawthorne's reliance on Adam Smith's definition
in most aspects of the term (Lester Hunt, "The Scarlet Letter: Hawthorne's Theory
of Moral Sentiments," Philosophy and Literature 8 (1984): 75-88). And Stephen
Railton, suggesting a correlation between Hawthorne's rhetorical stance and the
idea of sympathy, observes that Hawthorne analogizes the author/reader relation-
ship with that of the alienated character and members of his/her community
(Stephen Railton, Authorship and Audience: Literary Performance in the Ameri-
can Renaissance [Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1991], 107-31).
46. Hawthorne, Snow-Image, 99. The importance of the "chain" to both
sympathy and proper perception is suggested by the following passage from The
House of the Seven Gables: "So long as you should feel [her hand's] grasp, soft as
it was, you might be certain that your place was good in the whole sympathetic
chain of human nature. The world was no longer a delusion" (141). See chapter 2,
n. 44, above.
47. Hawthorne further challenges the interpretation of phenomena: "Oftener,
however, its credibility rested on the faith of some lonely eyewitness, who beheld
the wonder through the colored, magnifying, and distorting medium of his imagi-
nation, and shaped it distinctly in his after-thought" (155).
48. This phrase is echoed later after Dimmesdale's return to rewrite his elec-
tion sermon: "That self was gone! Another man had returned out of the forest"
(223). Yet, as the conclusion shows, Dimmesdale never relinquishes his social role.
49. Gabler-Hover, Truth, 98-9.
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50. Ibid., 99.
51. Hester Prynne's rebelliousness and Hawthorne's presentation of it perse-
veres as a difficult area for critical interpretation. Some critical works continue to
explore the heroic dimensions of Hester Prynne; these include Leland S. Person, Jr.,
Aesthetic Headaches: Women and a Masculine Poetics in foe, Melville, and Haw-
thorne (Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1988), and Joyce Warren, The American
Narcissus: Individualism and Women in Nineteenth-Century American Fiction
(New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1984). Others, however, are more in-
clined to find equivocation in Hawthorne's most notable character; for example,
Sacvan Bercovitch perceives in her an embodiment of the dissent with which Haw-
thorne struggles: "We might say that the problem of dissent in The Scarlet Letter
lies in the paradox of Hester's sainted individualism" (Bercovitch, Office, 121).
Along similarly complex lines, Lauren Berlant observes, "Hawthorne's women
emerge as uncanny, paradoxical, politically unintelligible: as fantasy projections of
patriarchal fear about the imminent end of male hegemony within the political
public sphere, as occasions for serious critique of that same patriarchal culture, and
as eroticized subjects who speculate that other forms of collective life might be im-
aginable, even within America" (Berlant, Anatomy, 9).
52. Richard Brodhead finds in The Blithedale Romance a narratively problem-
atic and culturally symptomatic conjunction between the private and the family. To
Brodhead, Hawthorne's fusion of what might be termed public or relational aspects
of the self with a radically disjunct spectatorial function is the mark of a particular
moment in antebellum literary culture; see Brodhead, Cultures of Letters, 48-68.
This fusion—and the corresponding failure of domestic relationships—in Blithe-
dale highlights by its absence the function of sympathy.
53. Buell, Literary Culture, 264.
4 The Altrurian Romances
1. Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter, 263.
2. Bellamy's Looking Backward is most similar in its call for an "ethical
revelation that makes social upheaval unnecessary" (John L. Thomas, Alternative
America: Henry George, Edward Bellamy, Henry Demarest Lloyd and the Adver-
sary Tradition [Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1983], 243). Kenneth Roemer has
noted the appearance of "153 Utopian, partially Utopian, and anti-utopian works"
(274) between the years 1888 and 1900; see Kenneth M. Roemer, "'Utopia
Made Practical': Compulsive Realism," American Literary Realism 7 (1974):
273-76.
3. Dominick LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts,
Language (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1983), 44. LaCapra's remark is particularly
relevant because it raises two issues central to a study of Howells: a split perspec-
tive and social criticism. The argument that Howells's social criticism was
superficial had its most forceful and influential exponent in H.L. Mencken.
Mencken, in his essay "The Dean" (1917), characterizes Howells as "a placid con-
formist" and "a contriver of pretty things" who perceives "through a pink fog"
and "has nothing to say, for all the charm he gets into saying it"; Mencken further
claims that "His psychology is superficial, amateurish, often nonsensical" (H.L.
Mencken, Prejudices, First Series [New York: Knopf, 1919], 52-58). During the
1950s, several significant critical studies appeared to refute the critical frame of ref-
erence that Mencken had established. Disputing Mencken's characterization of
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Howells, Everett Carter cast Howells in the role of the tough-minded realist who,
along with the pragmatists, embraced "the flux and change of experience" (Everett
Carter, Howells and the Age of Realism [Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1954], 154).
Edwin H. Cady's two biographical studies of Howells (The Road to Realism: The
Early Years of'William Dean Howells, 1837-1885 [Syracuse: Syracuse Univ. Press,
1956] and The Realist at War: The Mature Years of William Dean Howells, 1885-
1920 [Syracuse: Syracuse Univ. Press, 1958]) were particularly important because
they attended to Howells's emotional problems and treated his writings as complex
responses to both social and personal issues.
Much of the scholarship on Howells in the past two decades has followed
along the lines established by Cady. Kenneth Lynn's biography succinctly states the
contemporary defense of Howells's psychological complexity: "Despite what his
critics have said about him, Howells was a man of modern sensibility, whose
awareness of life was rooted in radical doubt and anxiety" (Kenneth Lynn, William
Dean Howells: An American Life [New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971],
12). Other significant explorations of the psychological complexities of Howells's
vision include Kermit Vanderbilt, The Achievement of William Dean Howells: A
Reinterpretation (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1968); and John W. Crowley,
The Black Heart's Truth: The Early Career of William Dean Howells (Chapel Hill:
Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1985). A more recent work that provocatively ex-
plores the conflict between what are described as "Howells's divided sympathies"
(187), his social criticism and a competing impulse toward elitism, is Elsa Nettels,
Language, Race, and Social Class in Howells's America (Lexington: Univ. Press of
Kentucky, 1988), 187.
4. This incongruity reflects an apparent fusion of disparate genres. As Ken-
neth Burke describes it, whereas the didactic and the jeremiad, with their demands
for change and adherence to ideals, reject the world as it is, the comic mode pro-
motes acceptance of the world (Kenneth Burke, Attitudes toward History, rev. ed.
[Boston: Beacon, 1959], 39-91).
5. For a publication history, see Clara and Rudolf Kirk's introductory essay
to William Dean Howells, The Altrurian Romances, vol. 20 of A Selected Edition,
ed. Edwin H. Cady, Ronald Gottesman, and David J. Nordloh (Bloomington: Indi-
ana Univ. Press, 1968), xi-xxxiv; also see Cady, Realist at War, 197-200. Howells
spelled traveler with two /'s when the essays were published serially in the Cosmo-
politan. He changed the spelling to one / when A Traveler appeared in book form,
perhaps in an attempt to distinguish the American style from the British (Clara
Kirk, W.D. Howells, Traveler from Altruria [New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ.
Press, 1962], 90). In this discussion, the form chosen by Howells for his book title
will be used except when specific reference is made to the essays.
6. The most extensive critical treatment of the Altrurian Romances remains
Clara Kirk's W.D. Howells, Traveler from Altruria, which describes in detail the
contemporary political milieu. The formal structure of these writings is treated in
George Uba, "Howells and the Practicable Utopia: The Allegorical Structure of the
Altrurian Romances," The Journal of Narrative Technique 13 (1983): 118-30.
The Altrurian Romances are compared with Herbert Marcuse's writings and thus
treated as sophisticated ideological criticism in Sam Girgus, The Law of the Heart:
Individualism and the Modern Self in American Literature (Austin: Univ. of Texas
Press, 1979), 73-83. For a study that situates the Altrurian Romances in a literary
tradition of pastoral Utopias, designed less to promote political change than to sug-
gest changes in individual consciousness, see Jean Pfaelzer, The Utopian Novel in
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America, 1886-1896: The Politics of Form (Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press,
1984), chapter 3. Most other critical discussions deal only briefly with the Altru-
rian Romances in the context of Howells's other writings. In this study, the
Altrurian Romances will be treated whole (as presented in the Indiana edition).
This follows Howells's expressed wish to have the two novels published together in
one volume; the inclusion of the first five "Letters" simply complements part 1 of
Through the Eye.
7. Howells, The Altrurian Romances, 30; hereafter cited in text.
8. Clara Kirk asserts that "Mr. Homos and Mr. Twelvemough are two sides
of Howells himself" (Kirk, W.D. Howells, 4); also see Jay Martin, Harvests of
Change: American Literature, 1865-1914 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1967), 228. The unusual names of the narrators have also sparked some critical
speculation. The name Twelvemough refers to duodecimo volumes used for novels
(Kirk, W.D. Howells, 4,13). And as Kirk observes about the Altrurian, "The phrase
'Aristides the Just' comes at once to the reader's mind, and also the fact that 'homos'
implies 'common man' or Man in the abstract" (Kirk, W.D. Howells, 83). Kirk fur-
ther remarks that the third narrator, Eveleth Strange, is "Eve in search of a lost
paradise, from which she had wandered into a strange world" (Kirk, W.D. Howells,
141). Aristides Homos will be referred to here by his surname as he is called in A
Traveler. Eveleth Strange Homos will be called by her given name, as she is referred
to in Through the Eye. No first name is ever given for Twelvemough.
9. Nettels, Language, Race, and Social Class, 184. Howells's response to
this contradiction, the ethical ideals of the Altrurian Romances, can be described as
a kind of Christian Socialism. Howells makes frequent reference to the Bible and
the "'ideal realized by the earliest Christians, who loved one another and who had
all things in common'" (146) as Altruria's conceptual basis. See Kirk, W.D. How-
ells, 15-33; also see Louis Budd, "Altruism Arrives in America," American Quar-
terly 8 (1956): 43-48.
10. Vanderbilt, Achievement, 108. Cf. Pfaelzer, Utopian Novel, 63, and the
identification of Howells's vision as "a recycled Jeffersonianism."
11. George Meredith, "An Essay on Comedy," in Comedy, ed. Wylie Sypher
(New York: Doubleday, 1964), 52.
12. Henri Bergson, "Laughter," in Comedy, ed. Wylie Sypher (New York:
Doubleday, 1964), 188.
13. Ibid., 73, 74. Bergson's formula of comedy is based on the idea that life
consists of a balance between "tension" and "elasticity" (72). If either is lacking, a
social response, the comic, serves as a homeostatic device. Although Bergson, like
George Meredith, focuses on the way in which comedy serves a stabilizing
function—Meredith would regard the destabilizing aspect of comedy as satire—his
attention to the way comedy "corrects" rigidity suggests the subversive aspects of
the genre. The essay "Laughter" appeared in 1900, though Bergson had published
his thoughts on the subject as early as 1884.
14. Sigmund Freud, Jokes and Their Relationship to the Unconscious, trans.
James Strachey (New York: Norton, 1963), 97. In this work, Freud's emphasis was
on unconscious motivation. Accordingly, he perceived a close relationship between
jokes and "dream-work," particularly condensation and displacement (159-80).
Jokes, like dreams, also contain a strong element of disguised wish fulfillment.
15. Ibid., 143.
16. Louis J. Budd documents how this literally occurred with the founding of
a community called Altruria near Santa Rosa, California, in 1894 (Budd, "Altru-
ism," 49-50). Howells sent money, but the community disbanded within a year. In
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addition several organizations, such as the Altruria Co-Operative Union (Oakland,
1895), the Altrurian League of New York City (1895-97), the Altrurian Society
(Boston, 1895), and the Association of Altruists (New Jersey, 1900), came into
being in the years following the publication of A Traveler.
17. The classic account of evolutionary theory in American social thinking is
Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought, rev. ed. (Boston:
Beacon, 1955). Also see Flower and Murphy, History of Philosophy, 2: 517-63;
and Schneider, History of American Philosophy, 321-415.
18. The late-nineteenth-century struggle in the United States over the disci-
pline of psychology will be treated in greater detail in the next chapter. For a de-
scription of American responses to empiricism and physiological psychology, see
Fay, American Psychology, 129-69.
19. Stanley Edgar Hyman notes that Darwin borrowed the idea of the
struggle for existence from Malthus (Stanley Edgar Hyman, The Tangled Bank:
Darwin, Marx, Frazer and Freud as Imaginative Writers [New York: Atheneum,
1962], 4). Hofstadter makes a similar observation, noting points where Darwin's
and Spencer's social ideas converge and diverge (Hofstadter, Social Darwinism,
38-39, 90-91). Also see Gillian Beer, Darwin's Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in
Darwin, George Eliot, and Nineteenth-Century Fiction (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1983).
20. Herbert Spencer, Social Statics, or the Conditions Essential to Human
Happiness Specified and the First of Them Developed (1851; reprint, New York:
Augustus M. Kelley, 1969), 412. Adaptation also had more general moral impli-
cations to Spencer: "All evil results from the non-adaptation of constitution to con-
ditions. This is true of everything that lives" (Spencer, Social Statics, 59).
21. Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Psychology, 3d ed. (New York: Apple-
ton, 1899), 1: 293-94.
22. See ibid., 1: 427-53. William James observes, however, that evolutionary
psychology, notwithstanding its supposedly materialistic analysis, demands a
primal "mind-stuff," which can then be shaped by evolutionary forces. In this way
the higher mental processes posited by Christian (and other) thinkers exist as a
possibility from the start and infuse evolutionary psychology with a supernatural
component. See James, Principles, 148-64.
23. John Fiske, Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy based on the Doctrine of
Evolution, with Criticisms on the Positive Philosophy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1892), 2: 201; hereafter cited in text as Outlines. Fiske first met Howells in 1867.
In 1871, while Howells was editor, Fiske proofread for the Atlantic Monthly; in
1872, he was asked to edit its science department. Fiske is identified as "Howells'
chief potential source of Darwinism" by Harry Hayden Clark ("The Role of Sci-
ence in the Thought of W. D. Howells," Transactions of the Wisconsin Academy
of Sciences, Arts and Letters 42 [1953]: 264).
24. In the 1872 edition of Psychology, Spencer first included a discussion of
egoistic and altruistic sentiments (Spencer, Psychology, 2: 578-626), which Fiske
adapted to his own purposes.
25. Donald Pizer notes that two main tenets of Howells's realist criticism in
Criticism and Fiction (1891) are that literature is a product of the society in which
it is found and that change in both society and literature is slowly but inevitably
progressive. Pizer further observes that when Howells was at the Atlantic (1866-
81) he "read, reviewed, or editorially supervised many works and articles on Taine
and evolution" (Donald Pizer, Realism and Naturalism in Nineteenth-Century
American Literature, rev. ed. [Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1984],
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72, 75). For a detailed account of the influence of science on Howells, see Clark,
"Role of Science"; and Jane Marston, "Evolution and Howellsian Realism in The
Undiscovered Country," American Literary Realism 14 (1981): 231-41.
26. William Dean Howells, "Recent Literature," Atlantic Monthly 33
(1874): 622.
27. WilliamDeanHowells, "JohnFiske,"Harper's Weekly20(July 1901): 732.
28. William Dean Howells, "Recent Literature," Atlantic Monthly 30
(1872): 366.
29. Howells "steered a nimble course between scientific adaptation in the
natural world, on the one hand, and the claims of moral freedom and Divine Provi-
dence on the other," according to Vanderbilt, Achievement, 85. The tension
between the two is further suggested by the novelistic counterpoint to the morally
transcendent acts in The Rise of Silas Lapham and The Minister's Charge, the
earlier A Modern Instance (1882). This novel's relatively modern tone derives in
part from its seemingly inexorable plot, in which neither effectual action nor appre-
ciable insight may be found among the main characters, but it does resemble
Howells's other writings insofar as it criticizes its characters' self-absorption. In ad-
dition, as Amy Kaplan observes, this novel, like A Hazard of New Fortunes and
The Rise of Silas Lapham, raises issues about American realism with its treatment
of the representation of culture in the mass media. See Amy Kaplan, The Social
Construction of American Realism (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1988), chap-
ters 1 and 2.
30. In Looking Backward, Bellamy also uses the family metaphor to charac-
terize the ideal country; see Thomas, Alternative America, 242-43). Despite this
similarity and the essentially Christian nature of both Utopian visions, Howells and
Bellamy differ on the important issue of human nature, which Bellamy treats as a
relatively static individualistic entity.
31. Bergson, "Laughter," 65. The joke, insofar as it temporarily promotes an
"absence of feeling" (63), serves to defuse potentially upsetting situations by indi-
rection and thereby helps to maintain social fictions. Howells himself notes this
function of laughter when he has Homos comment of another character, "In his
reply he took refuge in that humor peculiar to the Americans: a sort of ether where
they may draw breath for a moment free from the stifling despair which must fill
every true man among them when he thinks how far short of their ideal their re-
ality has fallen" (207-8).
32. See Maldwyn Allen Jones, American Immigration (Chicago: Univ. of
Chicago Press, 1960), 208.
33. Quoted in ibid., 259.
34. On working-class nativism, see Gwendolyn Mink, Old Labor and New
Immigrants in American Political Development: Union, Party and State, 1875-
1920 (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1986), 51-64. Also see Jones, American Immi-
gration, 207-77 passim, on more general nativist responses to immigration.
35. Ironically, in A Traveler Homos criticizes labor unions because they did
not involve themselves in electoral politics the way European labor organizations
traditionally did. On the issue of "American exceptionalism" from European
working-class political tendencies, see J. David Greenstone, Labor in American
Politics (New York: Knopf, 1969), 3-38; also see Herbert G. Gutman, Work, Cul-
ture and Society in Industrializing America: Essays in American Working-Class
History and Social History (New York: Knopf, 1976), 3-78; and Hubert Perrier,
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"The Socialists and the Working Class in New York, 1890-96," in American
Labor and Immigration History, 1877-1920s: Recent European Research, ed.
Dirk Hoerder (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1983).
36. Cahan had achieved renown among the Yiddish-speaking Jewish popu-
lation as editor of The Forward, a prominent Yiddish newspaper. Cahan's The
Rise of David Levinsky displays an intellectual debt to Howells even in its title.
Howells's contradictory impulses in relation to Cahan are described as a defense
of traditional American culture and a simultaneous desire to include new voices,
in Jules Chametsky, Our Decentralized Literature: Cultural Mediation in Selected
Jewish and Southern Writers (Amherst: Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 1986),
29-36. Vanderbilt offers an insightful discussion of Howells's anxiety about
immigration in which he notes the fervent anti-Semitism of Howells's friends—
Henry Adams, Charles Eliot Norton, and James Russell Lowell—and How-
ells's relative insensitivity about this issue; see Vanderbilt, Achievement 96-
126.
37. William Dean Howells, "Doorstop Acquaintance," Atlantic Monthly 23
(1869): 492.
38. William Dean Howells, "By Horse-Car to Boston," Atlantic Monthly 25
(1870): 122.
39. William Dean Howells, "A Pedestrian Tour," Atlantic Monthly 24
(1869): 595, 595, 594, 596.
40. Howells was using the conventional slang meaning of white to denote
"honourable; square-dealing" (Oxford English Dictionary, 3764). Howells's treat-
ment of miscegenation in An Imperative Duty (1891) is noteworthy here. In this
short novel, a Boston woman agonizes over the moral issue of whether to tell her
niece that the young woman had a black great-grandparent. When informed, the
young woman rejects her suitor, although she later marries him; the couple then
goes to live in Italy. Although Howells's decision to write on this topic may seem
bold, he relies on racial stereotypes and considerable melodrama. Howells also en-
couraged the African American poet Paul Laurence Dunbar, and he was a founding
member of the NAACP in 1909 (see Cady, Realist at War, 161-62). Elsa Nettels
offers a nuanced discussion of Howells's complex relationship to Paul Dunbar and
the question of his relative sensitivities and insensitivities regarding race; see Net-
tels, Language, Race, and Social Class, 80-86.
41. On the presence of Krupp in the White City, see Kirk, W.D. Howells, 112.
David Minter, in his discussion of "Chicago's Dream City," notes that in addition to
the exclusion of foreign peoples from the city itself only a single structure next to the
Children's Building was dedicated to women and that African Americans, limited to
formal recognition on a single day, were totally denied any official physical pres-
ence. See David Minter, A Cultural History of the American Novel: Henry James
to William Faulkner (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994), 23-31.
42. John Fiske, "Manifest Destiny," Harper's New Monthly Magazine 70
(1885): 578.
43. Ibid., 579.
44. Ibid., 578, 588.
45. The association between immigrants and urban industrial workers, noted
only obliquely in Homos's displeased comments about New York, has validity be-
cause in 1880, 80 percent of New Yorkers were either immigrants or children of
immigrants; see Gutman, Work, Culture and Society, 40.
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46. Yehoshua Arieli, Individualism and Nationalism in American Ideology
(Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1964), 28.
5 The Ironic Construction of Selfhood
1. Howells's solution was consistent with contemporary psychological
thought: "Historically, the 'back to Kant' movement in the latter part of the nine-
teenth century owed much to the post-Darwinian effort to save the human 'will'
from the deterministic implications of evolutionary naturalism" (William Wood-
ward, "Stretching the Limits of Psychology's History," in The Problematic Science,
ed. Woodward and Ash, 4).
2. Critics generally have treated James's writing from a thematic perspective.
For discussions that situate James in a tradition of idealistic individualism, see
Quentin Anderson, "Practical and Visionary Americans," American Scholar 45
(1976): 405-18; also see Frederick Hoffman, "William James and the Modern
Literary Consciousness," Criticism 4 (1962): 1-13. William James's thought is
evaluated from the perspective of Henry James's modernist literary experimen-
tation, in Ross Posnock, Henry James, William James, and the Challenge of Mod-
ernity (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1991). For a study that focuses on the
effects of James's ideas of consciousness on Gertrude Stein, see Lisa Ruddick,
Reading Gertrude Stein: Body, Text, Gnosis (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press,
1990); on his influence on his brother Henry, see Richard A. Hocks, Henry James
and Pragmatistic Thought (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1974).
Scholars also have explored the cultural implications of James's thought.
James is understood to offer a "humanistic understanding of experience" that can
help the individual cope with the world in Girgus, Law of the Heart, 134. Frank
Lentricchia similarly locates in James an impetus for action—"Philosophy should
be trying to change, not interpret the world"—in Ariel and the Police: Michel
Foucault, William James, Wallace Stevens, 105. Lentricchia treats The Principles
primarily to discuss the metaphor of private property in James's idea of the self.
Walter Benn Michaels also centers his discussion around this metaphor. Unfortu-
nately Michaels misidentifies the psychology of the time as "introspective"; he
resultantly pigeonholes James as "the most influential exponent of that psychol-
ogy" and elsewhere oversimplifies James's thought (e.g., "James thus imagines the
will as everywhere triumphant"); see Walter Benn Michaels, The Gold Standard
and the Logic of Naturalism: American Literature at the Turn of the Century
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1987), 241, 242.
3. James, Principles, 15; hereafter cited in text.
4. Rush himself strongly believed in the importance of environment. In an
essay published in 1786, "The Influence of Physical Causes upon the Moral Fac-
ulty," Rush stressed the physical to support the idea that insanity was treatable.
Later Common Sense psychologists, however, lacking Rush's (and James's) back-
ground in medicine, concentrated solely on mentation, without much regard for
physical factors.
5. Quoted in Fay, American Psychology, 166.
6. Quoted in ibid., 163.
7. Howard M. Feinstein, Becoming William James (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
Univ. Press, 1984), 322. Feinstein describes James's political maneuverings at Har-
vard and tells how James pressured Harvard by allowing Johns Hopkins University
to court him (332-40). This period in James's career is also treated in Sheldon
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Stern, "William James and the New Psychology," in Social Sciences at Harvard,
1860-1920, ed. Paul Buck (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1965), 175-195.
8. Unless otherwise noted, emphases are James's.
9. Jacques Barzun similarly calls The Principles "the narrative of a search";
see Jacques Barzun, A Stroll with William James (New York: Harper and Row,
1983), 34. Barzun's unfamiliarity with nineteenth-century psychology limits his
awareness of how this search operates in relation to the discipline that James
plainly is writing about. As an illustration of Barzun's unfamiliarity with the state
of the discipline at that time we may note that he calls James's use of examples
from literature "very provoking," when, in fact, the use of literary material was
utterly typical of philosophical psychology texts (Barzun, Stroll, 2). Accordingly,
Barzun concludes that the search ends less than a quarter of the way through the
book, and he ignores the structure of the remaining text.
10. The chapter on the will is followed by a supplement that treats a topic
closely related to questions of the will, hypnosis, a subject that perplexed advocates
of the free will. A general conclusion then follows.
11. In one respect, the shorter, one-volume Psychology, published in 1892,
even more closely resembles faculty psychology texts—it discusses sensation at the
start and treats the senses in the same orderly fashion as does Upham's Abridge-
ment. The shorter Psychology, though, more clearly charts a progression from
constraint, whether of mentation or of action, to freedom. It opens with his discus-
sion of habit and progresses to a treatment of voluntary behaviors and the will.
12. Kenneth Burke, "The Four Master Tropes," in A Grammar of Motives
(1945; reprint, Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1969), 503-17.
13. In its original form, this concept suggested that the neural pathway re-
mained intact so long as it was a functional response to a given stimulus. John
Dewey's 1896 discussion of the reflex arc, to be discussed later in this chapter,
broke from this dualism of stimulus and response by arguing that experience is
always mediated by mental constructs and that what had been labeled response
should properly be regarded as an attempt to act on the environment. See John
Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," in The Early Works, 1882-1898,
vol. 5, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1972),
96-109.
14. James's desire to rescue introspection from the intuitions of faculty psy-
chologists and place it at the service of an empirical psychology has led some
philosophers to align his work with that of Franz Brentano and Carl Stumpf as a
precursor to phenomenology; see Aron Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press 1964); Hans Linschoten, On the Way toward a
Phenomenological Psychology: The Psychology of William James (Pittsburgh: Du-
quesne Univ. Press, 1968); Bruce Wilshire, William James and Phenomenology: A
Study ofThe Principles of Psychology (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1968);
and Richard Stevens, James and Husserl: The Foundations of Meaning (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974). In The Principles, James, like these other psy-
chologists, regards introspection as fallible but essential to psychology; see Herbert
Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, 3d ed.
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 33-36, 62-63, 100-104.
15. William James, The Letters of William James, ed. Henry James (Boston:
Atlantic Monthly Press, 1920), 1: 147. References to this episode are a critical
commonplace; see Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William
James (Boston: Little, Brown, 1935), 1: 320-32; William Woodward, "William
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James's Psychology of Will: Its Revolutionary Impact on American Psychology," in
Explorations in the History of Psychology in the United States, ed. Josef Brozek
(Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell Univ. Press, 1984), 149; John Anderson, "The Worst
Kind of Melancholy': William James in 1869," Harvard Library Bulletin 30
(1982): 369-86; William Barrett, "Our Contemporary, William James," Com-
mentary 60.6 (1975): 59; S. P. Fullinwider, "William James's Spiritual Crisis,"
Historian 13 (1975): 39-57; and Gerald E. Myers, William James: His Life and
Thought (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1986), 45-53.
Myers defends Perry's notion of a philosophical cure by appealing to a ho-
listic vision: "James would have argued that the important consideration is not
whether a physical, psychological, or philosophical condition is a cause or a symp-
tom, but whether the whole constellation of a severe depression, which may
include elements of all these categories, can be significantly altered by improving
the philosophical condition" (Myers, William James, 46). Howard Feinstein is
more skeptical: "Perry's version provides a pleasing structure for the biography of
an important philosopher. It is a tale of rebirth typical of Christian spiritual biogra-
phy" (Feinstein, Becoming, 307-8). Feinstein also notes that the "crisis" was not
unique and that there was no concomitant change in James's health. Similar doubts
about the unique quality and importance of this episode are voiced in Daniel W.
Bjork, William James: The Center of His Vision (New York: Columbia Univ. Press,
1988), 88-90.
16. Gordon Allport has noted "the fact that the famous chapter on Habit is
not consistent with James's concept of a purposive self endowed with a selective
consciousness" (Gordon Allport, "The Productive Paradoxes of William James,"
Psychological Review 50 [1943]: 104). Dewey notes more generally the "double
strain in the Principles of Psychology. One strain is official acceptance of epistemo-
logical dualism. . . .  But James's analysis of special topics tends, on the contrary,
to reduction of the subject matter to a vanishing point" (John Dewey, "The Vanish-
ing Subject in the Psychology of James," Journal of Philosophy 37 [1940]: 589).
Dewey further remarks that this conflict is most prominent in James's discussion of
the self.
17. Coincidentally, the drainage-channel image also calls to mind the fact that
James's grandfather, William James, made his fortune in industry and land specu-
lation along the Erie Canal.
18. On Freud's use of this metaphor, see Jean Laplanche, Life and Death in
Psychoanalysis, trans. Jeffrey Mehlman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press,
1976). Laplanche ultimately criticizes Freud for sublimating empirical findings in
favor of figural consistency.
19. Charles S. Peirce, Selected Writings: Values in a Universe of Chance, ed.
Philip P. Wiener (New York: Dover, 1958), 99.
20. The second half of the chapter contains a lengthy rejection of earlier philo-
sophical schools and an outdated discussion of abnormal mental states.
21. Although James disagrees with Hume on a number of points (such as the
division of ideas into the categories of simple and complex), their shared attention
to experience is noteworthy, particularly because James persuasively refuted the
philosophy of Common Sense, which itself originated in the attempt to refute
Hume.
22. This idea is central to the structure of The Principles and to James's later
work. On the relationship between Hume's and James's thought, see Flower and
Murphy, History of Philosophy, 1: 249-51.
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23. The distinction is also a source of the questionable belief that James ulti-
mately abandoned the ideas in The Principles in favor of radical empiricism. Some
maintain that The Principles provides the basis for his later thought; for example,
see John Dewey, "William James as Empiricist," in In Commemoration of William
James, 1842-1942 (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1942), 48-57. More popu-
lar, however, especially among philosophers, is the belief that as James moved
beyond The Principles his philosophy would culminate in pragmatism and radical
empiricism; see Myers, William James, chapter 11 passim; also see Herbert Schnei-
der, "Healthy Minds with Sick Souls," in The Philosophy of William James, ed.
Walter Robert Corti (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1976), 357-77. The problem with
this latter position emerges when the essay "Does 'Consciousness' Exist?" (1904)
is examined. In this piece, later incorporated into Essays in Radical Empiricism,
James argues that upon analysis the distinction between mind and object disap-
pears from view. This is not substantially different from the ideas James advances
in "The Stream of Thought." The primary difference between these two essays is
that they are responses to different types of questions, the philosophical and the
psychological. In The Principles, James is reluctant to distinguish between the
source and objects of consciousness: "I do not wish just yet to 'commit myself
about the existence or non-existence of the ego, but I do contend that we need not
invoke it" (268). But because psychology traditionally dealt with the source of con-
sciousness, James has been inappropriately credited with too high a regard for
subjectivity.
24. With respect to the semiotic implications of James's psychology, Wood-
ward notes that James's view of language "was close to that of the hermeneutic
tradition, in which expressive movements, signs, and language became the foun-
dation for the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften). His successors, including
George Herbert Mead, Charles Morris, and Jean Piaget, attempted to add a social
meaning to James's conception of a science of language" (William Woodward, "In-
troduction," in William James, Essays in Psychology [Cambridge: Harvard Univ.
Press, 1983], xxx). By citing those who developed the explicitly social dimension
of James's thought, Woodward refutes the notion that the implications of James's
theory were necessarily individualistic.
6 Selfhood, Pragmatism, and Literary Studies
1. William James, Psychology: The Briefer Course, ed. Gordon Allport
(1961; reprint, Notre Dame, Ind.: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1985), 43. "The
Self," chapter 3 of Psychology, is a pared-down version of "The Consciousness of
Self" in the two-volume Principles of Psychology. The emphasis in the earlier,
longer work is on overturning an essentialist concept of the self; this is subordi-
nated in the later version to his discussion of the self as actor/observer (the "I") as
opposed to the self as object of study (the "me").
2. James, Psychology: The Briefer Course, 46.
3. George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a
Social Behaviorist, ed. Charles W. Morris (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1936),
138. Mead, like James, also distinguishes between the "I" and the "me" as compo-
nents of the self, but Mead's distinction is more complex than that of James. To
Mead, the "me" is more closely identified with social attitudes, whereas the "I" is
that which reacts to these attitudes. As Mead states, "The 'I' is the response of the
organism to the attitudes of others; the 'me' is the organized set of attitudes which
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one himself assumes" (175). The ultimate importance of the "I" for Mead is that it
is his name for the capacity for spontaneous action or initiative, although what
it furnishes in the name of freedom it lacks in the self-awareness available only
through the "me" phase of selfhood.
4. Ibid., 136.
5. Herbert Blumer, "Society as Symbolic Interaction," in Symbolic Interac-
tion: Perspective and Method (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), 79.
6. John R. Hall revealingly contrasts the symbolic interactionist approach
with the reliance on the idea of an objective historical matrix characteristic of the
Annales school (among others). According to Hall, from a symbolic interactionist
perspective, time is "subjectively and socially constructed, and it is meaningful
action and interaction that gives time its shape" (John R. Hall, "Social Interaction,
Culture, and Historical Studies," in Symbolic Interaction and Cultural Studies, ed.
Howard S. Becker and Michael McCall [Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1990],
19). This provides a discontinuous vision of events that does not purport to be ob-
jective but which also, insofar as it designates meaning as socially constructed,
does not simply assert that all accounts are equally valid. The great concern of
those anxious about abandoning the ideal of objectivity is thus noted by Hall. A
most impressive discussion of the ideal of objectivity and the corresponding fear of
subjectivism is offered by Richard J. Bernstein in Beyond Objectivism and Rela-
tivism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania
Press, 1985).
7. James, Psychology: The Briefer Course, 58.
8. Charles S. Peirce, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," in Selected Writings,
ed. Wiener, 121.
9. Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: Univ.
of Chicago Press, 1982), 209.
10. Tompkins, Sensational Designs, 123,124. Interestingly, one of the critics
Tompkins criticizes, Leslie Fiedler, had, like Tompkins, appreciated Uncle Tom's
Cabin as "an astonishingly various and complex book" (Fiedler, Love and Death,
264). His study of the sentimental novel was generated by his interest in the form
as a cultural artifact, however, one that finally was complicit with the hegemony of
middle-and upper-class values and did not comprise a self-consciously oppositional
form, as Tompkins insists. Some of Fiedler's criticisms of Stowe have returned to
the current debate, though, in play with Tompkins's ideas of the sentimental as
ideological critique. See, for example, Budick, Engendering Romance, 109-13.
11. Graff, Professing Literature, 173. Graff discusses the limits of explication
as pedagogy, noting that certain New Critics, such as Austin Warren and Rene
Wellek were aware that in effect the New Criticism took for granted some degree
of literary history and traditions. Elizabeth Freund, in discussing the problematic
legacy of the New Criticism, raises a difficult question and provides an equally dif-
ficult answer: "Why should a discredited critical method continue to trouble us so
persistently? Partly, no doubt (as many have said), because the academy is reluctant
to relinquish its indubitable pedagogical successes" (Elizabeth Freund, The Return
of the Reader: Reader-Response Criticism [New York: Methuen, 1987], 64). These
kinds of successes are difficult to abandon because there seems to be no alternative
but a substantial reorganization of classroom practices, a reorganization that only
begins with canon reformation. In a time when quantitative results are more
aggressively demanded by business-oriented critics of education, such a reorgan-
ization promises to inspire spirited opposition. This sort of oppositional position
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on the social functions of pedagogy and its relationship to theory is exemplified by
the introductory essay of Henry Giroux, Redrawing Educational Boundaries
(Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1990); see also the discussion of the rela-
tionship of postmodernism to teaching in Lester Faigley, Fragments of Rationality:
Postmodernity and the Subject of Composition (Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh
Press, 1992), chapter 4.
12. Richard J. Bernstein uses this phrase as a capsulized description of
Dewey's concept of the educative process (Richard J. Bernstein, "Dewey, Democ-
racy: The Task ahead of Us," in Post-Analytic Philosophy, ed. John Rajchman and
Cornel West [New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1985], 54). Bernstein also notes
the prevalent, distorted perception of Dewey's educational theory, bluntly stating,
"There is still a popular myth that Dewey, the so-called father of progressive edu-
cation, advocated a child-centered conception of education that sentimentalizes
and idealizes the child's development. This is one of the extremes he opposes" (54).
Familiarity with any of Dewey's writings on education reinforces Bernstein's cor-
rective characterization of Dewey's thought. An admirably clear description of his
educational philosophy is offered in John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New
York: Free Press, 1966).
13. Joan D. Hedrick, "'Peaceable Fruits': The Ministry of Harriet Beecher
Stowe," American Quarterly 40 (September 1988): 307.
14. Jehlen, "The Family Militant," 385.
15. Harriet Beecher Stowe, Uncle Tom's Cabin, or Life among the Lowly, in
Three Novels (New York: Library of America, 1982), 190.
16. Henry F. May, "Harriet Beecher Stowe's Oldtown Folks: An Introduc-
tion," in The Divided Heart: Essays on Protestantism and the Enlightenment in
America (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1991), 98.
17. Harriet Beecher Stowe, Pink and White Tyranny: A Society Novel (New
York: New American Library, 1988), 146; hereafter cited in text.
18. John Dewey, Individualism, Old and New, vol. 5 of The Later Works, ed.
Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1978), 49.
19. Dewey, Individualism, 76-77.
20. John Dewey, "My Pedagogic Creed," The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed.
John J. McDermott (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1973), 452.
21. Bernstein, "Dewey," 49.
22. Nancy Fraser, Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Con-
temporary Social Theory (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1989), 108.
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